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More than ever, new communication tech-
nologies contribute to the collapse of time
and space. Round-the-clock television and
radio programming in Persian is available to
diasporic communities around the world via
satellite and the internet. Print journalism is
also extensive in major urban centres.
Be hich yār mad-e khāter o be hich diyār
Ke barr-o bahr farākh ast oādami besyar
Do not dedicate yourself to any companion
and any land,
Because lands and seas are vast and human
beings numerous.
(Sa’di of Shiraz, Persian poet, 1184-1292 AD)
Quoted out of context, Sa’di’s couplet seems
to be a call for detaching oneself from com-
munity and place of birth. Later in the poem,
however, he celebrates the ties that bind
people together and asks: ‘Who will shy
away from the affection of a friend. Which
lover will turn away from the intimacy of a
b e l o v e d ? ’1 Sa’di was probably not contra-
dicting himself if we see detachment and at-
tachment not in isolation but as constituents
of a dialectical relationship.
The Iranian diaspora
o f C a n a d a
The number of Iranian immigrants in
Canada was approximately 100 in 1961 and
increased to 660 by 1970.2 According to the
1996 census figures, Persian, the official or
state language of Iran, was the ‘mother
tongue’ of 60,275 Canadians (out of a popu-
lation of 28,846,261).3 It ranked 17t h a m o n g
some 110 non-official languages of the
country (English and French being the only
official languages).
Canada is a country of the ideal ‘civic na-
tion’ system in which citizenship is not
based on relations of blood, ethnicity, lan-
guage, religion, or national origin. The over-
whelming majority of Iranian-born Canadi-
ans acquired Canadian citizenship without
rejecting their previous citizenship. Iranian
presence can already be felt in the major
urban centres. There are Iranian grocery
stores, mosques, restaurants, travel agen-
cies, driving schools, bookstores, and Per-
sian language sections in public libraries.
Persian signs can be seen in some business
q u a r t e r s .
Where is the homeland?
The following newspapers, mostly week-
lies, were published in Toronto in 2000: Ir -a n
E st -a r (Iran Star), Ir -a n - e J av -a n (Young Iran),
Iran Tribune, Ir -a n P o s t, J av -an -a n (Youth), S a-
l -a m T o r o n t o (Hello Toronto), S a rm -a y e ( C a p i-
tal), S e p id -a r (White Poplar), and S h a h r v a n d
(Citizen). All are secular, privately owned, fi-
nanced primarily through advertising in-
come, and distributed free of charge in
places frequented by the targeted reader-
ship (grocery stores, restaurants, video and
b o o k s t o r e s ) .
Browsing through these papers, one notes
immediately that the coverage of Canadian
news is minimal. Although interest in the
country of origin is to be expected in the
‘ethnic media’ of all immigrant communities,
most of the cited papers are sharply focused
on Iran. The limited space devoted to the
Canadian-Iranian community is also centred
on issues and activities related to Iran and
being Iranian.
The over-representation of Iran in the press
is matched by similar preoccupations in face-
to-face communication. Many Iranian Cana-
dians refer to the majority (i.e. the white pop-
ulation of European origin) as kh -a r e j i (i.e. for-
eigner). The word means ‘external, outer, ex-
terior, foreigner, outsider, stranger, alien’4
and has been used in Iran to refer to non-citi-
zens, especially European travellers or resi-
dents. The label is not intended to treat Euro-
Canadians as ‘foreigners’; its use indicates
deep-rooted ties – linguistic and political – to
the country of origin, Iran.
In a similar vein, the words hamvatan and
hammihan, both meaning ‘compatriots’, are
used to refer to Iranian Canadians only. The
synonyms vatan and mihan mean ‘homeland,
country, motherland, fatherland’. The word
ham means ‘also, too, likewise, even, both,
homo-, co-, con-, com-, sym-, iso-, equi-, syn-’,
and as a prefix it means ‘fellow’ as in hamkeläs
(classmate), or hamk -ar (fellow worker).5
The treatment of Iranian Canadians of
Christian faith shows a similar trend of at-
tachment to Iran. Like the papers published
in Iran, the Persian language press of Cana-
da writes: ‘We congratulate the new Christ-
ian [s -a l - e m il -a di] year to our Christian com-
patriots’ (front page headline in red, M e h r - e
Ir -a n, Toronto, Vol. 1, No. 3, January 1991).6 I n
Canada, however, the addressees of this
message continue to be Christian Iranians
rather than the entire Christian population
of Canada. The editorial of the quoted paper
ends by writing: ‘In a couple of months, the
new Iranian year [N o w r u z, March 21], too,
will arrive. And why should not we turn
every day into a day of housecleaning of our
spirit?’ – housecleaning being a practice of
preparing for the new year.
Equally noteworthy is the treatment of the
indigenous population of Canada. Since the
1 9t h century, Iranian perceptions of Canada
and the United States have been shaped by
colonialist politics and discourses. Thus
many Iranian Canadians continue to label
aboriginal peoples collectively as s o r k h p u s t
(i.e. redskin) and refer to the Inuit people of
the Arctic region as e s k i m o; these derogato-
ry labels are not used in Canada today.
Even in the civic nation of Canada, extra-
legal dynamics of inequality – racial, cultur-
al, economic, social, and political – reinforce
the attachment of new citizens to their eth-
nic, religious, racial, and national roots.7
Some Iranian Canadians use the word
g h a r i b - e (stranger) to describe themselves.
The author of a series of articles dealing
with the census data about Iranian Canadi-
ans chose the title ‘Stranger in the land of
s t r a n g e r s ’ .8 In spite of these linguistic and
discursive reproductions of the country of
origin, characteristic of the first generation,
many Iranians integrate into their new
h o m e l a n d .
Struggle for control
o f t h e d i a s p o r a
If Iranian Canadians continue to be at-
tached to their first homeland, the Islamic
state too continues to regard them as Iranian
citizens. Initially Tehran’s policy was the rejec-
tion of emigrants as ‘counter-revolutionaries’
who had betrayed both Islam and Iran. A
more tolerant approach was adopted in the
early 1990s in order to encourage their return
to Iran and to stem the exodus. Although this
policy failed, it has allowed many refugees to
travel to Iran and return again to their diaspo-
ras. It also contributed to Western govern-
ments’ adoption of policies to restrict the ad-
mission of Iranian refugees.
While Iranian exiles have established stable
diasporas in the West, the instability of the Is-
lamic state together with its policies of re-
Millions of Iranians left their country after the coming
to power of the Islamic Republic in February 1979.
Some twenty years later, the urge to leave the country
is as strong as it was in the early post-revolutionary
years. In a world that is less hospitable to refugees,
some Iranians risk their lives in search of a hostland.
For many emigrating Iranians, the hostland does not
readily turn into a new homeland. In fact, Iran is often
present, or rather reproduced, in the memory, lan-
guage, way of life, and the network of relationships
that remain in place despite physical distance.
Homeland and
H o s t l a n d
Iranian Press in Canada
Continued on page 34
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Over the last year, a heated debate about the position of Muslims in the Nether-
lands has evolved around the idea that Islam hampers the integration of Muslim
migrants and their children. It was basically argued that Islamic ideology does not
accept the separation of state and religion, and fails to confer equal rights to
women, making it unfit for a modern European society and a danger to the ideal
of multiculturalism (see Meuleman, p.33). The fierceness of the debate must have
taken most Muslims in the Netherlands by surprise. Problems that were until re-
cently explained in terms of relative poverty, or failing parental, educational and
other institutional support were now being linked to religion. In addition, debates
about the high degree of juvenile crime among Moroccans in the large cities were
now pointing to religious background as a possible cause. A Moroccan imam ex-
acerbated the debate by a homophobic remark on Dutch
television. His views were used to explain violence against
gay people by – again – some Moroccan youth gangs. How-
ever, the fact that such youths clearly frequent discos and
coffeeshops rather than mosques – thus unfamiliar with the
imam’s views – was simply ignored.
The imam’s remarks caused public outrage and within just days, gay pride had
become a national pride – naively implying that public demonstrations of homo-
sexuality are fully accepted in Dutch society. Very few pointed to the fact that the
violence against gays was not motivated by the queer-bashers’ religious beliefs,
nor was it limited to a particular ethnic group.
The discussion was complicated by various misconceptions about Islamic insti-
tutions. In particular, the position of the imam and his authority over the Muslim
community are generally construed as being greater than they actually are. This
stems from religion, albeit in a post-Christian society, still being understood in
Christian terms. Most people, including policy makers, associate mosque with
church, and imam with priest or minister. A formal, church-like structure is pro-
jected upon the Muslim communities, which inevitably fails to reflect reality.
Combined with the misapprehension of expressions of religiosity and identity
among migrants, the debate was highly erratic at times. For instance, the fact that
the great majority of youths of Muslim background are hesitant to embarrass
their parents and their community by denouncing (certain) practices and beliefs
was contrasted with the autochthonous youths’ common behaviour of openly
criticizing the beliefs of their parents or grandparents. Declaring oneself a Mus-
lim, a believer, is associated with mosque attendance and conformity with the
ideals of the imam as expressed in his preaching. The claims of many Moroccans
and Turks that their Islamic identity is important to them, even if outward signs of
religiosity seem to be absent, is confusing to many non-Muslims in the Nether-
l a n d s .
A remarkable aspect of the discussions is that the degree of ‘integratedness’ was
measured by the (post-)migrants’ stances on gay and female rights. As was previ-
ously the case in the United Kingdom, a paradoxical situation was constructed in
which people of Muslim background are asked to publicly accept the right of, for
instance, gay people to be different, while at the same time their own right to be
different is being questioned. They are pressured to denounce at least certain Is-
lamic codes and to openly criticize traditionalist or Islamist points of view. A num-
ber of intellectuals and politicians expressed their regret that
the voice of Muslim intellectuals was hardly heard in the de-
bate. Nonetheless, the events forced the Islamic community
to openly discuss the issue of homosexuality, and representa-
tives of a Gay Muslim organization (Yusuf Foundation) met
with local Muslim leaders. This summer people of Muslim
background participated in the public events that have become part of Dutch gay
culture over the last decade, like the annual Pink Saturday and the Gay Parade.
The participation in the debates of an organization of practising Muslim gays
who argue that the Qur’an and h a d i t h do not speak out against homosexuality, il-
lustrates the dynamic nature of religious discourse in the context of post-migra-
tion. Of course, this example may not be representative for the religious produc-
tion among Muslim communities in Western Europe, but it is part of the emer-
gence of local forms and adaptations of Islam in Europe. Over the last decade this
complex process has attracted increased scholarly attention. The ISIM has recent-
ly launched a project on ‘The production of Islamic knowledge in Western Eu-
rope’, in cooperation with a number of European partners (Van Bruinessen, p. 3).
The settings of new scripturalist trends in Europe occupy an important place in
this project. In this ISIM Newsletter the articles by Bava (p. 7), Jonker (p. 8) and Kehl
(p. 9) were produced to inaugurate the project. Of course, these discourses in di-
asporas are linked to the developments in the home countries and the u m m a as a
whole. Both Islamist and liberal intellectual debates in Muslim countries (Salva-
tore, p. 20; Jahanbakhsh, p. 21; Hamzawy, p. 22) impact the discourses in Europe,
although the writings of the latter are less readily available in the West and less
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The ISIM solicits your response to the ISIM Newslet-
t e r. If you wish to contribute to the ISIM Newsletter,
style sheets may be obtained upon request from
the ISIM Secretariat or on the ISIM website. In order
to offer updated information on activities concern-
ing the study of Islam and Muslim societies, along
with news on vacancies, grants, and fellowships,
the ISIM relies on its readers. The information will
be made available on the ISIM website.
The ISIM Newsletter is published three times per
year by the International Institute for the Study of
Islam in the Modern World (ISIM). Responsibility for
the facts and opinions expressed in this publication
rests solely with the authors. Their views do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute or its sup-
porters. The ISIM Newsletter is free of charge.
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E d i t o r i a l
D I C K  D O U W E S E d i t o r
ISIM Annual Lecture
Professor Barbara Metcalf will deliver this year’s
ISIM Annual Lecture on ‘Piety and Persuasion in the
Modern Islamic World’. The lecture will be held in
Amsterdam (Agnietenkapel) on 23 November 2001
at 16:00. For further information, please contact
the ISIM secretariat.
ISIM Seminar
Key Texts in the
Anthropology of
Islamic Law
In recent years, anthropologists have shown a
renewed interest in Islamic law. New themes, such
as the social life of Islamic texts and the relations
between law, gender, and property have emerged.
This interest in the anthropological study of Islamic
law calls for an attempt at a more systematic
overview of the field. This seminar aims to present
such an overview by discussing basic texts on the
anthropological study of Islamic law.
This seminar is intended for advanced M.A.
students, Ph.D. students, and faculty in the fields
o f Islamic studies, anthropology, history, and law.
T h e seminar also constitutes an introduction to
t h e ISIM workshop on ‘Current Research in the
Anthropology of Islamic Law’ to be held in April
2 0 0 2 .
D a t e s :
Fridays from 2 November to 7 December 2001
T i m e : 10:00 to 12:00
V e n u e : L e i d e n
Should you wish to attend, please contact the ISIM
secretariat. The final programme of the seminar
a s well as a list of participants will be sent to all
registered participants by 5 October 2001.
A provisional programme is available at the
following web address: 
h t t p : / / w w w . i s i m . n l / i s i m / a c t i v i t i e s / s e m i n a r . h t m l
New ISIM P h . D . F e l l o w s
Two new Ph.D. fellows joined the ISIM on 1 Sep-
tember 2001:
– Mujiburrahman (Indonesia): Muslim Christian
Relations in Indonesia (1967–1998).
Mujiburrahman aims to analyse Muslim and
Christian responses to the government policy on
(1) the Pancasila as the sole basis for all social orga-
nizations; (2) the application of Muslim personal
law and religious education in public schools; (3)
mission; and (4) interreligious dialogue. This study
is based, among other things, on documents on
government policy, writings of, and interviews
with, Muslim and Christian intellectuals and
preachers, and newspapers and magazines.
– Joska Samuli Schielke (Finland): Mawlid Festivals
in Egypt: A Study on the Description, Assessment, and
Categorization of a Controversial Tradition.
Throughout the 20t h century, m a w l i d f e s t i v a l s
have represented an epistemic as well as ideologi-
cal challenge to Islamic reformist and modernist
thought. Samuli Schielke intends to analyse the
rhetorical conventions, central assumptions, histor-
ical roots, and popular reception of this controver-
sy on m a w l i ds in contemporary Egypt. Based on
written sources and interviews, this study can pro-
vide important insight into the nature, common-
places, and reception of cultural criticism in mod-
ern Islamic societies.
ISIM Publications
The ISIM has launched its ISIM Papers Series with
the publication of Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral
Principle in the Middle East, by James Piscatori, and
Thinking about Secularism and Law in Egypt, by Talal
Asad. The third of this series, John Bowen’s S h a r ica,
State and Social Norms in France and Indonesia, is
forthcoming. The ISIM has also published the inau-
gural lecture for the ISIM Chair at Leiden University
by Muhammad Khalid Masud: Muslim Jurists’ Quest
for the Normative Basis of S h a rica.
These publications are available at the ISIM and
can be ordered through the ISIM secretariat.
ISIM Fellowships
The ISIM invites applications and research propos-
als for various programmes. Applications from can-
didates in the social sciences, humanities, and reli-
gious studies will be considered. Applicants should
be competent in academic English. The ISIM fellow-
ships and their respective application deadlines in-
clude the following:
– Ph.D. fellowships
(1 March 2002 and 1 September 2002)
– Post-doctoral fellowships 
(1 March 2002 and 1 September 2002)
– Visiting fellowships
(1 March 2002 and 1 September 2002)
– Sabbatical fellowships 
(1 March 2002 and 1 September 2002)
For more information on the various fellowships,
p l e a s e consult the ISIM website: 
h t t p : / / w w w . i s i m . n l / i s i m / f e l l o w s h i p s /
Application forms may be downloaded from the website
o r obtained upon request from the ISIM secretariat.
ISIM Senior Fellows
From September 2001, Michael Gilsenan (until De-
cember 2001) and Rudolph Peters (until February
2002) will join the ISIM as senior fellows with a
view to furthering their current research:
– Michael Gilsenan (Department of Middle Eastern
Studies, New York) is working on Hadhrami fami-
lies’ links around the Indian Ocean in the colonial
and post-colonial periods. This research includes
following a particular family from South Yemen to
countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, India and
areas of East Africa, so as to establish individual tra-
jectories and networks.
– Rudolph Peters (University of Amsterdam) is writ-
ing a volume on Islamic criminal law (ICL) as part of
a seven-volume series edited by Wael Hallaq
(McGill University) to be published by Cambridge
University Press. Apart from a survey of doctrine of
the f i q h, this project includes an analysis of the en-
forcement of ICL in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt
and the present-day relevance of ICL, particularly
its reintroduction in various Muslim countries.
A N N O U N C E M E N T S
Re sea rc h Pr o gr a mme
M A RT I N  V A N  B R U I N E S S E N
The ISIM is setting up a research programme on ‘The
Production of Islamic Knowledge in Western Europe’,
coordinated by Professor Martin van Bruinessen in
cooperation with Dr Nico Landman of Utrecht Uni-
versity. The ISIM has organized a series of lectures
(summer 2001 and forthcoming in autumn 2001) on
the state of the art in this research area – to be pub-
lished either in the ISIM Newsletter or separately as
ISIM Papers. An annotated bibliography prepared
through the concerted efforts of the ISIM, CNRS-
Strasbourg, the University of Louvain-la-Neuve and
other institutions, will soon be made available on-




In order to develop comparative research
on the production of Islamic knowledge, co-
operation with other research institutes in
Europe is actively being sought. The I S I M
N e w s l e t t e r and website are made available
for communication between researchers in
this field. The ISIM especially invites applica-
tions for Ph.D. and post-doctoral research
grants that fit within the programme. Appli-
cations are reviewed by the selection com-
mittee in October and March (see the web-
site for further details).
Local versus ‘universal’ Islam
In all parts of the globe where it has taken
root, Islam has developed local forms. This is
not uniquely due to the retention of local
pre-Islamic practices, which may gradually
be purged by reform movements. Different
regions may have their distinctive practices,
the various Islamic institutions may play dif-
ferent roles, education and adjudication may
be organized differently, and the interaction
between the u l a m a and the state may pro-
ceed according to different patterns. Even
within ‘scripturalist’ Islam, there is an undeni-
able regional variation, notwithstanding the
claims of certain Western scholars as well as
Muslim fundamentalists.
The Muslim communities of Western Eu-
rope constitute – with the exception of a rel-
atively small number of European converts
– diasporic communities, maintaining vari-
ous types of links with their countries of ori-
gin and with similar communities in other
countries. The social, economic and political
situation of these communities differs sig-
nificantly from that of co-religionists in their
home countries. In daily life they encounter
a whole range of new and different prob-
lems that demand an Islamic answer. The
various ‘host’ countries provide different
constraints and possibilities for the devel-
opment of Muslim institutions, Islamic
thought and Islamic practices. Inevitably Eu-
ropean forms of Islam will develop, ground-
ed in locally acquired knowledge of Islam.
Initially the sources for most of this knowl-
edge were located elsewhere, either in the
home countries of the Muslim immigrant
communities or in other Muslim countries
or transnational networks claiming to repre-
sent a purer, universal interpretation of
Islam. Among the mediators we find imams,
teachers and preachers visiting Western Eu-
rope, and u l a m a, intellectuals and journal-
ists in the ‘home’ countries reaching out to
the immigrant communities by mail and
through print and electronic media. Sec-
ond- and third-generation immigrants,
however, tend to understand the language
of the country of residence better than the
languages of their parents or grandparents.
The gradual shift from Turkish, Arabic, Urdu,
or Malay to English and other European lan-
guages as vehicles of Islamic discourse is
likely to be reflected in changing patterns of
religious authority as well as considerable
changes in the discourses themselves.
During the last few decades, Muslims in Eu-
rope have produced a considerable amount
of material on Islam in the forms of media
(from newsletters to the internet). There is a
multiplicity of voices, not only due to a variety
of origins (different home countries as well as
different currents within, for example, Turkish
Islam) and variations in the legal and cultural
contexts in the countries of residence, but
also to complex patterns of social interaction.
Although Turkish, Moroccan and Pakistani
Muslims interact for the most part with Mus-
lims of the same national origins, there is an
increasing number of Muslim spokespersons
and thinkers whose authority transcends eth-
nic and national boundaries. Terms such as
‘Turkish Islam’ or ‘Moroccan Islam’ do as little
justice to the complexity of the developing
discourses as ‘Dutch Islam’ or ‘French Islam’.
The production of local
k n o w l e d g e
There are several interesting aspects to the
processes under consideration that call for
serious study. One of these concerns the
production of local knowledge – a process
that inevitably occurred wherever Islam was
established outside its original heartlands.
Islam emerged in a specific cultural and his-
torical context of Arabia. When it spread to
other societies and cultures, it underwent a
dual process of u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n and l o c a l i z a-
t i o n. In order to adapt it to local contexts, the
producers (and brokers) of Islamic knowl-
edge had to first decide which elements of
Islam as it existed in the original context
were specifically Arabian and could be dis-
carded, while retaining those elements that
were considered essential and non-nego-
tiable. This could be called the process of
u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n, the separation of what was
considered universal in the Islamic message
from what was contingent. The second step,
that of l o c a l i z a t i o n, meant adapting the uni-
versalized message to local customs and
needs. This process of production of local Is-
lamic knowledge continues as local tradi-
tions of Islamic knowledge develop.
The Muslim migrants who came to West-
ern Europe brought Islam with them in
many different local forms, including local-
ized popular religious practices and local-
ized references to scriptural authority. They
too have to decide which aspects are nego-
tiable and which have to be retained intact.
Islamic knowledge in Western Europe is pro-
duced on the basis of ‘universalized’ ver-
sions of the local Islamic knowledge of the
home countries and other prestigious cen-
tres. It is this process of abstraction as well
as the process of adaptation of discourse to
local conditions that constitute the focus of
the present research programme.
Individual research projects within the
programme may concentrate on the follow-
ing aspects:
– The development of European Muslim dis-
courses: projects may range from an analysis
of sermons or fatwas specifically issued at the
request of Muslims in Europe, to debates in
Muslim media or public controversies con-
cerning Islam.
– The contexts within which Islamic knowledge
is being produced: comparative analysis of the
ways in which local contexts condition the
production of Islamic knowledge. European
countries have different policies concerning
Islamic education, the admission of imams
and preachers, Muslim media, associations of
Muslims, etc., and different conceptions of
the degree to which Muslim immigrants are
expected to integrate and assimilate them-
selves.
– Islamic institutions: a third important per-
spective is that of the institutions in and by
which Islamic knowledge is being produced
or reproduced. These obviously include the
mosque and Qur’an courses and institutes of
formal or informal Islamic education, but also
state schools. Muslim associations, broadcast-
ing corporations and other media, and em-
bassies of Muslim countries are to be consid-
ered. Since istifta, the requesting of an au-
thoritative opinion, is such a central process
in the development of Islamic knowledge
everywhere, special attention should be paid
to the various institutions that issue fatwas
(including the electronic media).
– The establishment of religious authority: Who
are considered as authorities whose counsel
is heeded, and why? How do they establish
their authority, and what are the means by
which they attempt to consolidate it? Is a shift
occurring from dependence on authorities in
the countries of origin to reliance on authori-
ties based in Western Europe? Mosque imams
appear to be far more influential in the dias-
pora than in the home countries, at least in
part because of the pastoral role and authori-
ty attributed to them by local governments
and other institutions, and in part because of
the different functions the mosque fulfils in
the diaspora. What strategies are used to es-
tablish or to de-legitimatize the authority of
certain imams? How and by whom can their
authority be overruled? How authoritative are
the Muslim thinkers who publish books and
articles in European languages, and how in-
fluential are their writings?
– Transnationalism: another important per-
spective is the transnational dimension of the
processes concerned. It is useful to distin-
guish the transnational relations of migrant
communities and their homeland from those
amongst migrants of the same cultural back-
ground living in various European countries,
and even from the relations transcending
ethnic or national boundaries as well as state
boundaries.
States such as Turkey and Morocco are
making great efforts to keep their (former)
subjects under control, and they are actively
promoting their respective official versions of
Islam among the European Muslim communi-
ties. Oppositional religious movements from
these countries use the relative freedom of
Western Europe to spread dissenting mes-
sages among the migrant communities in
various European countries in the hope of
using these as a stepping stone for political
action at home. A wide variety of dacwa
movements, from the puritan and fundamen-
talist to the tasawwuf oriented, are propagat-
ing rival versions of allegedly universal Islam-
ic messages to audiences irrespective of eth-
nicity and nationality.
– The ethnic dimension: the major fault lines
cutting through the Muslim communities in
Western Europe are those of country of origin
and ethnicity. (These two factors should not
be superimposed, as the examples of Turkish-
Kurdish relations and Arab-Berber relations
indicate.) One would expect these factors to
gradually decline in importance. Associations,
networks and authority figures that attract
members and followers across ethnic and na-
tional boundaries deserve special attention,
for this is where European forms of Islam are
likely to emerge.
– The new media: these and some of the
‘older’ media as well play a crucial part in the
production of Islamic knowledge in Europe.
Due attention should therefore be paid to the
role of print and electronic media in produc-
ing Islamic knowledge. It is also important to
discover to what extent the new media usher
in new types and modalities of communica-
tion, and what this means for the contents of
communication. Materials to be studied in-
clude fatwas and sermons (in all forms of
media), discussion lists, chat boxes and web-
sites on the internet, films or television pro-
grammes with religious themes, popular nov-
els, soap operas and documentaries.
– Production, reception and reproduction of Is-
lamic knowledge in Western Europe: the pro-
duction of new Islamic discourses is only rele-
vant insofar as these discourses also find ac-
ceptance by the Muslim communities in Eu-
rope. The reception of Islamic knowledge is a
subject deserving serious research in itself.
What does the second generation of Muslim
immigrants learn about Islam, and what do
the European converts learn? Where and how
do they seek knowledge, which questions do
they ask, and what answers do they find?
– Islam as the living praxis of Muslims: in-
evitably new practices are developing among
Muslims in Western Europe in the fields of
marriage and the family, economic enter-
prise, inter-religious relations, political em-
powerment, social security, and the relations
with the state. Insofar as those concerned be-
lieve that these practices are in some sense Is-
lamic or part of a Muslim culture with which
they identify, they represent a practical
knowledge of Islam, even though some of
these practices may be at odds with scrip-
turalist Islam as defined by the ulama.
ISIMI S I M  N E W S L E T T E R 8 / 0 1 3
For further information, please contact the ISIM
secretariat or consult the ISIM website: 
h t t p : / / w w w . i s i m . n l / i s i m / r e s e a r c h /
p r o g r a m m e s / I s l a m k n o w l e d g e . h t m
This issue of the ISIM Newsletter contains a special sec-
tion, ‘Features’, which deals specifically with the pro-
duction of Islamic knowledge in Western Europe. Bava
(p.7), Jonker (p.8) and Kehl (p.9) offer additional insight
into this dynamic field of research.
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Religion, Media 
and the Public Sphere
Taking as a point of departure that the na-
tion-state no longer features as the privi-
leged space for the imagination of identity,
scholars have paid much attention to the
crucial role that electronic media play in the
imagination and constitution of new links
between people and the emergence of new
arenas of public debate.
If the nexus of media and the nation-state
stood central in recent debates, the role of
religion in the transformation of the public
sphere has received much less attention. The
decline of religion in the public sphere has
been taken for granted as an intrinsic feature
of modernity. The limitations of this stance
came to the fore, of course, with the global
rise of religious movements such as political
Islam, Hindu nationalism and Pentecostal-
ism. Driven by their will to make sense of the
marked articulation of religious movements
in, and their contribution to, the transforma-
tion of state-society relationships in post-
colonial contexts, anthropologists and other
social scientists recently have ventured into
an empirical study of these dynamics.
The central issue to be addressed during
this conference pertains to transformations
in the public sphere, and the ways in which
these relate to the proliferation of media and
the liberalization of media policies, the up-
surge of religion, and the crisis of the post-
colonial state. Important in this context is
the question of the usefulness and limits of
the notion of the public sphere: How can this
notion be made productive for a better un-
derstanding of the dynamics of the complex
relationships between media, religion and
the state? Topics to be discussed include the
role of media and religion in transforming
the public sphere, the changes which reli-
gious organizations and individual experi-
ences undergo through processes of mass
mediation, and the ways in which different
forms of mass mediation impact debates
about the public-private relation.
For additional information, please contact the ISIM
secretariat or see the ISIM website:
h t t p : / / i s i m . n l / i s i m / a c t i v i t i e s / s e m i n a r s c o n f . h t m l
From 6 to 8 December 2001 the ISIM, together with
the Research Centre Religion and Society, will hold an
international conference on ‘Religion, Media and the
Public Sphere’ at the University of Amsterdam. Since
the 1990s, three themes have featured prominently in
debates in the social sciences and cultural studies: the
crisis of the post-colonial nation-state, the increasing
global accessibility and proliferation of electronic
media, and the rise of religious movements.
For more information, please contact the ISIM
s e c r e t a r i a t .
h t t p : / / i s i m . n l / i s i m / a c t i v i t i e s / s e m i n a r s c o n f . h t m l
Wo r ksho p Anno unc ement
From 9 to 11 November 2001 the ISIM will hold a
workshop on ‘Islam, Women’s Rights and Islamic
Feminism: Making Connections between Different
Perspectives’. Some consider ‘Islamic’ and ‘feminist’
perspectives as mutually exclusive or deny the need
for an Islamic feminism with the argument that Islam
as it is has already given women all their rights. An
investigation of women’s activism in Muslim soci-
eties through the prism of ‘Islamic feminism’ takes a
different point of departure.
Islam, Women’s Rights 
and Islamic Feminism
Rather than contrasting these terms, it
points to the possibility of connecting per-
spectives grounded in feminism and Islam.
Yet, simultaneously, it also brings to the fore
that such a linkage does not come about au-
tomatically. Being involved in politics, Is-
lamist women need to take a position v i s - à -
v i s state policy and oppositional move-
ments. Arguing in terms of Islamic concepts,
they engage in debates with those claiming
positions of religious authority. Debating
gender, Islamist women activists relate to
women’s daily-lived realities.
For this workshop a number of women
scholars and activists have been invited who
may describe themselves as Islamic femi-
nists, as Islamic scholars adopting a women’s
perspective, or as women’s rights activists in
Muslim societies. Three sets of questions
have been proposed as topics for debate.
First, how does Islamic feminism relate to
women’s daily lives? What has been the im-
pact of changes in women’s position, such as
women’s growing access to education and
formal employment, for the development of
Islamic feminism? How do Islamic feminists
deal with the possible tensions between f i q h
and family law on the one hand and
women’s changed lifestyles and realities on
the other? Secondly, what is the impact of
specific relations between Islam and the
state on women’s activism? What are the ef-
fects of the fact that Iran has had an Islamic
revolution in terms of enabling or disabling
particular forms of women’s activism, and
what has been the impact of the shift from
revolutionary fervour to reformism for de-
velopments in Islamic feminism? Similarly,
what are the effects of Islamism being an op-
positional movement in most other Muslim
countries (and its transformations through
time) for Islamic women’s activism? In what
ways may Islamic feminism be considered a
transformative force that impacts political
movements and structures of religious au-
thority? Thirdly, how has globalization, both
in the form of movements of people and im-
ages, impacted Islamic women’s activism?
Have international links of Islamic move-
ments also created a particular space for
women activists, and if so what have been
the effects? How have Islamist women en-
gaged with possibilities for international
networking and in which ways have they
dealt with the proliferation of means of com-
munication and the development of new
m e d i a ?
Fo r um o f Soc i a l R esea r c h
MA R E I K E  J U L E  W I N K E L M AN N
The papers that were presented and dis-
cussed during the two-day workshop ad-
dressed the theme of female Muslim identity
from various angles. The main focus of the
first day was religion and the challenge of
modernity. Within this framework Margrit
Pernau (Delhi) drew a fascinating comparison
between the Muslim community in India and
the Catholic milieu in 19th-century Germany.
This comparison raised the question of how
pious women, and their influence on the re-
spective communities, could be viewed as an
answer to the emergence of modernity in ei-
ther (Indian or German) context. At the same
time, by drawing this comparison between
Germany and India, emphasis was also laid on
the not so radical otherness of the Muslim
community in India, as very similar develop-
ments appeared to have taken place in the
German Catholic church at that time. Hodah
Salah (Mainz) then brought into view the
women activists of the Islamist movements in
Egypt. She argued that the discourse and
daily lives of the women she interviewed re-
flected their empowerment through Islam, as
they negotiate and re-define the traditional
role models. Wiebke Ernst (Constance) pre-
sented the final paper of the day, shedding
light on the very particular situation of the
Xinjiang Muslims in China as a Muslim com-
munity that many would define as peripheral
in terms of their cultural and geographical
context.
The morning sessions of the second day
were dedicated to education and the chal-
lenge of public representation. Linda Herrera
(Oxford) presented her findings with a view to
Islamic and secular education of Muslim girls
in Egypt (see also ISIM Newsletter, 6, p. 1),
showing how crucial the veil, and even more
so ‘downveiling’ are as indicators of the con-
stant struggle of women to gain greater free-
dom within the public space in Egypt. Follow-
ing the author’s paper on the emergence of
Muslim women’s education in late 19th-centu-
ry India, Daniella Kuzmanovic (Copenhagen)
introduced the cultivation of bodily ideals
among female students in Turkey. The issue
of body weight and the ways in which young
Turkish women regulate their weight initiat-
ed a discussion about self and other, as the
physical ideal these young women strive for is
influenced by the (Western) media and by
ideas of the self that are linked with upward
social mobility.
The afternoon sessions dealt with the chal-
lenges and strategies of incorporation of
Muslim immigrants in Germany. Kirsten
Wiese (Berlin) tackled this issue from the legal
perspective. She showed what the possible
outcomes of the debate on the wearing of
headscarves by teachers in German schools
could lead to. Schirin Amir-Moazami (Flo-
rence) presented some of the data gathered
during interviews with young Muslim women
in Germany, and Berlin in particular. In these
interviews she asked when and why young
Muslim women begin donning the headscarf,
and in how far their form of veiling differs
those from that of the earlier generations of
their mothers and grandmothers. Finally,
Sigrid Nökel (Bielefeld) discussed the con-
struction of female Muslim identity in Ger-
many. The life stories she presented focused
on how this particular identity is shaped by
the affirmation of the self as well as through
public policy in Germany.
One of the recurring topics of discussion
was the tension between tradition and
modernity, as it became evident that even if a
certain group of actors within a particular
context makes a claim to tradition, the mean-
ing attached to such (re)interpretations
might actually represent a break with tradi-
tion. A second recurring topic was the plurali-
ty of meanings, interpretations, and identi-
ties, some of which the programme and par-
ticipants in the workshop themselves reflect,
but also with regard to the geographical
spread of the topics chosen by the partici-
pants. The aims of the workshop, namely to
sketch a differentiated picture of the complex
forms and constructions of female identity in
modern Muslim societies, which is a picture
that displays antithetical dichotomies, and
the attempt to scrutinize common stereo-
types, were therefore accomplished.
The workshop was supported by the
‘Anreizprogramm’ in cooperation with Forum of
Social Research: http://www.socialresearch.de
The Construction of Female
Identity in Muslim ModernityOn 29 and 30 June 2001 nine young female scholars
met at the University of Constance (Germany) to dis-
cuss how female identity is constructed in various
contemporary Muslim societies, and what constitutes
this female Muslim identity. Sponsored by a special
university programme aimed at the encouragement
of academic research by women (Anreizsystem zur
Frauenförderung) and in cooperation with the Forum
of Social Research (www.socialresearch.de), Schirin
Amir-Moazami (Department of Political and Social
Sciences, Florence) and Wiebke Ernst (Department of
History and Sociology, Constance) organized the
workshop to give a panel of young scholars the op-
portunity to discuss their respective research pro-
jects with a view to this topic.
Mareike Jule Winkelmann is a Ph.D. candidate at
t h eI S I M .
E-mail: mjwinkelmann@hotmail.com
C O N F E R E N C E R E P O R T
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Wo r ksho p Rep o rt
The workshop on ‘Family, State, and Civil Society in
Islamic Communities: Legal and Sociological Per-
spectives’, held in Florence, Italy, from 21 to 25
March 2001, was a follow-up of a previous workshop
held in Berlin (see ISIM Newsletter, 6, p. 3). Both com-
prise part of a series of meetings, organized by the
ISIM and the AKMI, which is devoted to relations be-
tween family, state and civil society in Islamic com-
munities in the Islamic world and Europe. The ‘Fami-
ly, State, and Civil Society’ workshop was hosted by
the Robert Schuman Centre at the European Univer-
sity Institute in Florence as part of the 2n d M e d i t e r-
ranean Social and Political Research Meeting. T h e
workshop directors were Abdullahi A. A n - N aci m
(Emory University, Atlanta, Visiting Professor at
ISIM) and Laila al-Zwaini (ISIM). Muhammad Khalid
Masud opened the workshop.
Family, State, and Civil  Society 
in Islamic Communities
www.law.emory.edu.ifl), and as such aims at
clarifying the basic concepts, actors and
processes of improving respect for human
rights in this field, in addition to beginning
to develop the contacts and resources need-
ed for the practical implementation of the
project. The ISIM/AKMI workshops on Family
Law now constitute a forum of scholars from
various disciplines together with practition-
ers, all of whom are involved in the latest de-
velopments in the reformulation of family
law, the negotiation processes between
state and civil society, the implementation
of family law cases in courts, and informal
practices of solving family matters, with spe-
cial emphasis on the position and rights of
women and children.
The workshop was subdivided into three
themes. The first was ‘The anatomy and in-
ternal dynamics of family, state, and civil so-
ciety’, devoted to outlining a comparative-
theoretical framework of the three key con-
cepts (family, state, civil society) with regard
to their nature, context, and transformation
in a local and global setting. The second
theme, ‘Tripartite interaction between fami-
ly, state, and civil society’, involved an analy-
sis of the power relations, actors, determina-
tion and implementation of social policy,
and dynamics of processes between the
three ‘social fields’. On the basis of a com-
bined scholarly-practitioner’s methodology,
the last theme, ‘Strategies for an internalized
human rights approach to family relations’,
was aimed at drafting a frame of reference
and strategy for the implementation of an
internalized human rights approach to fami-
ly relations in Islamic communities today, re-
garding issues such as equality and autono-
my for women, protection of women against
domestic violence, and children’s rights.
Papers presented:
– A n - N acim, Abdullahi A. (Emory University,
Atlanta) & al-Zwaini, Laila (ISIM), Rights at
Home: An Approach to the Internalization
of Human Rights in Family Relations in
Islamic Communities
– Bargach, Jamila (Ecole Nationale
d’Architecture, Rabat), A b a n d o n e d
Children as a Human Rights Issue
– Buskens, Léon (Leiden University),
Debates on the Reform of the Moroccan
Code of Personal Status
– Fawzi al-Ghamri, Mohammed Essam
(Alternative Development Studies Center,
Cairo), Family Law in Egypt: Current
Situation and Prospects of Further
D e v e l o p m e n t ( p a p e r presented by Ivesa
Luebben, Berlin)
– Hamzawy, Amr (Free University of Berlin),
The Arab Discussion on Civil Society:
Between the Search for a New Paradigm of
Democratisation and the Controversy on
the Political Role of Religion
– Moors, Annelies (ISIM), Debating the
Family: On Marriage, Materiality and
M o d e r n i t y
– Murshid, Tazeen M. (Brussels), V i o l e n c e
Against Women: Sexual Misdemeanours,
Village Shalish and Shariah Courts in Post-
Colonial South Asia
– Rutten, Susan W.E. (University of
Maastricht), Islamic Family Law in Europe
– Schulz, Dorothea (Free University of
Berlin), New Muslim Movements and the
Struggle over the Reform of Family Law in
Democratic Mali
– Welchman, Lynn (CIMEL/SOAS, London),
Staking out the Territory: Family Law
Debates in Transitional Palestine
– Wuerth, Anna (Human Rights Watch,
W a s h i n g t o n ) , The State, Activism and
Social Class: Family Law Reform in Post-
Unification Yemen
A full report of the workshop has been
drawn up by Nahda Y. Sh’hada (Internation-
al Institute of Social Studies, The Hague) and
will be published by ZED Publications, Lon-
don. Apart from the contents of the papers,
the publication will include a detailed ac-
count of the discussion, demonstrating the
difficulty for an observer to distinguish dur-
ing the debates whether activism or acade-
micism was being voiced. The enthusiasm
and devotion of the participants, the chal-
lenging realities they revealed, and the rig-
orous analyses they advanced, highlighted
the fact that activism is a necessary conjunct
to academia in this particular field. The par-
ticipants were aware of the complexity of
the subject matter, which prompted them
to address new theoretical and method-
ological issues. With respect to issues such
as the negotiation processes between state
and civil society, the implementation of
family law cases in courts, and informal
practices of solving family matters, the dis-
cussion moved forward the analytical
frames of the papers discussed. At another
level, the workshop demonstrated a notice-
able advancement in analysing the con-
cepts used. It concerned changes in the
broader context and conditions under
which the discussion is frequently conduct-
ed – in other words, the workshop did not
view the family, the state and civil society as
predefined given units.
The third meeting of this series will con-
vene in January 2002 in Morocco. Further
details on this meeting will be made avail-
able on the ISIM website.
Family law constitutes – next to penal law –
the most controversial area of law in the
modern Islamic world. Considering the
salience of this topic, relatively little has
been published in this field in Western lan-
guages. Comparative literature on family law
developments, both in legislative texts and
as applied by Islamic and secular courts, is
scant. Furthermore, law in general – family
law being no exception – is often left to stu-
dents of law, and is thus not usually subject
to social science approaches. With this in
mind, the first ISIM/AKMI workshop on Is-
lamic family law, entitled ‘Family and Family
Law in Asia and the Middle East’, was aimed
at creating a network of scholars currently
based in Europe, who employ social science
methodologies in the study of family law, its
historical and regional developments and its
interpretation by the courts.
The ‘Family, State, and Civil Society’ work-
shop proceeded towards a scholarly-practi-
tioner’s approach to the subject, with partic-
ipants both from the West and from various
Islamic communities. The workshop also
forms the overture to the second phase of
the Islamic Family Law (IFL) Project (see also:
Semi nar  R ep or t
K A R E N  W I L L E MS E
From 18 to 20 April 2001 a number of scholars from
Africa, Europe and the United States convened at the
ISIM to present papers for the seminar on ‘Muslim
Communities, Globalization, and Identities in Africa’.
The event ended an ISIM atelier that had commenced
in February 2001 with four scholars: José van Santen
(Leiden), Karin Willemse (Rotterdam), Cheikh Guèye
(Dakar) and Shamil Jeppie (Cape Town).*
Muslim Communities, 
Globalization, and Identities in Africa
During the week-long meeting of the atelier
in February, the four-member working
group discussed various theoretical and
methodological questions that could fur-
ther enrich their own study of Muslim com-
munities in Africa. This resulted in an ex-
change of ideas and debates on the uses of
self-reflexivity (while also being self-reflex-
ive), the role of memory, transnationalism
and the meanings of space, and new ways
of presenting academic research. The di-
verse regional and disciplinary orientations
of the individual members enabled discus-
sions that were both revealing and animat-
e d .
From this first week together the group
arrived at four themes that they considered
to serve as a basis for the subsequent semi-
nar with a larger group of scholars. The
themes were as follows: spatial and imagi-
nary frontiers, the public sphere, identities,
and texts and/in contexts. These were ad-
dressed in terms of current processes of
globalization, the latter term being prob-
lematized as well. Within each theme a
number of more detailed issues were enu-
merated. To address these issues invitations
were sent out to an international panel of
speakers for the April seminar.
Given the limited time – from the end of
February to the middle of April – in which the
seminar was to be organized, it still managed
to bring together a distinguished selection of
both younger and senior scholars. Under the
theme of the ‘public sphere’ speakers ad-
dressed, for example, the place of African Is-
lamic scholarship (O’Fahey, Northwestern/-
Bergen) or attempted a phenomenological
reading of Islam in Senegal (Oumar Sy, Dakar).
Hussein Ahmed (Addis Ababa) delivered a
paper which looked at the development of
the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs in
Ethiopia. The lives of women students at the
University of Ngaoundere were presented
through the medium of film by Habi (Tromso).
Film was the medium for three presenta-
tions during the seminar. In the session under
the theme of ‘identities’ a video on the Baye
Fall sect within the Mouride tariqa in Senegal
was shown by Tshikala Biaya (Addis Ababa).
This theme was also more or less directly ad-
dressed in the papers of three other speakers.
Karim Dahou (ENDA-Dakar) compared re-
formism and Islam-state relations in Algeria,
Senegal and Nigeria, while Nafissatou Tall
(Nouakchott-Mauritania) focused on Qur’anic
texts favouring the position of women in
Islam. Adeline Masquelier (New Orleans)
analysed the impact of the arrival of a new
‘preacher’, Malam Awal, in a small town in
Niger.
Under the theme of ‘texts and/in contexts’
there was an analysis and performance of So-
mali women’s poetry in colonial and post-
colonial contexts (Lidwien Kapteijns, Welles-
ley College) and a compelling film about a
Muslim capitalist in Cameroun (produced by
Lisbet Holtedahl, Tromso/Ngaoundere).
The papers under the theme of ‘spatial and
imaginary frontiers’ dealt largely with the re-
cent history and impact of the Mouride tariqa
(Cheikh Babou, Michigan) in its place of ori-
gin, Senegal, and beyond in places like Mar-
seille, Tenerife, and New York. Papers dealt
with the role of Mouride women traders (Eva
Rosander, Uppsala), innovative ways of mak-
ing financial transfers between countries by
members of the tariqa (Mansour Tall, Dakar),
and the transformation of religious practice in
the context of migration (Sophie Bava, EHESS,
Marseille). Gendered frontiers were consid-
ered in the case of the relations between mas-
ter and disciple in the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya
tariqas in Mauritania (Abdel Wedoud Ould
Cheikh, Metz/Nouakchott). The concluding
paper was presented by Ousmane Kane
(Yale/St Louis, Senegal), who addressed the
question of the relations between tariqas and
the state in West Africa. He examined the long
history of relations between these formations
and showed how important the tariqas have
been for the state, especially in Senegal, while
also pointing out that several tariqas with
West African origins have found roots in the
United States. He ended with a plea for more
studies on reformism and African Muslim
communities, and asked a more general
question about the discourses in which Islam
in Africa is conceived. The language of analy-
sis needs to more closely reflect the realities
of the actors, Kane argued.
The seminar produced a great deal of in-
sight into modern African Muslim communi-
ties. It also exposed the areas that are in need
of more research. Both the atelier and the
seminar, however, were exploratory and cre-
ated opportunities for discussion about the
state of the field. Future research activities of
the ISIM will certainly include a focus on
Africa.
N o t e
* See the ISIM website and ISIM Newsletter, 6, p.6
f o r an outline of the atelier.
This report was jointly produced by Karen Willemse,
Shamil Jeppie, José van Santen, and Cheikh Guèye.
Karen Willemse is lecturer of the History of African
Societies / Islamic Processes at the Erasmus
University Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
E-mail: k.willemse@fhk.eur.nl
In January 2000, a trip was made to Tanzania to make
an inventory of the locally produced Islamic literature.
Through the financial support of ISIM, 500 titles were
collected for the ISIM library. In October 2000, a 6-
month fieldwork period was embarked upon, which al-
lowed for the gathering of another 700 books, pam-
phlets, newspapers, magazines and ephemera in Tan-
zania and Kenya. In both countries some 30 bookshops
(excluding the street vendors) were visited in 10 urban
centres. The items in the collection are written in
Swahili (approximately 50%), Arabic (30%) and English
(20%). Apart from Gujarati and Urdu, which are sparse-
ly used in East African Islamic publications, other lan-
guages seem to be of no importance at all.
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G ER AR D C.  VAN  D E B RU I N HO RS T Islamic Literature 
in Tanzania and Kenya
S w a h i l i
During the fieldwork process a collection
was made of both local productions and
works translated into Swahili. Polemical and
apologetic works were abundantly available
in this language. Also the works on sexuality
and biographies of prophets are very popular.
Books on magic, however, are still published
(and apparently sold) in Arabic. The collection
contains only two Swahili tracts with practical
advice on an Islamic ruqya in case of a jinn
possession. Devotional literature is widely
available and is mostly bi-lingual – Arabic and
Swahili. At least six books explain how to use
the 99 names of Allah most profitably. Be-
cause Swahili is the mode of instruction in
Tanzanian primary schools and part of the
curriculum in the secondary schools, the ma-
terial used for ‘Islamic Knowledge’ (Maarifa ya
Uislam) is entirely in Swahili. The 10th edition
of the authoritative tafsir by Shaykh Abdallah
Saleh al-Farsy (1912-1982), Kurani Takatifu,
contains for the first time a transcription of
the Arabic text in Latin script.
A r a b i c
Nowadays the local production of Arabic lit-
erature in Tanzania and Kenya is very limited.
Remarkable is an evaluation report of the Is-
lamic dacwa in Kenya. This 80-page account of
the current state of Islam is apparently writ-
ten for an educated audience in the Muslim
world. There is an Arabic book on Islamic and
Christian relations (sirac, struggle is used) in
Eastern Africa, published in 1999. Also in Ara-
bic, but still extremely popular, is Hidayatul-
atfal, written by Mazrui from Mombasa. This
book on fiqh and other general Islamic topics
has been introduced in the madrassas both in
Kenya and Tanzania and is extensively quoted
by many Muslims. In footnotes the author
refers frequently to local, ‘incorrect’ practices.
In order to gain more insight into the inex-
pensive popular literature, the imported Ara-
bic books which were sold for up to 3000 Tan-
zanian shillings (2.5 US dollars) were pur-
chased. The bulk of this collection consists of
prayer manuals, devotional and madrassa lit-
erature.
E n g l i s h
The third important language in East African
Islamic publishing is English, especially in
Kenya. Here the official language of formal ed-
ucation is English, so all the books written for
the subject of Islamic Religious Education are
obliged to use this medium. Also, the Nairobi
branch of the Islamic Foundation publishes
books and magazines in English. The situation
in Tanzania is quite different. English publica-
tions from Tanzanian authors are mainly writ-
ten for an international audience. Dr Mo-
hammed Said, for example, wrote a book on
Abdulwahid Sykes and the role of Muslims in
the struggle for independence. Likewise, the
university lecturer, Hamza Mustafa Njozi, pro-
duced a work on the Mwembechai murders of
1998, when soldiers killed at least four Mus-
lims in Dar es Salaam. Selling or even quoting
the book in Tanzania is forbidden. From the
non-local English works, a small selection was
made, mainly of works printed in India. This
category is therefore far from representative.
It is not easy to find bookshops. After clos-
ing time, they can hardly be recognized be-
hind their iron gates. Even during opening
hours there is no sign indicating the com-
modities that are sold inside. The mosque
turned out to be a good place to start. During
prayer times there are usually one or more
book vendors opposite the entrance. These
merchants were often most willing to indicate
the location of bigger shops. Although get-
ting information about petty traders was
much more difficult, tracing them down was
usually very much worthwhile. Old material,
sold out in the ordinary shops, was often avail-
able on the streets and in smaller towns out-
side the capitals.
Staying in a bookshop resulted in valuable
information. Not only were other researchers
encountered, but also teachers from madras-
sas, individual scholars, and representatives of
the main publishing agencies. Businessmen
from Mozambique shopping in Dar es Salaam
indicate that the spread of Swahili Islamic
books is not limited to Uganda, Tanzania or
Kenya.
Publications outside the mainstream of
Islam have their own distribution system. An
excellent place for Shica material is the Bilal
Muslim Mission in Dar es Salaam (more than
100 books and two magazines) as well as the
Iranian cultural centres in the capitals. At the
different branches of the Ahmadiya sects the
first Swahili translation of the Qur’an and
many other books can be obtained, although
very few written by local scholars. Their news-
paper, Mapenzi ya Mungu, contains interest-
ing data, especially on religious polemics.
A bookshop
i n Dar es Salaam.
Gerard C. van de Bruinhorst is currently a Ph.D.
candidate at the ISIM.
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N o t e s
1 . A d a a r a is a Maraboutic agricultural community in
which one learns the Qu’ran in addition to
working in the fields.
2 . The dahira is an association that groups Mouride
disciples either on the basis of Marabout
allegiances or on the basis of the location at which
they are found.
3 . In Marseille there is a central d a h i r a, the Marseille-
Touba d a h i r a, and other d a h i r a formed on the
basis of Marabout allegiances.
4 . Considered the most important Mouride village
(outside of Africa) after Touba. The very fact that
this name is used indicates a way of expanding
Mouride territory by conferring a sacred meaning
to it.
5 . In general, the Mourides prefer to pray amongst
themselves at the d a h i r a rather than at the
m o s q u e .
6 . D h i k r: lit. r e c o l l e c t i o n .
7 . M a g a l: festival that celebrates an important event
in the brotherhood. The most important m a g a l
commemorates the departure into exile of the
brotherhood’s founder, Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba,
and is accompanied annually by a pilgrimage.
8 . K h a s s a ï d e s: poems authored by Sheikh Ahmadou
B a m b a .
This article is an extract of a paper given at the ISIM
in April 2000.
Sophie Bava is a Ph.D. candidate in the religious
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S O P H I E  B A VA
Mouridism is a contemporary Sufi religious move-
ment originating in Senegal at the end of the 19t h
century. Its founder, Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba, was
exiled several times by the colonizers, who saw the
movement as a danger to their enterprise. Initially
trained in prayer and in working in the fields in the
d a a r a1 and pioneers in the cultivation and sale of
groundnuts in Senegal, the Mouride t a a l i b é s ( d i s c i-
ples) became great merchants. The drought of the
1970s led them to organize new economic activities,
notably those related to commerce, initially in Dakar
and later in the cities to which they migrated.
Today Mouride migrants, found all over the
world, lead a transnational commercial net-
work that is linked to the brotherhood net-
work (Mouridiyya) they transport to each city
of migration. The latter is executed by the
founding of d a h i r a.2 Circulating amongst
several territories, these migrants transport
knowledge and religious experience. A vital
question to be dealt with is how this knowl-
edge actually circulates and how it is recom-
posed between the local societies of the
places of migration and the holy city of
T o u b a .
The birth of an economic
Mouride territory
The history of Marseille and the Sene-
galese migrants is a very old one, dating
back to the Senegalese infantrymen and sea-
men who were generally recruited by mar-
itime companies during World War II. The
central quarters of Marseille were where the
Mouride Senegalese merchants were to set-
tle in the 1960s and 1970s. Here they joined
the retired seaman and infantrymen, and the
recently arrived African labourers, a situation
that offered the merchants a base for their
c o m m e r c e .
The majority of the Senegalese migrants
arriving in Marseille during this period were
merchants who alternated between ambu-
lating sales during the tourist season and
labouring in the textile factories of Marseille
during the low season. These merchants, liv-
ing between a mobile and sedentary exis-
tence, comprised the great majority. During
the 1980s some of them became whole-
salers or (immobile) merchants, furnishing
their more mobile colleagues with merchan-
dise. It is thus that a network was organized
amongst cities in Europe, Africa, and later
America and Asia. Within these economic
networks, in addition to the common affilia-
tion to the brotherhood, a logic can be deci-
phered in the circulation, the inter-relational
and transnational network, and the relation-
ship between territories, juridical systems,
and other non-Mouride individuals.
The Mouride religious
e n t e r p r i s e
The Mouride economic enterprise that
was organized in various countries is the
point of departure of yet another enterprise
– a religious one – which de-localized and
recomposed itself according to the fluidity
of migrants and their migratory routes.
These Mouride merchants in migration
stimulated both the constitution of places
of worship abroad and the elaboration of
decentralized (i.e. with respect to Touba) rit-
uals. While the central authority of the
brotherhood is constantly called upon, the
initial initiative came from the migrants
themselves and from their need to maintain
a bond (spiritual and material) with the holy
city of Touba. Today the migrants readily
transmit the religious and social knowledge
proper to Mouride migrants in Marseille to
their children and to the new t a a l i b é s.
Evolution of the Marseille-
T o u b a d a h i r a
The Marseille-Touba d a h i r a ,3 found at the
centre of the small islet of Belsunce, was re-
ferred to by the Senegalese in the 1980s as
the ‘Darou Salam’ of Marseille.4 This d a h i r a
was the result of one group of Mouride mer-
chants anxious to have one central place for
p r a y e r ,5 a place at which they could also
gather to organize debates, meetings, and
dhikr s e s s i o n s ,6 host passing marabouts,
hold the m a g a l ,7 and exchange both mater-
ial and spiritual goods. The d a h i r a, a simple
room in an apartment, was created in the
early 1980s. Every Sunday evening the mer-
chants ritually united for prayer. The young
merchants who had initiated the project
conferred the management of the d a h i r a,
after a few generation-conflicts but also be-
cause they were too mobile, to the eldest of
the Mourides, who considered themselves
the most legitimate for the task.
During the last 30 years in France, these
structures of hosting t a a l i b é s (the d a h i r a)
have changed. Not only have the spaces
been transformed, expanded, and modern-
ized, their very functions have also evolved.
While their services were originally directed
towards perpetuating the Mouride religious
practices (recitations of the k h a s s a ï d e s, z i k h r
sessions, organization of Mouride events
such as the m a g a l festival, receiving sheikhs,
etc.), towards social monitoring of the Sene-
galese in France and towards the possibility
of having a place to meet and exchange
goods, the d a h i r a today – while maintaining
their original functions – are increasingly
becoming cultural places: places where one
can transmit the history of Mouridism and
the translated texts of Sheikh Ahmadou
Bamba to younger generations born in
France, to converts or to non-Mourides. In
this framework, the youth (students in
France) often take charge in debates on
Mouridism and politics, Mouridism and sec-
ularism, the commentaries of the k h a s s a ï d e s
of Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba, Mouridism on
the internet and other social issues, allow-
ing for the transmission and popularization
of Mouride religious thought.
In recent years, only the major events have
remained a unifying force for the Mouride
migrants in Marseille. The influx and number
of Senegalese migrants have decreased, and
a power struggle between generations and
over social and religious status has begun to
play a role. According to the initiators of the
d a h i r a, who are younger but more educated:
‘The elders only dealt with the prayers and
the readings of the k h a s s a ï d e s,8 but the rest
was not well organized.’
After an incident in the organization of a
visit by Sérigne Mourtada Mbacké in Sep-
tember 2000, the members of the d a h i r a
found themselves mandated by the brother-
hood to provide better organization. If this
was not obeyed, the sheikh would never
come again. Sérigne Mourtada is the son of
Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba and brother of the
current caliph, and the fact that he circulates
between the different cities of migration
makes him a sort of guarantor of the conti-
nuity and legitimacy of the various spaces
invested by members of the brotherhood.
From the d a h i r a t o
t h e f e d e r a t i o n
Following these events, those who had
created the d a h i r a decided to take affairs
back into their own hands and to found a
federation of all the d a h i r a in the south of
France. This implied 24 d a h i r a, which meant
approximately 3000 people, the seat of
which would be in Marseille. The setting up
of the federation is very interesting to ob-
serve as we can witness negotiations be-
tween Mouride merchants and students,
alone or with their families in France: in
short, groups that have neither similar plans
for the future nor the same understanding
of the brotherhood.
The first are the oldest merchants, who
live alone in Marseille and for whom the
d a h i r a is a place that above all should allow
for the development of Sheikh Ahmadou
Bamba’s work abroad and comprise a link
with the holy city of Touba, but should also
be a place worthy of hosting Mouride
events. For them, leaving a legacy in France
is of utmost importance, even if they focus
strongly on Touba.
The others are those at the origin of the
d a h i r a who brought their families over, and
who are preoccupied today with settling in
Marseille and with the future of their chil-
dren. For them, the d a h i r a must provide a
means through which their children can re-
main informed about Mouridism and
through which they can maintain ties with
their culture – thus a simultaneously reli-
gious and cultural space that will remain
should they (the parents) return to Touba.
They know many people in the local society
and have always maintained links between
the Mouride d a h i r a and the local authorities
when the Mourides organize events. They
reproached the ‘old’ Mourides for not hav-
ing done so and for always speaking in
Wolof. They feel that in the face of this new
mission sent from Touba, the words of the
future president of the federation best ex-
press their views: ‘We should not fight
against one another, that is what I told them
[the ‘old’ Mourides]. Now we have to unite
for an international cause and especially for
the children who are their future’.
For the t a a l i b é migrants of Marseille, even
if they are capable of being here and there
at the same time, those who have their fam-
ilies with them are more or less anchored in
France, mainly because of their children.
The question is one of adapting the Mouride
religious system in such a way that the mi-
grants are accepted as much by the Mou-
ride hierarchy as by the mayor of Marseille.
The current problem of the migrants is the
difficulty in giving sense to their migration,
that is, in integrating the global Mouride re-
ligious project with the migrant culture and
their dynamic, mobile way of living their re-
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G E R D I E N  J O N K E R
Germany is becoming a multi-faith society at a rapid
pace. The influx of foreign workers and a liberal poli-
cy towards fugitives and asylum-seekers made Islam
the third religious force of the country. As immigrants
become citizens, the Muslim faith is slowly being in-
stitutionalized. In public discourse arguments flare
up, exposing a deeply felt contrariety between the
Christian and Muslim faiths. On the part of the Ger-
man general public, Muslim claims to particularity
(places for prayer in schools, separation for biology
instruction) meet with resistance, as Muslim activity is
suspected of serving political, not religious aims.
Questions are being publicly raised as to whether
Muslim communities should be forced to adopt cul-
tural ideals such as gender equality. The educational
system offers a stage on which this battle over differ-
ence is acted out.
For Germany’s schools religious privatiza-
tion, as signalled by American scholars,
seems to be the only way to make Muslim
particularity socially acceptable. Some thirty
years ago, Peter Berger observed in America
that the pluralization of religion inevitably
led to the privatization of all religions.1 T h e
mechanism behind this societal re-adjust-
ment seemed to be motored by the wish to
live together in peace. When speaking
about core religious questions in public,
people from different religious faiths have
begun to remodel their speech in order not
to be offensive. Religious judgements have
been transposed to a more abstract level,
leaving the explicit religious component
out. In public discourse, ‘hot’ topics like
abortion, pre-marital sex, and homosexuali-
ty nowadays appear to be less under attack
on religious grounds. Rather, their legitima-
cy is increasingly questioned with argu-
ments that touch upon the supposed needs
of society as a whole.2
The conditions
In the German Federal Republic the state
maintains the lead in educational matters,
seeking cooperation with those religious
communities that it acknowledges. In this
legislative arrangement, religious communi-
ties are only responsible for religious con-
tent. Everything else remains the responsibil-
ity of the state. Bremen and Berlin are excep-
tions as these two states have taken steps to
confer religious communities the full respon-
sibility for religious instruction in state
schools including the organization of teacher
training and the development of pedagogi-
cal methods. The state supplies material and
financial support by providing buildings,
heating and electricity and pays 80% of the
teachers’ salaries. After re-unification, most
former socialist states decided that religious
instruction should be once more the respon-
sibility of the state, with the exception of
Brandenburg where religious instruction was
banished from public schools altogether.
Muslim communities who wish to play a
part in public schooling have to adapt to
this legal frame. This is accelerated by the
way legislation is put into practice. As state
money and responsibility is involved, the or-
ganizational model and educational con-
tent are heavily scrutinized by the court.
Judges pose questions to determine
whether an organization is really a religious
community, whether it is able to cooperate
with institutions of the state, and whether
the content is genuinely a product of reli-
gious tradition (and not a result of political
or ideological indoctrination). Particularly
the last question shows a bias, one that has
prevented Muslim organizations from en-
tering the educational system to this day.
In fact, the intricacies of German jurisdic-
tion on the freedom of religion present only
part of the picture, the ongoing process of
secularization comprising the other. Be-
tween 1965 and 1999 the percentage of
churchgoers among the population of the
former Bundesrepublik (West Germany)
dropped from 75% to less than 30%. And, as
the population of socialist Eastern Germany
had been discouraged from religion for two
entire generations, the total of non-practis-
ing Germans duly increased after re-unifica-
tion. This development decreases the coun-
try’s ability to speak about or even recog-
nize religious matters at hand.
In public discourse, teachers unions,
media and the majority of scholars as a rule
express distrust of religious communities
and sometimes declare religiosity a form of
ignorance. When Muslim religiosity is at
issue, many tend to see it as politics in dis-
guise. Of course, there is a xenophobic com-
ponent in their distrust of Islam. This is rein-
forced by representatives of various mi-
grant organizations that promote laicist
views. Kemalists, Alevis and others continue
to stress that Muslim religious organizations
are a threat to democracy. Not surprisingly,
most Muslim religious organizations, but es-
pecially those that are involved in political
issues in the home country – in this case
Turkey – are suspected of serving the inter-
est of Turkish political groups and conse-
quently are accused of being dishonest in
their motives for teaching religion in school.
Part of the media accuses them of under-
cover extremism and indoctrination.3
Churches, on the contrary, increasingly seek
contact with Muslim organizations, seeing
them as natural allies in presenting religious
viewpoints in the public sphere.
The Berlin case
Germany counts 3.2 million Muslims, the
majority of which are of Turkish descent
(75%), predominantly adhering to the Sun-
nite (Hanifi rite) school. Due to a high con-
centration of immigrants from southeast
Anatolia, in Berlin the picture differs. As a
rule Kurds follow the Shafi’i rite and approx-
imately 30% of all Kurds and Turks living in
this city adhere to the Alevi rite, which is a
different brand of Muslim religiosity alto-
gether. In the light of the German legisla-
tion, all Muslim communities have remained
underdeveloped in terms of religious orga-
nization. The law expects religious commu-
nities to develop interior differentiation and
to form expert groups, this being the only
way in which state institutions are able to
cooperate on educational designs.
In November 1998, the Berlin court decid-
ed upon nominal inclusion of the local Islam-
ic Federation into the school system. The Is-
lamic Federation is a single-purpose organi-
zation with the aim of providing the means
for collective religiosity. It lays claim to rep-
resenting all Berlin Muslims. As in other Mus-
lim organizations, individual membership is
rather low but the board of the Federation
mirrors a wide spectrum of Muslim religiosi-
ty in this city. Out of the 71 mosques, 53 – in-
cluding the Shi’ite and the Kurdish Shafi’i –
gave written testimony to the fact that they
feel well represented by the Federation. The
Alevis of Berlin, however, deny the Federa-
tion’s claim, as do all the Turkish citizen or-
ganizations whose members as a rule do not
participate in mosque community life. How-
ever, the Islamic Federation does cooperate
with the Milli Görüsh, a Turkish organization
that claims to sustain Muslim life in general
and for that purpose has set up youth and
women’s organizations within the Federa-
tion mosques. It also offers sustenance in
economic networking and organizes sum-
mer schools and religious festivals. Kemal-
ists, Alevis and the general German public
demonstrate a strong distrust of the Milli
Görüsh because of its (former) association
with the Islamist parties in Turkey.
As yet, the court decision has not yet been
turned into practice. Because of its connec-
tions to Milli Görüsh, the Federation has not
been able to gain access to any of the Berlin
schools. Moreover, it is still in the process of
preparing teachers and schedules. Nonethe-
less, the 1998 court decision was an incentive
for Muslims all over the country to develop
educational plans and for local administra-
tions to develop tools for communication.
Muslim organizations in Berlin, Hessen,
Northrhine-Westphalia, Bavaria and Baden-
Würthemberg, all agreeing upon the so-
called ‘Four plus One’ formula (Four Sunni
law schools plus one Shi’a) but excluding
Alevis and Ahmadiyya, now have produced
proposals for educational programmes. Fur-
thermore, administrations of these states
organized informal working groups as fu-
ture instruments for cooperation. In Berlin,
proceedings seem to be well under way. Its
law on freedom of religion, being different
from that of other states, allowed more
room for religious partners.
The Berlin Working Group (of which the
author is part) was established early in 2000
and consists of members of the Islamic Fed-
eration, representatives of Christian and
Jewish teacher training programmes, repre-
sentatives of the State School Authority,
politicians and scholars. In its meetings the
Islamic Federation explains its educational
plans and discusses particulars with those
present. Core issues comprise inter-reli-
gious co-existence, flexibility in gender is-
sues, individual rights and abstinence from
political goals. As the Federation continues
to cooperate with Milli Görüsh, doubts of its
ability to solve these issues slow down pro-
c e d u r e s .
In this way, a proposal for religious in-
struction – the outcome of internal religious
considerations – is being put to test by edu-
cational and religious experts, politicians
and administrators who do not necessarily
belong to the religious community in-
volved. Of course other candidates, Jews,
Mormons, Unitarians, and Humanists, now
teaching in state schools were also ques-
tioned prior to admission. Questions aim to
connect the school teachings of a particular
religious tradition to the mainstream of Ger-
many – including its secular tradition, em-
phasis on individual rights, or gender equal-
ity – which in itself comprises abstractions
of diverse religious and ideological tradi-
tions and tendencies. As a consequence the
predominantly Christian and secular mem-
bers are in the position to define the main
goals and methods. And where Muslims are
concerned, non-Muslims often demonstrate
a high degree of subjectivity.
For the representatives of the Islamic Fed-
eration, proceedings in the working group
bear the consequence that they are obliged
to make adjustments in the educational plan
and also in places where their following ex-
pects clear religious instruction. To solve this
problem, the proposal now sometimes re-
sorts to ‘humanist’ reasoning. Those respon-
sible now distinguish between what is com-
municated to the community and what is
communicated to ‘the outside world’, in-
cluding the public schools. Thus, whenever a
topic appears to be very sensitive – different
treatment of the sexes, or headscarves – it
dissociates from strictly religious arguments
and points to the responsibility of the indi-
vidual believer instead. A shift to the privati-
zation of religion can thus be seen taking its
course. In the long run, this shift may well
connect Islamic knowledge to the German
educational system, and through this to the
acceptance of Islam.
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In the past decade, Alevis in Germany have stressed
their distinctness mainly in terms of culture when ne-
gotiating with the majority society. Since recently,
however, an increased emphasis on religion can be
observed, which is not so much due to a regained
strength of religiosity. It is rather a response to
changed public discourses and an adjustment to the
prevailing legal and institutional conditions. In Ger-
many, the issue of immigration has been treated in
terms of cultural difference since long ago, the reli-
gious identity of the mainly Muslim immigrants hav-
ing nearly no impact on integration policy. Yet since
the end of the 1990s, when attention was drawn to
fundamentalist tendencies among the Muslim youth,
the religious dimension of immigration has been
brought to the fore.
Alevis in Germany
On the Way to
Public Recognition?
Public debates on the implications of the Is-
lamic presence in Germany gained a new
impetus when – for the first time – a high
court decision in February 2000 granted an
Islamic organization (Islamic Federation
Berlin) legal recognition as a religious com-
munity. According to the regulations, this
organization now retains the right to give
religious instruction at public schools. Since
then, Islamic instruction has become a cen-
tral issue of the integration policy.
Alevi response
The Alevis reacted promptly to this high
court decision. Already three months later,
the largest Alevi association in Berlin had
applied for recognition as a religious com-
munity and for the establishment of lessons
in Alevism at school. Since then, on behalf of
associated organizations, the Federation of
Alevi Communities in Germany (AABF)
made similar applications to the ministries
in four other federal states. If Islamic instruc-
tion is introduced, Alevis argue, the inter-
ests of their children too must be taken into
account. Analogous to denominational
Christian instruction, there should not be
only one type of Islamic instruction. In fact,
separate instruction should exist for Sun-
nism and Alevism.
In this reasoning, Alevism clearly appears
as an Islamic denomination. Considering
the unsettled debates in the Alevi diaspora
over such a classification, as well as the
rather secular attitude of the majority of its
members, the unanimous Alevi support of
the demand for religious instruction may
appear surprising.
Indeed, the generating spirit behind the
current mobilization appears to be the de-
sire for the recognition of their collective
identity, stigmatized under the Ottomans
and officially denied in the Turkish Republic.
Of equal importance is the will to delimitate
themselves from, and to not be placed at a
disadvantage with respect to, their Sunni
co-immigrants. An observation recently
made during a podium discussion orga-
nized by an Alevi association in Duisburg
may illustrate the prevailing attitude: While
the opinion that religion should be kept out
of school was met with great approval, all
those present stressed that if Sunnis are
granted the right to religious instruction,
the Alevis should strive for it as well. Fur-
thermore, recognition of the Alevi commu-
nity in Germany could also have an impact
within Turkey. As one of the diaspora cadres
put it: ‘Our most urgent duty is to fight for
legalization. Alevi religious instruction is a
first step. If we succeed, Turkey can not con-
tinue to deny our distinctness.’ Yet the new
emphasis on religion is not merely strategic;
it refers to inter-community developments
as well.
Alevism in the diaspora
Though since the 1960s Alevis are present
in large numbers in Germany, until the end
of the 1980s they did not appear in the pub-
lic eye as a distinct community. They were
organized on the basis of political affiliation,
ranging from social democracy to the radi-
cal left. The lack of community-based orga-
nizations reflected the decline of Alevism as
a result of migration to the urban centres of
Turkey – and subsequently to the West. The
decline was also accelerated by a state poli-
cy unfavourable to the maintenance of het-
erodox traditions. The outcome has been a
nearly complete breakdown of the social-re-
ligious structures and a halt to the transmis-
sion of the esoteric teachings from one gen-
eration to the next. Highly influenced by
Marxism, the generation of the 1960s reject-
ed religion, the guardians of which, the Holy
Men, thus lost their function and authority.
The rediscovery of Alevi identity began in
the mid-1980s as a result of the worldwide
decline of the Left and the emergence of Is-
lamism, which aggravated the historical
Sunni-Alevi tensions in Turkey as well as
abroad. The foundation of the first commu-
nity-based association in 1989 in Hamburg
was the prelude to Alevi organizations all
over Turkey and Europe, which have be-
come the backbone of an ethno-political
movement striving for public recognition.
Today, in Germany alone there are some
150 associations, the majority being com-
bined in the AABF. Only a few of the associ-
ations show a clear religious orientation,
most having preserved their indifference to-
wards religion. Among the latter, the pre-
dominating view is that of Alevism as a ‘cul-
ture’, based on democracy, humanism, and
equality of men and women. The term ‘cul-
ture’ is understood here as being in opposi-
tion to religion, which is associated with
backwardness and fundamentalism, and
particularly with orthodox Islam.
In the diaspora, there is a strong tendency
to situate Alevism outside of Islam and even
to underestimate its character as a r e l i g i o u s
community. In an inquiry on the most impor-
tant features of Alevism recently made by
the AABF, the majority voted for social as-
pects; the ‘fight against injustice’, ‘high es-
teem for Man’ and ‘gender equality’ ranking
foremost. Religious issues such as the image
of the Deity or rituals came far behind. The
inferior role of religion corresponds with the
lack of religious education in the associa-
tions, with the consequence that the youth
is highly ignorant of the traditional belief
system. Yet the Alevis increasingly recognize
that religion – as the smallest common de-
nominator – is the only bracket with which
the community can be kept together. Lack-
ing knowledge of the ‘path’, it is feared, the
youth could experience a loss of identity as
they find it difficult to maintain distinctness
in a secular society in which they define
themselves merely in terms of the Enlighten-
ment. Regarding the lack of transmission of
knowledge within the community, it is
hoped that religious instruction at school
will fill the gap left behind by the breakdown
of traditional institutions.
How to teach Alevism?
There is no tradition of institutionalized
learning in Alevism. In the past, the teach-
ings were handed down orally within differ-
ent Holy Lineages and passed on to the dis-
ciples in special ceremonies held a few
times per year. Due to the orality and the
often divergent traditions held by the Holy
Lineages, it is difficult to speak of a single
and coherent system of beliefs in Alevism.
Yet this is exactly what is required today. In
order to gain recognition as a religious com-
munity, the Alevis have to furnish proof of a
binding religious authority, and a consensus
in dogma and belief. So as to succeed in the
current negotiations over religious instruc-
tion, a syllabus has to be presented: A first
draft, prepared by the Commission for Reli-
gious Instruction of the AABF, was declared
inadequate by the authorities and was
given back for further specifications. De-
spite setbacks, the production of a basic
textbook of Alevism is breaking new
ground. Until now there has not been any
conscious and organized effort to system-
atize and unify the diverse traditions of the
community. Diasporic Alevism is thus
putting itself under pressure to develop a
teachable religion in order to meet the legal
r e q u i r e m e n t s .
One of the problems to be solved refers to
that of authority. The AABF Commission
consists of secular-oriented former leftists,
all but one belonging to the ‘laity’. As it can
be concluded from the references given in
the above-mentioned syllabus, they tend to
depend on works written by Western schol-
ars on Alevism, rather than on personal ex-
periences or the knowledge of the Holy
Men. The latter, though nowadays increas-
ingly demanding a greater say in the affairs
of the associations, are not likely to regain
their former influence. They are often seen
as old-fashioned, dealing with issues alien
to the youth. In addition, the Holy Men have
maintained the divergence in their treat-
ment of religious issues. ‘Listening to them,
we become only more confused’, is a fre-
quent complaint. In this situation, members
of the highly secularized ‘laity’ are taking on
the job of creating a new Alevi theology.
However, due to ideological and political di-
vergences among the associations, reach-
ing a consensus remains a difficult task.
Nonetheless, the joint struggle for recogni-
tion has already managed to bring together
competing organizations: It lead to the
putting aside of internal debates in order to
reach an agreement on outward represen-
tation of Alevism as a branch of Islam. An
agreement has yet to be reached concern-
ing the contents of this future religious in-
s t r u c t i o n .
In the meantime, a textbook on Alevism
has been published in Germany, co-pro-
duced by an immigrant teacher and a promi-
nent Alevi writer in Turkey.* As it circum-
vents awkward themes such as the deifica-
tion of Ali or the widespread Alevi denial of
the divine nature of the Qur’an, the book
presents a picture of Alevism denuded of its
most heterodox features. But even then, the
book provoked the protest of the Turkish au-
thorities, claiming that it shows Alevis to be
of an ‘other belief’ (than Islam). This inter-
vention pointed to the political dimension of
the possible recognition of Alevism in Ger-
many. Kurdish Alevis, on the other hand, crit-
icized the book’s strong Turkish nationalist
attitude. These debates may be a foretaste
of the future clashes over the syllabus to be
presented to the German authorities in
order to gain formal recognition.
Due to the legal and institutional condi-
tions of the host society – particularly state
recognition of religions – the Alevi politics
of identity gained a new impetus in Ger-
many. Yet as the requirements for recogni-
tion are basically derived from the Christian
tradition of Germany, adjustment to them
will undoubtedly cause further transforma-
tions in Alevism, the results of which are at
the moment unforeseeable. Until now
Turkey has been the intellectual centre of
negotiations over Alevism. Thus not even
half a per cent of the hundreds of books
written by Alevis on Alevism in the last 15
years is the product of the diaspora. But be-
cause the teaching of Alevism at school in
Germany is nearly at hand – in Turkey it is
still out of sight – the focus could very well
be shifted to the diaspora.
A first Alevi
textbook for
c h i l d r e n .
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MO H AM E D  AB U S A B I B
The place and definition of art as a human practice
have proved to be a thorny problem – in theory and
in practice – for Muslim thinkers, old and new, mod-
erates and fanatics alike. The views of both parties
are well known, but two features of the problem are
of special concern to this essay: the relationship be-
tween Islamic teachings and the actual human in-
volvement with the arts as an integral cultural activi-
ty; and the practical political move taken by the Is-
lamists to tackle this problem. Here, the Sudanese
case is significant in two respects. It is the first time
that the Islamist movement has seized power in a
dominantly Sunnite, Arab League member state, and
it is also an African country that exhibits in its politi-
cal, social and cultural texture all that has rightly ac-
quired it the description of African microcosm.1
Political Islam
a n d the Arts
The Sudanese Experience
Sudanese societies, under the present Is-
lamist rule, have come to experience an ex-
treme form of entanglement of the three
major components of culture: politics, reli-
gion and the arts. In the early 1980s Dr Has-
san al-Turabi, the Islamist ideologue and
leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), laid
the theoretical foundation and suggested
the practical guidelines for what he con-
strued as true Islamic involvement in the
artistic phenomenon.2 Those guidelines
were put into practice by the present gov-
ernment after the military coup of 1989,
which brought the NIF to power.
The baseline in Al-Turabi’s discourse on
art is the doctrine of unicity, t a w h i d, a s t h e
main Islamic principle that determines the
place and meaning of beauty and art. Citing
the Qur’anic verse, ‘We have decked the
earth with all manner of ornaments to test
mankind and to see who would acquit him-
self best’ (18: 7), he describes beauty and art
as seductive and distracting from God, and
states that we either indulge in them or
transcend them. He regards art as a sensu-
ous reaction incompatible with rationality
and conscious devoutness to God; like rule,
economy and sex it is lustful; it is free, unruly
and far from being an objective system or a
social function that serves the general wel-
f a r e .
But art, as he puts it, occupies a wide space
in modern society and thus should not be ig-
nored. If it is handled properly, he maintains,
it can open a door for religiousness en-
hanced by the magnetic effect of beauty.
To solve this problem, Al-Turabi adopts a
pragmatist approach. He criticizes the lega-
cy of Islamic jurisprudence on art for being
indolent, negative, and tending to repel the
artist from religion. The alternative to this ju-
risprudence, as he perceives it, is what he
terms the ‘method of jurisprudence princi-
ples’, in the sense that the jurisconsults
should not build on absolute legal opinions
about special cases. He exemplifies this by
the following principles:
– The making of beauty is sanctioned by the
Sharica.
– The creation of beauty should be directed
to the worship of God.
– Whatever distracts from the worship of God
is nullity and if it contradicts worshipping it is
forbidden.
– The greatest sins in Islam are polytheism,
worship of idols and embodiment of glorifica-
tion, such as statues of leaders and prominent
personalities.
Then Al-Turabi suggests some guidelines for
how these principles can be implemented:
– It is possible to unite and blend religious
and artistic practices because both of them
are symbolic practices aiming at transcend-
ing world realities to reach a higher ideal.
– Art can be deployed as an effective ideo-
logical vehicle.
– In the first stages of Islamic jihad and revo-
lution all artistic resources must be deployed
for the sake of God.
– Inherited jurisprudence on art is to be re-
considered.
– The present traditional and modern artistic
practices are to be re-evaluated because they
carry pre-Islamic (jahili) values as well as ills of
Western civilization.
– There should be a creation of the religious
artist who would be able to produce ‘true Is-
lamic art’.
Practical measures
The Islamist strategy is to have the entire
artistic enterprise monopolized, manipulat-
ed and transformed into a religious practice.
In part one, article 12, under ‘Sciences, Art
and Culture’ and article 18 under ‘Religious-
ness’, the constitution of 1998 affirms the
commitment of the state to encourage all
forms of art and strenuously seek to elevate
society to values of religiousness to be direct-
ed towards the grace of God in the here-
a f t e r .3
This constitutional formulation is, in fact, a
codification of administrative measures that
were already put into effect by the regime in
its first years. The appointment of loyalists to
leading positions in art institutions, universi-
ties and the mass media, the banning of liter-
ary and art unions such as The Sudanese Writ-
ers Association, and the formation of an alter-
native organization expected to play a central
role in promoting religious art, are some ex-
amples of these measures. The outcome in-
cludes a sharp decline in the quantity and
quality of artistic production in the country,
and the voluntary or forced immigration of
artists to other countries. According to estima-
tions of the Musicians Union, more than 200
singers and professional musicians left the
Sudan in the first years of the regime. The ma-
jority of qualified teaching staff in art institu-
tions either were dismissed or forced into early
retirement, or chose to resign instead of toler-
ating unacceptable educational policies of the
so-called Islamization of the arts. In general,
the culture of parasitism with its sophisticated
politics, which is now deeply rooted in Su-
danese political life, has already tainted the
artistic field, and mediocre artists of every kind
are now dominating the artistic scene.
The ideological dimension
The ideological aspect of this Islamist pro-
gramme is significant in many respects. Firstly,
the place of Al-Turabi in the Islamist move-
ment is likely to turn his vision on art into a
‘classical’ reference for political Islam not only
in the Sudan, but in other Muslim societies as
well, particularly in Africa given the relations
and contacts the Sudanese movement has al-
ready established with them. Secondly, it is
the first time that a fundamentalist jurispru-
dential opinion is unequivocally incorporated
by the Islamist movement into a comprehen-
sive political agenda. Hence it enables the
state to try to use the artistic medium in its
strategy to impose a pan-Islamic identity on
the multicultural and multi-religious Su-
danese society. Thirdly, the Khatmiyya and the
Ansar sects, which form part of the Sudanese
religious institution and still play a major role
in Sudanese politics, never attempted this
kind of theorization on art. They are Sufi or-
ders that turned into political sectarianism
and adopted conservative visions and rightist
policies without having any elaborate political
or cultural programme, something that has
made it possible for a more intellectual Is-
lamist movement to try to fill in the gap in re-
ligious discourse on art. And, the very nature
and history of the Sudanese Sufi institution do
not allow for such jurisprudential interference
in such delicate cultural matters.
Another ideological aspect is that the initial
tying of artistic creation to the Islamic princi-
ple of unicity is designed to curb its capacity
as an effective critical tool. Also, if art is to be
based on this principle then any opposition
to measures associated with this conception
must eventually lead to its antithesis – that is,
heresy.
But one serious ideological consequence is
the phenomenon of vandalism. Destruction
of sculptural works and statues of historical
personalities is now quite frequent. Another
version of vandalism is that some brain-
washed singers declared their ‘repentance for
singing’ and sought to recover and destroy
their previous records. Even more serious is
the type of official vandalism practised by the
Islamist authorities. The director of the cultur-
al section of Sudan television has stated that
‘[t]he banning of some songs is in accordance
with the general policy of the state to estab-
lish genuine creative works of art and culture
and purge them of all blemish.’4
Finally, terrifying rumours were widespread
in the mid-1980s that the Islamist establish-
ment, in collaboration with the Minister of
Culture and Information in the Cabinet of
Sadiq al-Mahdi of the Ansar sect, was consid-
ering the elimination of the Sudanese archae-
ological heritage assembled in the National
Museum. He backed down only after local
and international bodies started to move.
The aesthetic dimension
The Islamist discourse on art reflects a kind
of epistemological arrogance. The vast knowl-
edge accumulated by the humanities and so-
cial sciences in this area is simply ignored. The
Islamists so easily abstract culture into religion
and then accommodate art to it after having it
‘purged of non-religious stuff’; hence taking a
major risk as they hinge the whole project on
a bid to transform art into a religious pursuit.
And while as predicted they failed to create
the ‘religious artist’, they did not anticipate
the consequences of their policies.
It follows that the role of art as a multi-pur-
pose component of culture deeply rooted in
the social realities of the people is irrelevant
to the Islamist paradigm. In the African con-
text, the question of art simply transcends a
wearisome jurisprudential wrangling over
Qur’anic texts and Prophetic Tradition on art.
As manifested in the practices of Muslim and
non-Muslim Sudanese, art is an integral part
of a cosmological outlook. It is instrumental in
the preservation, promotion and enrichment
of the life of the community, as well as in re-
solving delicate socio-cultural and psycho-
logical situations, thus helping both the
group and individuals maintain a healthy and
balanced way of life.
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Without going deep into details of the selec-
tive brand of Islamization the state promot-
ed, let us say that the regime was above all a
dictatorship: eleven years of military rule
(1977-1988) that ended only with Zia ul-
Haq’s death. Zia’s Islamization programme
was mainly twofold: Firstly, it comprised a
deliberate attempt at reforming selective as-
pects of the penal code inherited from the
British through the Hudood Ordinances
(1979), the Law of Evidence (1984) and the
Blasphemy Law (1986). It was then a kind of
juridical b r i c o l a g e that tended to harm
above all women and religious minorities.
Secondly, it used propaganda through the
media (television, radio, and schoolbooks) in
favour of religious education, Arabization
(Zia ul-Haq himself put on an Arabic accent
when he was speaking in Urdu), sanctity of
the mosque, canonical Islam, and women’s
modesty (veiling, restriction of the image of
women in commercials and cinema). During
the 1980s, Pakistan’s national television was
notorious for John Wayne movies: a ho-
mosocial universe where, except for the sa-
loons, women were virtually absent.
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C o u n t e r - d i s c o u r s e s
C H R I S T È L E  D E D E B A N T
As the first nation created as a religious asylum, Pak-
istan has a short but tormented history of fifty-four
years, half of which was controlled by a military
regime. Founded in the name of ‘Islam in danger’ by
Muhammed Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), Pakistan official-
ly elected Islam as the religion of the state in 1973,
during the tenure of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979),
the first popularly elected Prime minister of the coun-
try. Bhutto was arrested and hanged by general Zia
ul-Haq (1928-1988). While the Islamization rhetoric of
Bhutto was characterized by its mixture of socialism,
nationalism and populism, the discourse of Zia ul-
Haq appeared to be of a much more straightforward
military-Islamist type. In opposition to his rule, a




Pakistani society responded to the state
Islamization process at different levels.
Some – extremely vocal – women’s groups,
intellectuals and journalists spoke out
against the policies, but among them were
also animators of the media scene (dancers,
painters, music bands, fashion designers,
etc.). The latter is a universe which, as a mat-
ter of fact, cannot do much without women
or the image of women. It was in the 1980s,
at the zenith of Zia’s dictatorship, that the
trope of the Mughal Empire, or rather a spe-
cific reflection of the lost Mughal splendour,
became a kind of passage obligé for a certain
section of the media.
It should be noted here that the Timurid
dynasty, widely known as the ‘Mughal’ dy-
nasty, founded by Babur in the mid-16t h
century, dominated India politically until
the 18t h century and culturally up to 1857
(which marked the Sepoy Mutiny). But by
the second half of the 19t h century, effective
Mughal power was no more than a memory.
What is now considered Pakistan was then
at the periphery of Mughal India, the heart
of which was Delhi, Fatehpur Sikri and Agra
(located in present-day India). The flamboy-
ant exception was Lahore, which for 13
years (1585-1598) was the main seat of the
1 6t h-century Great Moghul Akbar (1542-
1605) and one of the major imperial cities
during the Mughal period.
The ‘Mughal miniature’
The most prestigious art school in Pak-
istan, the National College of Arts (NCA, a
1 9t h-century institution built by the British),
became one of the centres for the revival of
the Mughal nostalgia dur-
ing Zia ul-Haq’s era (when
non-figurative art and cal-
ligraphy became the domi-
nant ideological style). Mi-
niature painting was the
epitome of this attempt at
revival – not, of course, that
the reproduction and mer-
chandising of the so-called
‘Mughal miniature’ were
entirely new. In the 1970s,
for instance, under Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto the reclamation
of traditional Mughal style
became a part of the na-
tionalist rhetoric and the
miniature was regarded as
the perfect gift for visiting
d i g n i t a r i e s .1 But it was defi-
nitely under the regime of
Zia ul-Haq that ‘Mughal
mania’ really took off at the
NCA, where art was pro-
moted as a major study, a
department in its own right.
The NCA, which is a semi-
governmental institution, al-
ways stood as a bastion
of liberalism (or objection-
able laissez-faire, according
to one’s convictions). It is a
co-educational institution
where the golden youth of
the country mix freely, fe-
male students and teachers
never donned the veil (even
at the peak of Zia ul-Haq’s
regime); short hair (for girls),
tight t-shirts and cigarettes
are commonplace. In short,
in a milieu where study of
nudes is compulsory as a part of the curricu-
lum, the NCA was considered to be at the
forefront of ‘westernization’. Hence the im-
portance of this concept of ‘endangered Is-
lamic tradition of miniature art’ vocally pro-
moted by the teachers from the 1980s on-
wards. However, the students, especially the
current generation of graduates, are more
than keen to shake the model of reference.
While portraits of the ‘Great Mughals’ (Je-
hangir, Shah Jahan, etc.) are still produced,
exhibited and sold, and the production tech-
nique is as close as possible to the original,
the graduates from the miniature depart-
ment have also produced a great deal of
avant-garde or engagé work. For example, the
miniature entitled ‘Stitched to Order’ (Sadir
Amin, 2000) reads as a critique of develop-
ment programmes for women, which identi-
fied the sewing machine as the key to eman-
cipation.
The empire strikes back
During the Zia years, the fashion scene
went through a tremendous change as well.
If ‘truly Islamic’ calligraphy was the regime’s
motto in the art scene, the anti-sari campaign
(the sari being seen as Hindu and non-Islam-
ic in origin) as well as anti-Western dress pro-
paganda (Western dress being seen as re-
pugnant to tradition) were very active in the
1980s. In the glamorous fashion scene, the
glittering splendours of the lost empire were
particularly revived, but not of course with-
out a heavy dose of eclecticism. In a country
where the vestiges of Muslim grandeur are
more likely to be found next door (in India),
Pakistani fashion designers created a fantas-
tic repertoire where the intricate, so-called
‘Mughal’ embroidery (brocade, gold and silk)
coexisted with a kind of pastoral evocation
and pseudo-mystical inspiration: colourful
cotton peasant dress, ethnic jewellery and
even the accessories of religious mendicants
(such as amulets ‘recycled’ as necklaces). In
short, at a time when, following (or compet-
ing with) the government rhetoric, Arab-
style ca b a y a a n d h ij -a b, Iranian-style ch -a d a r,
and the South Asian tight and covering d u p-
p at -a (veiling) became more and more visible
in public spheres, the urban fashion scene
was celebrating the flamboyance of the
Mughal court, the colours of the countryside
and the mystical light of the Sufi saints. Such
an outcome would be fruitfully evaluated
through the problematic of hybridization, or
m é t i s s a g e as it recently has been developed
in contemporary research.2
Cosmetic though it may seem, this selec-
tive appropriation of the ‘ethnico-mystical-
historical’ register was very much in accor-
dance with the strategy of certain oppo-
nents to Zia’s regime. Against the central-
ized state-sponsored Islamization, many in-
tellectuals opposed to Zia ul-Haq’s dictator-
ship used the Sufi poets of the Sind and
Punjab as a political device to show how
much these figures of traditional Islam (or
traditional religiosity) had been the champi-
ons of the people’s cause and the adver-
saries of tyranny. That this interpretation
might be somehow anachronistic and his-
torically inaccurate is not of concern here.
The purpose is to show how a kind of
counter-discourse – advocating the periph-
ery rather than the centre, pluralism rather
than a singular dogma, traditional mystical
poetry rather than universalist s h ar -ı ca – an
alternative way of presenting ‘authenticity’
which does not necessarily deny but rather
questions the state’s propaganda, became
an extremely powerful force during Zia’s
t i m e .
It is ironic that more than 150 years after the
collapse of Muslim rule, the empire or (the
vestiges of the empire) struck back in certain
Pakistani media. Now, this consumption and
reconstruction of the past is in accordance
with what Hobsbawm has described as the
‘invention of tradition’. Admittedly these me-
diatic spheres were – consciously or uncon-
sciously – bypassing the censorship board
(which the Islamists successfully invested in
the 1980s) by using a historically defined, pro-
fane, mundane, but nonetheless resolutely Is-
lamicate register. The concept of Islamicate,
as coined by Hodgson, implies a repertoire
‘referring not directly to the religion, Islam it-
self, but to the social and cultural complex
historically associated with Islam and Mus-
lims, both among Muslims themselves and
even when found among non-Muslims’. As he
rightly puts it, ‘[…] much of what […] Muslims
have done as a part of the “Islamic” civiliza-
tion can only be characterized as “un-Islamic”
in the […] religious sense of the word’.3 And
indeed, against the constant criticisms of
westernization and violation of tradition, the
strategy displayed by the animators of the
media scene paid off (and to a certain extent
still does).
Beyond the fear of the censor’s scissors, in
a young nation like Pakistan (the r a i s o n
d ’ ê t r e of which is still a matter of polemic)
this inventive derivation of a prestigious
Muslim grandeur et décadence allows, in
Hobsbawm’s words again, ‘to establish con-
tinuity with a suitable historic past’.4 T h e
strategy has also become a quest. Through
the media and artistic space, Pakistani cre-
ators seem to have presented a more plural-
istic view of what being a Muslim and a Pak-
istani could mean.
Stitched to Order.
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Cross-cultural dressing is usually seen as a Western
activity, but elite Ottomans would have been by the
end of the empire perfectly accustomed to wearing
Western clothes – something which challenges cur-
rent theories about cross-cultural dressing. The fol-
lowing considers photographs of cross-cultural
dressing in books written by two friends: the Ot-
toman Zeyneb Hanum, who with her sister, Melek
Hanum, collaborated with Pierre Loti on his novel,
Les Désenchantées, and the English feminist and
Turkophile, Grace Ellison. Zeyneb Hanum’s episto-
lary account, A Turkish Woman’s European Impres-
s i o n s (1913), was edited by Ellison, whose own story
of visits to Turkey, An Englishwoman in a Turkish
H a r e m, appeared two years later in 1915. In both
books the authors appear cross-culturally dressed,
yet the images register very differently.
C r o s s - c u l t u r a l
Dressing in the Late
Ottoman Empire
Within Orientalism’s fantasy logic about the
forbidden harem, women writers could
claim an insider’s knowledge prohibited to
Western men. But, as Ellison knew, associat-
ing oneself with a realm so relentlessly sexu-
alized in the minds of the West was also
risky: ‘To the Western ear, to be staying in a
Turkish harem sounds alarming, and not a
little – yes, let us confess it – improper’ (Elli-
son 1915, p. 2). Although this closeness to
the object of study might prohibit a mode
of detached scientific neutrality otherwise
desired by European women, Ellison wel-
comes the proximity permitted by cross-cul-
tural dressing when the privileges of pass-
ing gain her access to religious sites:
… now I am wearing a veil who can tell
whether I am Muslim or Christian?… [But]
how could I, even as a veiled women, take my
place amongst the women … I was just a lit-
tle frightened; my action might be mistaken
for irreverence.
(Ellison 1915, pp.162-4)
But she is all laughter at having fooled some
E u r o p e a n s .
Just before we reached our carriage I saw a
dear friend… escorting some English visitors
round… She recognised my voice, and I was
introduced as a Turkish lady to my compatri-
o t s .
I felt just a little guilty at their delight in
meeting a r e a l Turkish woman, but it was too
dangerous to undeceive them in those fanati-
cal surroundings. “And how well you speak
English too!” they said. “English was the first
language I spoke,” I answered truthfully. I
wonder whether Miss A. ever told them who I
r e a l l y w a s ?
(Ellison 1915, p.169, my emphasis)
Yet though Ellison delights in being mistak-
en for a Turk, the narrative also marks out
her distance from her Oriental objects of
study, often by referencing her attempts to
‘capture’ Oriental women in photographs.
There is a beautiful old woman in the house-
hold whom I long to “Kodak”. Once I thought I
“had” her… but she noticed me, alas! then
cursed, screamed, and buried her head in her
roomy pantaloons. I shall not try to repeat the
e x p e r i m e n t .
(Ellison 1915, p.183)
Not only did the new technology of photog-
raphy develop coterminously with the new
investigative social sciences of anthropology
and ethnography, it also became an estab-
lished part of the fieldwork process – classify-
ing, conceptualizing and visualizing ‘other’
peoples. For Ellison, the Orient’s enchanting
distinctiveness becomes exasperating when
it thwarts her ethnographic and scopophilic
desire to gather photographic evidence: she
finds members of her hostess’s entourage to
be ‘most fanatical’ in their insistence that
photography is forbidden by Islam (though
photography was, in fact, increasingly avail-
able in Istanbul by this period). Defiantly en-
titling her book An Englishwoman in a Turkish
H a r e m, Ellison fronts it with a photograph of
herself, ‘The author in Turkish costume’, in
‘native’ dress – her hair covered by a t c h a r-
c h a f f, her face unveiled. The Ottoman clothes
are identified as ‘costume’, rendering ‘native’
clothing as timeless and archaic rather than
as modern fashion, further endorsing the sit-
ter’s racialized identification.
Grace Ellison is identified as ‘the author’ at
the head of the book, yet in another plate,
‘An Englishwoman wearing a Yashmak’ (see
photo), the identity of the woman as well as
her face is allegedly veiled. But it is clearly
Ellison and her face is still clearly visible,
being only partly obscured by the y a s h m a k.
If the logic of the veil is that one cannot
identify the wearer, why does the caption to
‘An Englishwoman wearing a Yashmak’
identify the nationality or race of the subject
but not her name? Passing only makes
sense if it can be based on the transgression
of clearly fixed boundaries of racial and cul-
tural difference. So Ellison, secure in her po-
sition as an ‘Englishwoman’, can be thrilled
when she hoodwinks people into thinking
that she is Turkish, just as she plans to hood-
wink her readers who open the book ex-
pecting one thing (disreputable ‘smoking
room’ tales of polygamy) and get another.
By presenting herself though photographs
and prose as willingly acculturated to Turk-
ish life, Ellison suggests the positive aspects
of haremization and keys into a mode of sur-
veillance based on invisible voyeurism.
Whilst the book pictures elite Ottoman
women’s adoption of Western fashions, Elli-
son herself only appears à la turque. Her
presence in English dress would be too anti-
exoticizing, would too much trouble the
transculturating drive of the book.
European harems
The reverse side of cross-cultural dressing
is illustrated by Zeyneb Hanum. Offering a
cogent criticism of the limitations of West-
ern ‘freedom’, she finds the harem in Europe:
What a curious harem!… [This] Ladies’ Club
[where she is staying in London] is not a big
enough reward for having broken away from
an Eastern harem… A club… is after all an-
other kind of harem, but it has none of the
mystery and charm of the Harem of the East.
(Zeyneb Hanum 1913, pp.182-6)
Zeyneb Hanum exerts a haremizing gaze on
the West that makes strange its familiar divi-
sion of space and organization of sexuality,
relocating Orientalism’s sexualized projec-
tions back to their Western point of origin:
But, my dear [Grace], why have you never told
me that the Ladies’ Gallery [in the Houses of
Parliament] is …the harem of the Govern-
ment!… You send your women out unpro-
tected all over the world, and here in the
workshop where your laws are made, you
cover them with a symbol of protection.
(Zeyneb Hanum 1913, p.194)
Clearly Zeyneb Hanum had European clothes
and even in Turkey, like many elite women,
would have habitually worn Paris fashions –
but remarkably in this book about her time in
Europe we see the sisters wearing Turkish
clothes in all but one of the illustrations. In
the face of the potentially acculturating ef-
fects of their sojourn in Europe these pho-
tographs work to maintain a sense of the au-
thor’s Turkishness. It is, after all, the racialized
specificity of her gendered gaze on Europe
which supports the rationale of the whole
book. So when we turn to photographs like
‘Zeyneb in her Paris drawing room’ (see
photo), we have a mixture of the two – a visi-
bly Turkish woman in her Turkified room in
the French capital. If the frontispiece to Elli-
son’s book, featuring her in ‘Turkish cos-
tume’, is designed to testify to the actuality
of her visits to Turkish harems, the photo-
graph which fronts Zeyneb Hanum’s book
shows her bringing the harem with her.
Being seen wearing a y a s h m a k in Paris
proves her authenticity as a Turkish woman
in the way most easily recognizable to the
West. Unlike Ellison, who can leave it to cap-
tions to distinguish her racialized identity,
Zeyneb Hanum’s book cannot start with any
hint of unreliability in its narrator.
Zeyneb Hanum’s identifications need to
be seen as performative, as identifications
which, rather than being natural or innate,
are constructed and understood through
the reiteration of socially and culturally rec-
ognizable signs of difference. The com-
pletely unnecessary wearing of the y a s h m a k
in the frontispiece makes sense if we allow
that the veil (in all its versions) is the ulti-
mate sign by which the Western consumer
can distinguish the ‘Oriental’ woman from
the Occidental. Her knowing deployment of
Orientalist imagery suggests a self-con-
scious manipulation of Western cultural
codes, since cross-cultural dressing would
have had a very different meaning for her in
an Ottoman context. There, Western com-
modities were seen as part of a continuum
of goods, the value of which was concerned
as much with rarity as with ideas of cultural
difference. So whereas the cross-dressing of
the English Ellison in Turkey works to en-
dorse the racialized boundaries she trans-
gresses, the excessive theatricality of
Zeyneb Hanum’s attempt to dress as a Turk
in Europe reveals the non-naturalness of
those apparently absolute differentiating
terms. Rather than transmit the Orient to
Europe it reveals the inventedness of tradi-
tions of cultural difference.
A longer version of this article previously appeared as
‘On Veiling, Vision and Voyage: Cross-Cultural
Dressing and Narratives of Identity’, I n t e r v e n t i o n s ,
Vol. 1, no. 4, 1999, pp. 500-520.
R e f e r e n c e s
– Ellison, Grace (1915), An Englishwoman in a Turkish
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European Impressions, London: Seeley, Service Co.
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N o t e
* The main portion of Punjabi literature prior to
British rule was written by Muslims in Persian
script. Most of the sacred Sikh literature was
written in Braj (western Hindi) using Gurmukhi
script. Of course sacred texts need not be judged
on their literary merit, but according to the
message they attempt to convey.
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Punja bi  L ite ra tur e
P E R V A I Z  N AZ I R
The colonization of the Punjab by the British ushered
in economic, social, cultural and legal conditions in
which Islamic identity came to assume new forms. In
pre-modern times, Waris Shah’s epic, H e e r, was an in-
tegral part of everyday life; it was recited at social
and literary gatherings. But the text had not yet be-
come the object of intellectual critique. Rather, the
critique embedded in the text suffused everyday
conflicts and pleasure. In the modern period, howev-
er, the text was dis-embedded from the life-world. It
became a site for the contestation of pre-modern and
modern forms of Islamic identity.
Modernity, 
R e - I s l a m i z a t i o n
and Waris Shah’s
H e e r
The re-Islamization that emerged during the
colonial period had distinctive modern fea-
tures. During this period both communal-
based (Muslim, Hindu and Sikh) and multi-
communal organizations appeared in the
Punjab. In the first category these included
the Muslim a n j u m a ns, and the s a b h as of the
Hindus and Sikhs; in the second category
were the various academies, circles and so-
cieties. Both types developed as a result of
British rule, and were the precursors of a
separate, developing national conscious-
ness among Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs in
the Punjab.
Even today, more copies of Waris Shah’s
H e e r are sold in Pakistan than any other
book – except the Qur’an. Waris Shah’s clas-
sic Punjabi text (completed in AH 1180; AD
1766) is considered by many familiar with
the work to be the greatest work in Punjabi,
and one of the greatest classical literatures
of the world.* Ostensibly a story of tragic
love between Heer Sial, who is poisoned by
her parents for wanting to marry Thidho
Ranjha against their wishes, H e e r is an ex-
tremely complex text which narrates the
economic, social, political and religious con-
ditions in the Punjab during the decline of
Muslim rule. After about a hundred years of
rule (1766-1849) by the Sikhs, the British an-
nexed the Punjab in 1849, and this period
marks the beginning of modernity, during
which this immensely popular work began
to be read differently from the pre-British
era. The work became ‘Islamized’ within the
context of Islamization of other aspects of
life for the Punjabi Muslims. British rule thus
witnessed the formation of newer forms of
Muslim identity, which were defined in a
more systematic and self-conscious manner
than before, and in relation to the new insti-
tutions established by the British.
The reading of H e e r during the period of
modernity presented an enormous dilem-
ma for Muslims (in ways it did not for the
Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab) because
here was an extremely popular text among
all classes of Punjabi Muslims, in which the
main characters (Heer and Ranjha) were en-
gaged in conduct that transgressed South
Asian and especially Muslim norms, but who
vindicated their conduct by seeking justifi-
cation in the same sources – such as the
S h a r ica – as did their antagonists (the Qazis
and Heer’s family). For example, Heer says
to the Qazi after her forced marriage: ‘You
have performed my n i k a h without my con-
sent. Your act and fatwa are not in accor-
dance with the Qur’an.’ Later another Qazi
declares this marriage null and void be-
cause it was contracted without Heer’s con-
s e n t .
‘Re-Islamization’ rather than ‘Islamization’
is emphasized because the period of British
rule (1849 onwards) is considered by many
scholars to be the time when the Islamiza-
tion of Muslims in the Punjab took place.
These scholars assume that Islamic tradition
was either non-existent or poorly devel-
oped in the Punjab prior to British rule.
What in fact happened was the re-interpre-
tation of the Muslim tradition in the context
of new conditions that emerged during
British rule.
In this context newer forms of religious
identities were developed which were rec-
ognized by the colonial state and embodied
in legislation, law courts and so on. The
reading of H e e r was far more problematic
for the Muslims than for the Hindus and
Sikhs, among whom this text was and is
popular also, but they read it differently
from the Muslims by omitting or de-empha-
sizing the Muslim aspects. In fact, during the
period under discussion the Hindus and
Sikhs began to write their own H e e r w i t h
Hindus and Sikhs as the main characters in
the text. This was because Waris Shah’s H e e r
began to be construed as a ‘Muslim’ text
since it uses Islamic concepts and language
– references to Islamic history and tradi-
tions, the Qur’an, S h a r ica, etc. – and the
main characters are Muslim. It describes
love which is both h a q i q i (spiritual) and m a-
j a z i (physical); the latter being prohibited to
those not married. Similarly, H e e r c o n t a i n s
definite notions of attire and conduct which
either conform to, or deviate from, Muslim
norms. The text also describes certain prac-
tices from which Muslims refrained in the
1 8t h century, as for example the use of all-
silk cloth, whilst silk mixed with cotton or
wool, called m a s h r u, was permitted (this
practice is no longer adhered to in contem-
porary Pakistani Punjab).
’Modern’ and ‘traditional’
r e s p o n s e s
Heer and Ranjha’s behaviour ostensibly
both conforms to and contradicts Muslim
tradition in that it permits a person to refuse
marriage, but also stipulates that children
must obey their parents. So how was this ex-
tremely popular text to be reconciled with
new forms of Muslim sentiments and identi-
ty that emerged during modernity? There
were two main responses among Muslim
scholars of H e e r in the Punjab. These may be
termed as those belonging to the ‘modern’
and the ‘traditional’ literary circles. It should
be noted, however, that the ‘traditional’
scholars were also the product of moderni-
ty, and their presence and their intellectual
concerns with regard to H e e r are nowhere
to be found prior to the period of moderni-
ty. In fact, the latter undertook the task of
reconciling this text with re-Islamization; a
task far more difficult than that undertaken
by the ‘modern’ literary circles. The term
‘traditional’ here means those informal liter-
ary societies that were not self-consciously
modelled on institutions introduced by the
British, with written rules and regulations,
formal membership and admissions proce-
dures, and so on. To this could be added
knowledge of the English language and par-
ticipation in the institutions introduced by
the British such as colleges, schools, and for-
mally organized workplaces.
For the modern literary circles that devel-
oped during British rule (the Punjabi Adabi
Academy and other a n j u m a ns), the main
preoccupation with H e e r was the editing
out of what were considered indecent pas-
sages from the text and the bringing of bal-
ance and symmetry to the verses. But most
of all they were concerned with the authen-
ticity of the verses: they wanted to purge all
verses which they suspected were not Waris
Shah’s own, i.e. included into the text after
his death. Thus the 1863 edition of H e e r
published by the Punjabi Adabi Academy is
entitled (in Punjabi) Heer Waris Shah, Au-
thentic and Purged of all Fake Verses.
The traditional literary circles published
the so-called Kashmiri Bazaar editions, such
as those by Mian Hidayatullah, Nawab
Sialkoti, Piran Ditta, and Maula Buksh Kush-
ta. In contrast to the modern editions cited
above, Sialkoti’s edition, also published in
the 19t h century, is entitled (in Punjabi) H e e r
Waris Shah, The Original and Largest Edition
with S h a r ica S h a r i f.
For the traditional scholars of H e e r t h e
main problem was to make the transgres-
sions of the text acceptable to Muslim read-
ers, something which no one felt was neces-
sary prior to the period of modernity. This
was for two reasons. Firstly, the absence of a
‘modern consciousness’ lacking in pre-mod-
ern times meant that H e e r did not have to
be defended on ‘modern’ lines. But now the
heightened consciousness of what was ‘Is-
lamic’ or ‘non-Islamic’ made such a defence
necessary. Secondly, during Sikh rule, Islam-
ic tradition was weakened in public spaces
and became more privatized. For example,
the a z a a n was banned during this period.
British rule created the conditions for the
development of civic institutions whereby
Muslims could publicly debate, dispute, and
propagate what might or might not be con-
sidered Islamic. The educational system,
newspapers, and reform societies all consti-
tuted such public arenas. For example, one
of the first ‘modern’ Islamic societies in the
Punjab, the Anjuman Islamiyah, was formed
in 1869 to promote the interests of Muslims.
The attempt to make Waris Shah’s H e e r a c-
ceptable was made by relating the narrative
in the text to Islamic tradition in general and
to the S h a r ica in particular. Thus the Kash-
miri bazaar editions contain extensive notes
and commentary relating the narrative in
H e e r to Islamic tradition. In fact, Sialkoti’s in-
troduction to his edition asks the question:
‘Was Ranjha a pious person?’ The answer is
in the affirmative because Ranjha goes
through trials and tribulations which many
pious persons in Islamic tradition have had
to go through, and analogy is drawn with
Yusuf and Zuleikha. There is scarcely any ev-
idence to suggest that Waris Shah’s master-
piece was read in any way other than as en-
tertainment, and that concerns about its
moral standing in relation to Islamic tradi-
tion can only be observed after the onset of
modernity – in spite of Waris Shah’s com-
ment on his own work: ‘Ahe maine Quran
kareem dhey nain, jaire shair mian Waris
Shah dhey nain’ (These verses by Waris Shah
are an interpretation of the Qur’an).
The point to be stressed here is that a
Muslim Punjabi modernity was not merely a
repetition or a derivative of European
modernity. Rather, it was a modern forma-





General Issues1 4 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  8 / 0 1
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AN H  N G A  L O N G V A
In 1994, Husayn Ali Qambar, a Kuwaiti S h ici, aban-
doned Islam and joined the Evangelical Church. The
news of his conversion caused quite a sensation in
Kuwait, as such an event is practically unheard of in
the Arabian Peninsula. Instead of keeping a low pro-
file, as is the custom amongst converts in the Middle
East, Qambar self-confidently stood up to the storm
of reactions. He agreed to meet with the press and
appeared in photos wearing a small silver cross
around his neck and holding a Bible in his hand. To
the question of why he had decided to become Chris-
tian, Qambar candidly answered ‘I have found God
e l s e w h e r e ’ .
Apostasy and
t h e L i b e r a l
P r e d i c a m e n t
to the association of liberalism with secular-
ism, politically expressed through the sepa-
ration of religion and state.
In the Kuwaiti context liberalism is primar-
ily understood in the latter sense. While
rights and liberties are also important, it is
not their embracement per se that makes a
Kuwaiti liberal. Rather, it is the embrace-
ment of the third tenet, the separation be-
tween d i n and d a w l a. As the term is used
here, a liberal is a person who looks upon re-
ligion as a personal matter and the public
sphere as a religiously neutral space. ‘Liber-
al’ is therefore commonly used in opposi-
tion to ‘Islamist’, the latter term referring to
people for whom religion pervades and
shapes every aspect of social life. Every-
where in the Middle East these days, Is-
lamists and liberals differ in their views on
the relationship between religion, public
life and politics. Kuwait is no exception.
When it comes to apostasy, however, a
strong consensus can be found across the
liberal/Islamist divide. Most people reacted
with anger and dismay at Qambar’s conver-
sion; even local human rights activists per-
ceived it as an offence that called for some
form of punishment. While there were only
few demands for the death penalty, most
people accepted unquestioningly the im-
plementation of the civil sanctions.3
Protecting the significant
c o m m u n i t y
It may be tempting for Westerners to see
in the apostasy law yet another instance of
the incompatibility between the illiberal
Muslim East and the liberal West, or indeed
the ultimate vindication of the orientalist
‘absences’ thesis. To assess the situation in
such terms is to miss the point. What we are
dealing with here is not so much the clash
between liberal and illiberal cultures as a
political and ethical challenge common to
all modern societies: How can the political
community be protected against real or per-
ceived threats while infringing as little as
possible on basic individual rights? From
this perspective, the difference between
Muslim and Western societies lies in the de-
finition of the community under threat
rather than in the measures they evolve to
thwart this threat.
All communities – whether ethnically, reli-
giously or nationally defined – depend for
their existence on the allegiance of their
members; they are therefore keen to watch
their boundaries and the movements across
such boundaries. Not all large-scale com-
munities achieve the same degree of signif-
icance, nor are they all mutually exclusive.
To many in the Middle East, the most signif-
icant large-scale community is the u m m a.
Elsewhere, for example in Europe, it is the
nation-state. As a universal spiritual com-
munity, the u m m a throws its doors wide
open to incoming members but severely re-
stricts the right to exit. By contrast, nation-
states generally tend to be lenient on the
right to exit while keeping a particularly vig-
ilant eye on the admission of new members.
When confronted with acts construed as be-
trayal of the significant community, reac-
tions everywhere tend to be rather similar.
Thus nation-states deal with individuals
found guilty of treason by stripping them of
their freedom, and/or citizenship rights; in
case of high treason, they may even be sen-
tenced to death.
The politics of recognition
A further parallel can be drawn if we ap-
proach apostasy within the framework of the
politics of recognition. The most remarkable
feature of the case under study is not Qam-
bar’s conversion in itself, but the self-confi-
dence with which he faced his society’s criti-
cism. Qambar publicly defended his decision
by invoking the Kuwaiti constitution and the
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
From insights gained through interviews
with the convert, the conclusion can be
drawn that he sought to assert not only his
right to choose his own faith but also his
right to be accepted for who he is and be-
long in the Kuwaiti community on his own
terms. In other words, Qambar was seeking
not merely toleration but recognition.
Anyone familiar with developments in
Western societies within the past two to
three decades realizes that this is the same
demand that lies at the core of the multicul-
turalism debate, which is raging these days
on both sides of the Atlantic. In this debate,
which has split the liberal camp, more than
one Western liberal have rejected the cul-
tural minorities’ right to difference on the
grounds that such recognition would frag-
ment the national community and under-
mine its value consensus. On the opposite
side, liberal defenders of minority groups do
not hesitate to assert the primacy of certain
collective rights at the expense of important
individual rights. For example, Charles Tay-
l o r4 has argued in favour of the Quebec lan-
guage legislation, which among other
things forbids French-speaking Quebecois
to send their children to English-language
schools. Although this law clearly infringes
on the parents’ freedom of choice, Taylor
finds it justifiable because it guarantees the
continued existence of the French-speaking
minority of Canada. Taylor and other West-
ern political philosophers question not only
the classical liberal tendency to defend indi-
vidual rights at all costs, but also the liberal
Kantian conception of justice that does not
presuppose any particular conception of
the good life. As Michael Sandel5 puts it:
‘The fundamental question is whether the
right is prior to the good.’ I believe Sandel
articulates here the concern of the majority
of Kuwaiti liberals for whom rights may not,
or not always, be an end in themselves. The
reason that liberal informants could not
bring themselves to support Qambar’s free-
dom to convert may be seen as related to
their conviction that the virtue of rights lies
in the fact that they promote an end pre-
sumed to be good. Islam being in their eyes
the ultimate religion, they regard the apos-
tasy law, which prevents Muslims from mak-
ing the mistake of leaving the community’s
fold, as a good law. The end it promotes is
more important than the restrictions it
places on freedom of choice, which if exer-
cised may lead Muslims astray.
The implementation of the apostasy law
in several Middle Eastern countries is
viewed by human rights experts as a major
problem. In my opinion, the severity of the
law justifies both concern and criticism. It is
meanwhile important to bear in mind that
neither the rationale behind the law nor the
reluctance of Muslim liberals to put an end
to its implementation is unique and peculiar
to Islam or Muslim societies. Rather, it illus-
trates a predicament common to all political
communities. If we wish to argue against
the law, we should start from this common-
ality of dilemmas and concerns and not
from the rhetoric of difference between a
liberal (read: morally superior) West and an
illiberal Muslim world.
When it became clear that he would not
withdraw his decision, Qambar was sued for
apostasy. The case was tried in the S h ici
Court of First Instance, and in May 1996
Qambar was officially declared an apostate.
By then, he had already lost his family, his
home and his income. Qambar appealed
against the ruling, but shortly before the ap-
peal was to be reviewed, he was granted a
visa to the USA and was flown out of Kuwait.
I r t i d a d or conversion from Islam, also
known as apostasy, has always been a seri-
ous offence in the Middle East.1 A c c o r d i n g
to tradition, the apostate is to be executed;
pending execution, he/she is deprived of
the right to remain married to his/her Mus-
lim spouse, to retain guardianship over
his/her Muslim-born children and to inherit
or hold possessions. Within the personal
status laws of several Middle Eastern coun-
tries, these civil sanctions are codified and
spelled out explicitly. The apostasy law thus
strips the apostates of their most basic
r i g h t s .
The scientific literature on apostasy is lim-
ited. Discussions centre almost exclusively
on whether the death penalty is required by
the Qur’an. While of great scholarly interest,
they have no practical relevance since in
most Muslim countries today conversion is
no longer punishable by death. What re-
mains in force are the civil sanctions, which
violate several basic rights and freedoms.
Yet there is a perceptible reluctance in Mid-
dle Eastern societies, including within liber-
al circles, to discuss this form of punish-
ment. What are the reasons behind this re-
l u c t a n c e ?
Liberalism East and West
According to Bryan S.Turner,2 o r i e n t a l i s t s ,
in their attempt to imagine the Muslim
world as the radical Other of the West, de-
pict Islam as a ‘cluster of absences’. Possibly
the deficiency most widely and persistently
associated with Islam in the Western imagi-
nation is the absence of liberal thinking.
Within the past two centuries, liberalism
has acquired a wide range of meanings, all
of which do not necessarily correspond to
the ideas of the doctrine’s founding fathers.
Liberalism is increasingly understood as the
equivalent of democracy. Indeed, many
Westerners would argue that liberalism is
found only in the West, and they would dis-
agree with talk of liberalism in the Middle
East, let alone the Arabian Peninsula. A dis-
cussion of this view would have to be car-
ried out elsewhere. What is important to
point out here is that as a philosophical doc-
trine liberalism contains several basic
tenets, not all of which are equally focused
upon in practice. Different societies choose
to define liberalism by laying stress on one
or some particular tenet(s). Among the prin-
ciples that liberal thought characteristically
emphasizes are autonomy of choice, the pri-
macy of the individual over the collective,
and reason over faith. The first two tenets
have given rise to the centrality of individ-
ual rights and liberties; the third one has led
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Sa tel l i te  T V
N A J I B  G H AD B I AN
Satellite television stations are subtly challenging
the state’s monopoly over the means of persuasion
and information in the Arab world. A Qatari-based
television channel, Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Syrian
politics exemplifies how satellite television is chang-
ing the conditions of communication between citi-
zens and states in the Arab world and increasing the
space for civil society, creating more moments in
television that are not as controlled by states. The
significance of the Syrian case lies in the fact that the
Syrian regime is highly authoritarian and still main-
tains near total control of information and communi-
cation. The following examines Al-Jazeera’s report-
ing of several issues considered highly sensitive ac-
cording to the censorship policies of Syria’s Min-
istries of Information and Culture and Guidance: po-
litical opposition in Syria, succession, and the impact
of the peace process on the regime’s survival ability.
A l - J a z e e r a ’ s
Coverage of
S y r i a n P o l i t i c s
Since the 1963 military coup, the Syrian au-
thority closed down all independent newspa-
pers. It passed several restrictive articles
under the State of Emergency that gave the
state the right to control newspapers, books,
broadcasting, advertising, and visual arts,
which might be threatening the security of
the state.1 Starting in 1974, the Syrian media
became a vehicle to promote the cult of Asad.
Syria’s style of
c o m m u n i c a t i o n
The Syrian government has developed a
long list of taboo topics. For example, it
does not allow criticism of the following
topics: the president and his family, the rul-
ing B act h Party, the military, the legitimacy
of the regime, the sectarian question, the
government’s human rights record, Islamic
opposition, involvement of Syrian troops in
Lebanon, graphic descriptions of sex, and
materials unfavourable to the Arab cause in
the Arab-Israeli conflict.2
The government also has not tolerated any
independent source of information consid-
ered threatening to, or critical of, the regime.
A case in point is the crackdown on indepen-
dent Lebanese newspapers in Lebanon im-
mediately following the Syrian military inter-
vention there. Moreover, human rights orga-
nizations documented the arrest, expulsion,
and even assassination of prominent journal -
ists by Syrian security forces. Nonetheless, the
Syrian government has not succeeded in
maintaining total control over the dissemina-
tion of information. Syrian citizens turned, be-
fore the age of satellite television, to Western
radio stations such as the BBC, Monte Carlo,
and to a lesser extent the Voice of America.
Occasionally, Syrian media, especially
newspapers, have been allowed and some-
times encouraged to criticize corrupt offi-
cials in the bureaucracy. While the Syrian
government has strived to maintain its strict
control over the dissemination of informa-
tion, it has been less successful in control-
ling the receiving satellite dishes than in re-
stricting the internet.
Al-Jazeera’s contesting
c o v e r a g e
Al-Jazeera’s coverage of Syrian politics has
moved toward progressively more assertive
coverage of Syrian politics, pushing the lim-
its with each report. The coverage has in-
cluded three types of issues: indirect refer-
ence to Syria under topics such as democra-
cy, human rights and Islamic fundamental-
ism in the Arab world; direct discussion of
the Syrian-Israeli peace process; and report-
ing on Syrian domestic developments.
Over the last three years, programmes
such as al-Itijah a l - M uca k i s (Opposite Direc-
tions) and Akthar min Ra’i (More than One
Opinion) and Bila Hudud (Without Bounds),
have debated democracy and human rights
with a tone condemning authoritarianism
and human rights violations. Another offen-
sive topic for the Syrian regime is the issue
of Islamic opposition. Having confronted an
armed Islamic movement in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the Syrian government
considers this topic taboo. Al-Jazeera fea-
tured an interview with the leader of the
banned Syrian Muslim Brothers for two
hours on the programme Without Bounds.
Both the Syrian and general Arab audiences
had the opportunity to hear a very moder-
ate voice advocating democracy, demand-
ing an end to marshal law rule, and insisting
that his party be legalized.3
The second category of coverage concerns
the Syrian role in the peace process. While
the overall coverage is somewhat sympa-
thetic, discussions of the domestic impera-
tives and implications of the peace process
for the Syrian regime and society have not
always been appreciated by the Syrian gov-
ernment. On More than One Opinion, Najib
Ghadbian – the author of this article – being
one of the guests, questioned the lack of
democracy in Syria and how this affects the
peace process. Syrians do not get the chance
to debate their government’s policies in
their press or their rubberstamp parliament.4
The third contest over the dissemination of
information between Al-Jazeera and the Syri-
an regime is in the area of reporting and
analysing significant domestic political devel-
opments. When the Syrian President Asad
died, Al-Jazeera played a leading role in the
coverage of the domestic and regional impli-
cations of the departure of Asad. It was on this
station that several Arab commentators ex-
pressed their outrage over the speedy
amendment of the Constitution in order to in-
stall Asad’s son, Bashar. Another recent exam-
ple is Al-Jazeera’s distinguished coverage of
Monzer al-Mouseli, an independent member
of the People’s Assembly, who dared to raise
an objection to the formality of the infamous
constitutional amendment. Syrian television
discontinued broadcasting during his daring
remarks, transmitting instead the comments
of the Speaker who censured Mouseli and
made a statement on his behalf, affirming
that ‘the respected member’s sinful part of his
soul led him into error, and he has realized his
mistake and repented.’ Al-Jazeera had a full
report of what had happened and then inter -
viewed Mouseli to get his side of the story,
which was totally suppressed by the Speak-
er’s comments. The interview was followed
by another discussion with Mustapha Ab-
dulcal, the director of the Centre for Pluralism,
who was very sarcastic about the session and
the obvious lack of freedom of expression in
the Syrian Assembly.5
Response and effects
Al-Jazeera soon became a major contend-
ing source of news for many Syrians. Some
Syrian viewers, however, have complained
that Al-Jazeera’s programmes are more con-
fusing than illuminating. Some viewers in
Damascus say that Syrian audiences are
alarmed at hearing vehement contradictory
views about such basic issues, being used to
hearing only one correct version of the
‘ t r u t h ’ .6
As for Syrian officials, the rise of Al-Jazeera
coincided with the ascendance of Bashar al-
Asad to power. Officials have attempted to
engage this medium rather than to boycott
it. They express approval of Al-Jazeera as
long as it does not step on what they con-
sider sensitive topics or violate what they
consider ‘objective’ reporting.
The participation of Syrian officials in Al-
Jazeera’s programmes has revealed their in-
ability to communicate effectively with au-
diences outside Syria. One example of Syri-
an officials’ attempts to take advantage of
the newly popular channel is the appear-
ance of the Riyadh N acs a n Agha, head of the
Political Office of the President, on W i t h o u t
Bounds just after the death of Asad.7 A g h a
immediately clashed with the host and lost
the sympathy of most Arab viewers when he
tried to assert that the succession of Bashar
Asad to power was not a command from
above but an overwhelmingly popular
choice. He had real difficulties communicat-
ing with viewers from other Arab countries
who were shocked by his logic – or lack
thereof. One viewer from Egypt described
Agha’s argument as ‘an insult to the intelli-
gence of the audience.’
Lately, there has been some evidence that
the Syrian government is relaxing its control
over media. This retreat could be attributed
to two factors. Firstly, many Syrian channels
are losing audiences to other channels (e.g.
Al-Jazeera) or types of media; and secondly,
more recently the new leader seems to want
to lead the country into the information age.
A number of measures have been taken
which indicate real efforts by the Syrian gov-
ernment to modify its media policy in re-
sponse to the competition. During the 9t h
Congress of the B act h Party, the new minis-
ter of information criticized the performance
of the Syrian media, using harsh language to
describe his predecessor and claiming that
Syria did not have a true ‘media policy’.8
After his inauguration, Bashar issued two
directives pertaining to the development of a
‘new media discourse’. The first directive
asked chief editors of print and broadcast
media to embark on a ‘calm, logical, and bal-
anced media address’, which would ‘respect
the intelligence of the audience’.9 The sec-
ond instruction was to stop printing and
posting new pictures of him, and to stop the
use of the phrase a l-Ra’is al-Khaled (the im-
mortal President). Such immortality, he said
with remarkable insight, is only for God. The
ministry of information reshuffled the heads
of its major departments, newspaper editors,
and the heads of the Syrian radio and televi-
sion agency to reflect the new openness.
The third important indication that change
is afoot in Syria came from journalists and in-
tellectuals who demanded more freedom of
speech and accountability. Ninety-nine Syri-
an writers issued a statement demanding
freedom of expression, freedom of the press,
and an end to one-party rule. 1 0
While Al-Jazeera cannot claim full responsi-
bility for all these positive changes, it can be
credited with forcing the media in Syria – as
elsewhere in the Arab world – to redefine
their discourse so as not to lose what is left of
their audiences. Despite the success of chan-
nels such as Al-Jazeera in expanding the com-
munication and dissemination of informa-
tion, it is clear that they cannot topple author-
itarian regimes. As the Syrian case demon-
strates, authoritarian regimes are capable of
coping with the new technology and expand-
ed public sphere. Another limitation on Al-
Jazeera’s ability to continue its contest with
authoritarian media has to do with its ability
to maintain its independence. Nonetheless,
Al-Jazeera has become a phenomenon, and
owes this as much to its own approach as to
the failure of the official Arab media.
More than
O n eO p i n i o n,
A l-J a z e e r a .
Media1 6 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  8 / 0 1
Medi a  Re spr esenta t i o ns
T.  D E N I Z E R K ME N
On 22 September 1999 the dead body of an 18-year-
old girl was found in a cemetery in Istanbul, Turkey.
Massive media coverage was launched when the po-
lice discovered that she had been killed by two
young men and a young woman, who, claiming to be
Satanists, testified that one of them had orders from
Satan to perform the sacrifice. When the public pros-
ecutor used the description of Satanism in the formal
charges brought against the accused, Satanism en-
tered the legal documents as a new crime for the first
time in Turkish legal history. The three perpetrators
were judged guilty of murder and were sentenced to
a total of 25 years in prison.
Construction of
S a t a n i s m
in Turkish Secularist and
Islamist Newspapers
Although since the youths were imprisoned
media interest in Satanism has died down,
all newspapers had covered the issue ex-
tensively in the period leading up to and in-
cluding their trial. There were conferences,
talk shows and heated debates on various
television channels where important public
figures voiced their opinions on the issue.
The police declared Satanism an organized
terrorist group and began arresting youths
who were considered to be connected.
Places suspected of being hangouts of Sa-
tanists were raided, and bars and clubs ac-
cused of being frequented by adherents to
the movement were shut down.
This new, marginal issue of Satanism was
appropriated by different sectors of Turkish
society and placed into existing matrices.
However, before commencing with the dis-
cussion, the following brief overview of
constructionist theories offers useful tools
for understanding the Satanic hype.
Social problems are, according to con-
structionists, socially constructed. Instead
of concentrating on the analysis of actual
practitioners as was done in early sociolog-
ical literature, constructionists argued that
there was no significant Satanist danger, al-
though it has been defined as a social prob-
lem. Concentrating on the portrayal and
representation of Satanism, they under-
lined social mechanisms such as ‘scape-
goating’ and stereotyping in public re-
sponses to Satanism. Accordingly, the
forming of a stereotype involves the cre-
ation of a ‘reverse mirror image of one’s so-
ciety’ in which the ‘evil enemy’ is depicted
as having all those unflattering qualities
that contrast with the virtues of that soci-
ety. This activity aims at restoring an ideal-
ized society and serves the function of ‘uni-
fying the conflicting elements within a soci-
ety, by imposing unity on something that is
fragmented’ (Jeffrey S. Victor: Satanic Panic:
The Creation of a Contemporary Legend,
Chicago and La Salle: Open Court Press,
1993, p.41). It enables rising collective anxi-
ety to be released, especially in times of in-
creased tension.
If the ‘scapegoating’ is about construct-
ing an ideal society, is it possible to find
shared ideals between Islamic and secular
groups in Turkey? Indeed, there is a unify-
ing activity occurring as a result of the
shared patriarchal norms of both groups.*
Reading the newspapers
Both liberal/secular and Islamic newspa-
pers depict a Satanist stereotype and tell us
that the Satanists can be detected by their
physical appearance and behaviour. For in-
stance, M i l l i y e t states that Satanists ‘mostly
come from richer families and live in better
neighbourhoods of the cities. They are in-
terested in perverse music types such as
heavy metal and black metal. They have
long hair and they wear black t-shirts with
Satan and skull prints on them. They look
unkempt and grungy. [Satanism] is com-
mon among youths between the ages of 14
and 25’ (22 September 1999).
This basic stereotype of the Satanist as
being young, long haired, clad in black with
tattoos and earrings, looking untidy and lis-
tening to ‘perverse’ music is repeated over
and over in all the papers – always with
some mention of alcohol, drugs, bars, clubs
and nightlife. Names of places that they fre-
quent and magazines they read are also
mentioned. Along with these descriptions
are vivid accounts of what they do, which
being generally very much against legal and
ethical conventions of Turkish society, help
to define the group as a social problem.
These accounts are similar in both groups of
papers. Accordingly, the Satanists ‘worship
Satan and conduct rituals in which they sac-
rifice virgins. They drink animal blood, […]
they conduct activities that go beyond all
borders, and they carry out horrifying mur-
ders […]’ (Z a m a n, 22 September 1999).
‘They sacrifice their own children, have sex
with a newly killed corpse, kill their father
and mutilate his body without showing any
signs of guilty conscience, use young
women maliciously to drink their blood and
eat their internal organs. […] They enter
into cemeteries at night, choose a girl
among themselves, cut her up with a knife,
smear her with animal blood and satisfy the
Satan by having intercourse with the muti-
lated girl. They are against all religions and
holy books’ (M i l l i y e t, 22 September 1999).
As the Satanists begin to be characterized
as ‘sick’, ‘perverted’, ‘psychologically unbal-
anced’, and ‘lunatic’, or as ‘alienated’, ‘de-
tached’ and ‘lost’, interpretations and moral
judgements about their existence and solu-
tions for preventing them come to the fore.
The accounts of both sides emphasize the
moral void of the youth that leads to a
search for identity. However, a discrepancy
emerges between the secular and Islamist
newspapers in their primary line of argu-
mentation. The majority of comments in the
Islamist newspapers explain the situation
not as a problem with the youth, but with
society and social life in general. The youth
is only one part of the whole in which the
problem is manifested. According to those
accounts, Turkish social life is becoming
alienated from its traditional cultural roots,
moral tradition and national/traditional val-
ues (Yeni Safak, 26 and 27 September 1999).
There is no longer a moral unity, national
culture or totality within Turkish society
(Milli Gazete, 24 September 1999). All this is
due to the severance of the nation from reli-
gion. Once religion, which is ‘the most im-
portant factor in shaping a society’s moral
values’, is removed, the ensuing moral void
in society leaves the youth prey to all kinds
of marginal and perverse beliefs (Ibid.). It is
the system that pushes the youth to where
they end up, by not teaching them their reli-
gion properly, closing down the schools
that teach religion, and replacing them with
‘materialist’ education (Ibid., 25 and 26 Sep-
tember 1999). The youth, with proper Islam-
ic culture, would not ‘use drugs, murder, [or]
drink blood’ (Ibid., 24 September 1999).
Some of these arguments have a harsh,
even accusing tone towards the secularists
for being the cause.
Secularist newspapers, on the other hand,
picture the problem more as one related to
adolescence, in which the identity-search-
ing youth somehow fall in to the hands of
those waiting to impart their dangerous be-
liefs. Not only ‘mystic’ groups like that of the
Satanists, but ‘other materialist totalitarian
groups’ can also captivate the youth by of-
fering them a sense of belonging and iden-
tity (M i l l i y e t, 22 September 1999). This crisis
of identity is emerging from a system that
lacks meaning and is related to the traumas
of modernization. Hence, the cause is not lo-
cated in Turkey in another group, but is
rather a global issue of modernity. The solu-
tion also comes from the globe, especially
the West. It has been indicated that Western
societies encourage healthy communities
and voluntary organizations against illness-
es such as these, thus implying that Turkey
should do the same.
Points of convergence
The above findings reveal that even
though both liberal/secular and Islamist
newspapers present Satanism as a ‘belief
system’, there is never an indication that
people can actually choose to believe in it.
The Satanists are depicted as sick, atomized,
deviant or part of a terrorist group. They are
deceived, seized and captivated by danger-
ous forces or are coerced by the corrupt sys-
tem into the situation in which they find
t h e m s e l v e s .
Both secularists and Islamists have made
attempts to control the youth – which has
become an area of contestation, just as
‘women’ – since they are the perpetuators
of society and symbols of its ideals. Al-
though the Kemalist regime paid special at-
tention to gender roles and gender equality,
it did not change the patriarchal order but
rather maintained the basic cultural conser-
vatism of gender relations. These patriar-
chal norms of morality are, however, not
only hierarchical in terms of gender but also
in terms of age. Both Islamists and secular-
ists share this patriarchal norm regarding
the role and position of the youth. They
both see young people not as responsible
individuals, but as a group to be shaped for
the future. They postpone the present – a
situation in which young individuals are not
supposed to participate or to speak up, but
need to be educated, follow rules, obey, and
only realize themselves in the future. Both
groups also underline values such as obedi-
ence, education, loyalty, devoutness, seri-
ousness, decency, and modesty in outlook
and lifestyles – and not creativity, individual
choice or criticism. While secularists aspire
to westernization and modernization, they
nevertheless place limits on these. One has
to be modest; if not, one falls into decaden-
cy. Thus, both groups agree on setting
boundaries on excessive individualization.
Despite Islamists’ and secularists’ seem-
ingly different reasons for the existence of
Satanists, there is a unifying activity: both
groups conjoin in not accepting a different
mode of living, a different type of youth.
They both exclude those who do not fit the
patriarchal norms. Furthermore, in both in-
stances, the constructed stereotype is vague
and thus potentially targets anyone who is
part of a larger hard rock/heavy metal sub-
c u l t u r e .
Youth subcultures represent symbolic vio-
lations of social order and can be seen as
provoking the dominant culture. Groups
differentiate themselves through construct-
ing unique styles that define an identity and
offer particularity. They are collective articu-
lations of a cultural critique that establishes
and maintains a new self-concept and sym-
bolically challenges the dominant culture’s
value system.
In accordance with constructionist expla-
nations of Satanic hype, it can be seen that
in the context of growing tension between
Islamists and secularists a trigger event –
the murder story – leads to an explosion in
one of the areas of contestation in Turkish
society, revealing dissatisfaction with the
moral order. Nonetheless, the two groups
are united in their establishing of an enemy
that incarnates all the negative virtues to
which both aim to put an end. By overreact-
ing and depicting this subculture’s mem-
bers as deviants or terrorists, both sides
downplay the possibility that Satanism may
be presenting a social critique in the form of
symbolic violations of social order. Howev-
er, in both groups of newspapers as well as
in the accounts in this article, what is lacking
is the voice of the Satanists, both those who
call themselves such and those who are sim-
ply perceived as such. Without this, our un-
derstanding of the dynamics of this subcul-
ture and whether it presents a social cri-
tique is limited and undoubtedly deserves
greater attention.
N o t e
* The arguments in this article are based on the
author’s close reading of three liberal/secular and
three Islamic newspapers, namely Milliyet, Hurriyet,
Sabah, Yeni Safak, Zaman and Milli Gazete, for a 
15-day period following the event.
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I n t e r n e t
M A TT H I AS  B R Ü C K N E R
Since the mid-1990s, Islamic webcontent has grown
considerably. The distribution of fatwas, one of the
most booming components of Islamic webcontent, is
becoming a must for any Islamic website. In 1999 at
least 10,000 fatwas were to be found online. In the
year 2000 the number rose to at least 14,000 fatwas,
and this year thousands more are sure to be added to
the score. Since the time of the Prophet Muhammad,
the provision of fatwas has been an important social
barometer. The interactive component of the internet
has made online fatwa services not only possible, but
easy and accessible as well. Such virtual services,
however, impact certain Islamic beliefs and practices.
I s l a m i C i t y
Creating an Islamic
C y b e r s o c i e t y
The distribution of fatwas via internet can
be divided into two major groups: the first
group comprises the so-called ‘fatwa
archives’, which are simply compilations of
fatwas that are already published in books.
The second group, ‘fatwa services’, involves
the process of creating fatwas online. There
is usually an online form provided, where
users can pose their questions. Through
these forms, information is also obtained
about the users. The fatwas are then deter-
mined by muftis and subsequently pub-
lished on the website.
I s l a m i C i t y1 (based in the USA) is one of the
two main Wahhabi players on the internet –
the other being Islam – Question & Answer.2
IslamiCity has already published about
5,000 fatwas on the internet, while the Dar
al-Ifta al-misriyya,3 for example, has pub-
lished but 300 fatwas online. The massive
interest in IslamiCity’s fatwa service, howev-
er, has led the founders of the site to slow
down the services so as to search for funds
to finance the site in the future. In the mean-
time, fatwas from the Saudi daily, A r a b
N e w s, have been added to the IslamiCity
d a t a b a s e .
IslamiCity is more than just a fatwa ser-
vice. It provides information on the Qur’an,
the Sunna, the Hajj, and other Islamic topics.
It offers radio and television channels, chat-
rooms, Islamic screensavers and electronic
greeting cards. It also offers space for adver-
tising. Users are offered the possibility to
play an Islamic quiz, donate z a k a t online, or
even order flowers. All services are guided
by an Islamic etiquette. In this sense, such Is-
lamic web-programming could be consid-
ered comparable to the concept of Islamic
b a n k i n g .
Intercultural settings
IslamiCity is based in the USA and the
muftis Muhammed Musri, Dr Ahmed H. Sakr,
Dr Muzammil Siddiqui and Dr Yahia Abdul
Rahman, currently working and living in the
USA, and Dr Dani Doueiri and his ‘Imam
Team’ from Beirut handle the fatwa ques-
tions. This demonstrates that virtual fatwas
are different from ‘normal’ fatwas. In cyber-
space, it makes no difference where the
mufti and the m u s t a f t i are located. Ques-
tions from all around the world can be, and
indeed are, posted to IslamiCity. The techni-
cal management of the website distributes
the questions to the muftis, for example in
Beirut. So, i f t a becomes abstract. The mufti
no longer sees the m u s t a f t i , and the m u s t a f t i
no longer hears his voice. In such a context,
the mufti cannot determine the background
information of a question, and cannot per-
ceive the potential dubious aspects of a
question. He is bound by its textual form.
This was the case, for example, for a ques-
tion (No. 1301)4 about t a p a i, a Malaysian
dish with fermented cooked rice, which
consists of 5-10% alcohol. A religious
teacher had told the questioner that it was
halal, since the alcohol does not come from
grapes. But according to IslamiCity’s mufti it
is h a r a m, because it is fermented without
oxygen and this always produces ethyl alco-
hol. The thing is, t a p a i might be a common
dish in Malaysia, and a mufti based else-
where can only abstractly solve the prob-
lem. He may not know anything about living
in Malaysia. To avoid this type of rice might
cause serious nutritional problems for Mus-
lims there. Who knows? The following an-
swer to a similar type of question shows
more sensibility in terms of local differences
(No. 4063):
‘In certain countries, Coca Cola does (or
used to) include alcohol and in this case, the
drink is considered Haram. In many Muslim
countries, there are Islamic establishments
(like Dar al-Fatwa or the highest religious
authority) that monitor such drinks and
foods to make sure they don’t contain alco-
hol, in which case the drink becomes per-
missible. We don’t know the situation in
Australia and we suggest that you contact
Coca Cola itself to find out about the alcohol
content in their drinks. The same should
apply with Pepsi Cola. Please update us.’
IslamiCity is also faced with problems of
intercultural settings within the USA itself.
There was a case involving a Japanese
neighbour who adamantly tried to give a
box of liquor to a Muslim as a Christmas pre-
sent. The Muslim got the impression his
Japanese neighbour’s English was so bad
that it was impossible to explain to him that
alcohol is not allowed in Islam. Finally, the
Japanese left the liquor at the doorstep of
the Muslim’s house. IslamiCity’s solution
was to empty the bottles of alcohol into the
sink (No. 351).
C y b e r f a t w a s
It seems that some users are confused as
to whether IslamiCity actually exists in real
geographic space. Though the answers to
questions do clarify that it is in cyberspace,
they nonetheless call the guests ‘tourists’
and not ‘surfers’ (No. 3203, 3677). Other
users are obviously more than aware of the
cyber-location of the site, as one reader
even asked (No. 1754):
‘Dearest virtual imam of the esteemed
cyber-city, I attended jummah salat t o d a y ,
and wanted to merely inquire that since we
are living in this hectic hussle bussle life,
would it be possible to attend your virtual
k h u t b a s and maybe even on a virtual Friday,
and skip the live Friday sermon. This would
greatly aid the conservation of time and en-
ergy in our lives. Dearest imam, please write
back soon as you can see that I’m desper-
ately in need of guidance. And I feel that
your virtual hand will virtually correct my
ways. Eagerly awaiting your reply is your
brother Abdullah (but my friends call me
C h a r l i e ) . ’
To answer this question is a delicate task.
Considering its formulation, one might even
doubt the sincerity of the questioner. Jean
Baudrillard’s theory of hyper-reality might
be the best way to explain it: hyper-reality
means that the signs no longer hide reality,
but hide the absence of reality.5 This is ex-
pressed by the view of the questioner, who
would like to replace reality by virtual reali-
ty. According to his question, not only the
sermon, but also the Friday itself should be
replaced. In this way, a symbiosis between
Islam and internet is possible. In the mufti’s
answer, while the revolutionary component
of the internet is acknowledged, he insists
on having mosques in physical space. His
answer to this question is all the more deli-
cate because the questioner is obviously fa-
miliar with new media. The mufti has to
prove that he can adequately respond,
demonstrating his mastery of the specific
vocabulary and its meanings.
Another question raised involves whether
the internet itself is h a r a m (No. 1474). Islam-
iCity’s opinion is that the internet is a tool
that can be used for good or for bad purpos-
es (No. 294, 492, 3252, 3468, 3495). This
means that the internet in itself is not
h a r a m. Nonetheless, it is understandable
that some question this since, for example,
computer images do not fall under the Is-
lamic prohibition of images (No. 829). Thus,
developers of computer games are allowed
to draw pictures (No. 3606).
The aim of using the internet for good Is-
lamic purposes has resulted in some new
topics for fatwas. For example, before read-
ing a digital Qur’an one should perform the
ablution, but does not need to (No. 1101,
1880); the recitation in the background of a
webpage is not allowed (No. 3343); and
d acw a via internet is possible (No. 2078). As
IslamiCity offers its own chatrooms, it is im-
portant to know how to use them: chatroom
discussions are allowed as long as Islamic
etiquette is taken into account and useful Is-
lamic topics are being discussed (No. 223).
For example, one may take a valid s h a h a d a
in the chatroom (No. 752, 2873, 3699). As
there is a physical distance, the chatrooms
offer an opportunity for conversation with
the opposite sex. If people should happen
to fall in love as a result, it is not wrong, but
they should not from the beginning have
the intention to meet someone in cyber-
space with a view to marriage (No. 1983).
Muftis warn of disappointments when peo-
ple, who have only chatted on the internet,
meet in reality. Therefore, the intention to
marry should be a true and sincere one, es-
pecially when the two people concerned
communicate privately over the internet
(No. 824, 1221, 1724, 2774, 3099). In such a
case, it is even allowed to exchange photos
(No. 1092). It should be noted, however,
that Shaykh Muhammad ibn Saalih a l -
cU t h a y m e e n issued a fatwa via internet in
which he forbade the sending of photos to
an ‘internet fiancée’ (Islam – Question & An-
swer, No. 4027). There are thus two contra-
dictory Wahhabi viewpoints on this ques-
tion, which means that even in the Wahhabi
school consensus does not exist.
A multitude of competing Islamic opin-
ions are distributed via internet. In one of its
responses, IslamiCity points out that the dy-
namic change of websites is a limiting factor
to the verification of the authenticity of in-
formation, stating that IslamiCity does not
act as a watchdog over all material (No.
2055). With the possibilities of the internet,
IslamiCity builds not only an Islamic institu-
tion but also creates a community of virtual-
ly connected Muslims.
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Rend er i ng Tr a di ti o ns
C H A R L E S  H I R S C H K I N D
Within scholarship on contemporary Islam, one of
the issues that has generated considerable discus-
sion (and often perplexity) concerns the accuracy or
validity of Muslim historical claims. Many authors
have pointed to a discrepancy between what Muslim
activists today invoke as belonging to the traditions
of Islam and the actual historical record of Islamic so-
cieties. It is argued that historical reality is ignored or
rejected, while a false, distorted, or selective version
of the past is affirmed in its place. In attempting to
characterize and explain this use (or misuse) of histo-
ry, scholars have had recourse to a variety of con-
cepts, some of which merit a re-examination, espe-
cially in light of recent work within historiography. A
brief review of these concepts suggests a need for
new analytical approaches to the styles of historical




A common current argument is that the
Islam invoked by contemporary activists is
an ‘invented tradition’, in the sense that it
is founded by a sort of historical sleight-of-
hand, positing ancient roots while actually
being of recent origin. In many ways, Hobs-
bawm and Ranger1 provided the re-
spectability of a concept for a phenome-
non that had long been central to the defi-
nition of fundamentalist Islam: namely, the
duplicitous (or in sympathetic accounts,
naive) misrepresentation of history. Addi-
tionally, Benedict Anderson’s work,2 i n
showing how a similar creative historiogra-
phy undergirded modern nationalism, en-
couraged scholars to interpret Islamist his-
torical claims within the framework of na-
tionalist politics. Accordingly, arguments
for the traditional Islamic status of the
headscarf, democratic political forms, or
the idea of an Islamic state are unmasked
as strategic moves within a modern politics
of cultural authenticity, and thus as not re-
ally – historically – authentic. One paradox-
ical aspect of this argument, it might be
noted, is that while cultural authenticity is
often criticized as a reactionary form of
modern politics, it is assumed that there is
an a u t h e n t i c relation to the past (not in-
vented, mythological, etc.), and that Is-
lamists are in some sense living falsely not
to acknowledge it and adjust to its de-
m a n d s .
Anthropologies of error
Scholars have also frequently drawn on
the resources of 19t h-century anthropology
in their attempts to grasp the mode of his-
torical reasoning employed by contempo-
rary Muslims. Note, for example, Aziz al-
Azmeh’s use of the notion of the f e t i s h i n
his complaint that ‘their [Arab society’s] ex-
aggerated attachment to what is past and
what they fetishize as “Heritage” means
that they are effectively forbidden to per-
ceive reality for what it is or acquire the
means to evolve.’3 As developed within
colonial anthropology, fetishism referred
to the false attribution of objective value
by non-Europeans, the sacralization of ob-
jects that European Christians recognized
as actually profane. Al-Azmeh’s reference
to the incapacitating effects of a historical
vision clouded by religious passion testi-
fies to the ongoing impact of this scholarly
t r a d i t i o n .
Colonial anthropology also bequeathed
to students of religion a particular elabora-
tion of the concept of myth, one to which
scholars of Islam have frequently had re-
course. Take, for instance, the following
two well-known authors’ suggestions that
Muslims have a ‘mythical’ or ‘mystical’ rela-
tion to knowledge:
‘The historian and the sociologist must
call attention to the anachronism inherent
in [the Islamists’] approach and its nullifica-
tion of the historicity of meaning as subject
to the political, economic, and cultural
metamorphoses of society… The Muslim
cognitive system is essentially mythical.’4
‘It is in the myth of the complete and Per-
fect Man, and not in the corpus or in Histo-
ry, that one can read the universal, that all
knowledge adds up and that the return to
the golden age – the time of the prophet –
is foreshadowed. It is with this mystical
conception of knowledge that the new [Is-
lamist] intellectual completes his home-
made construction.’5
There is often a slide in such arguments
from the simple charge that Islamists cheat
in representing history to the more compli-
cated claim that they are incapable of
grasping reality. The latter claim resembles
the long-since discarded anthropological
theory, associated primarily with the early
Levy-Bruhl, that primitives were possessed
of a mythical consciousness. This pejora-
tive sense of myth is particularly surprising
in light of the large body of literature ex-
ploring the importance of myth within
modern societies, its foundational role
within our individual psychologies, nation-
al politics, social customs and other areas.
The assertion that Muslim historical
claims involve a kind of mythical reasoning
is frequently coupled with the idea that
such claims ignore or deny ‘real history’.
Gilles Kepel, for example, notes: ‘What dis-
tinguishes the extremist Islamist move-
ment from the bulk of Muslims as far as ref-
erence to the golden age is concerned is
that the former blot out history in favor of
the reactivation of the founding myth,
while the latter accommodate themselves
to the history of Muslim societies.’6 T h e
claim being made is not that Muslim ac-
tivists offer no accounts of the past; on the
contrary, they are generally accused of ex-
aggerating its importance. Rather, it is not
history as an account of past events which
Islamists erase, but history understood as
the sole ground of present reality, as the
real (material) conditions of their lives.
Kepel implies that by not ‘accomodat[ing]
themselves’ properly to these conditions,
Islamists take up a false or distorted rela-
tion to their actual historical situation. He
assumes, in other words, that there is a sin-
gle correct relationship to the past: when
Muslims do not acknowledge its dictates, it
is they, and not the analyst’s concept of
history, that are at fault.
Sources and selectivity
Let us look more closely at the issue of
historical accuracy, since it seems to ani-
mate much of the scholarly critique of Is-
lamist arguments. What all of these views
have in common is the assertion that Is-
lamist claims are not supported by histori-
cal facts. But is this claim valid? Historical
facts, in the sense of the documentary or
archaeological remnants that constitute
the historian’s sources, provide evidence
but are not equivalent to ‘history’. Were
this not the case, then the historian’s task
would be to simply collect and display
these remnants. Historical narratives, how-
ever, are produced by interrogating the
sources, asking particular questions of
them so as to reveal patterns and process-
es more extensive than the sources them-
selves. It is by embedding source materials
within a theoretical construct of history
that a particular kind of historical knowl-
edge is produced. Moreover, it is not the
sources themselves that determine which
construct is to be applied (e.g. economic,
social, theological); that decision precedes
the analysis, and to some degree condi-
tions which sources will be relevant, capa-
ble of providing evidence. As not every his-
torical detail can be presented, this process
always involves a certain selectivity: within
any narrative, certain objects of discourse
are excluded while others are foreground-
ed. Importantly, this selection and arrange-
ment reflects the use to which that narra-
tive is put, the institutional forms (political,
theological, scientific) which that historical
practice upholds, legitimates, and extends.
Historical writing, in other words, is always
shaped by the historian’s location at a par-
ticular time and place, and by the commit-
ments that he or she holds. It is odd, there-
fore, that we fault Islamist historical narra-
tives for presenting the past from a limited
perspective, as this is a feature of a l l h i s t o r-
ical works.
This does not mean to imply, of course,
that we need to interpret Muslim history
‘Islamically’ (or theologically, for that mat-
ter), but that to the extent that Muslims do
so, that choice will impact their societies in
ways that (secular) historical work must
take into account. Thus, the goal should
not be to unmask the error of Muslim his-
torical practices from the standpoint of a
set of supposedly universal criteria, but to
ask what their presuppositions, modes of
constructing and arguing from sources,
and methods of verification are, and how
these practices have been transformed
under current conditions in Muslim soci-
eties. This entails greater attention to the
kinds of historical objects which Muslim
historical practices presuppose and the
purposes and projects those practices sus-
t a i n .
To say this is to acknowledge that a tradi-
tion is more than a mere record of facts
which the researcher (with proper academ-
ic training) can scrutinize and re-describe.
As J.L. Austin noted long ago, arguments
about history always entail a performative
aspect: any assessment of their validity
must take into consideration the context of
goals, practices, and assumptions within
which they are embedded.7 For this reason,
we need to recognize that the institutional
goals, standards, and competencies (both
moral and intellectual) involved in Western
academic practice may be distinct in cer-
tain aspects from those undergirding Is-
lamic knowledges. The statements made
by a professor at a Western university, for
example, and those of an ca l i m in Saudi
Arabia are embedded in very different
kinds of social-historical projects. This dif-
ference conditions the kinds of engagement
each will have with Islamic tradition, the
status of their respective claims. Despite
the increasing scope and speed of global
interaction and movement (‘globaliza-
tion’), such differences in societal and insti-
tutional location remain extremely impor-
tant to contemporary relations of power
and knowledge. This point seems to be in-
sufficiently appreciated by those scholars
who rush to chastise Muslims for unfaith-
fully rendering their own traditions.
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Ar ti c ula t i ng D if f er enc e
U S S A M A M A K D I S I
The civil war in Lebanon is over. Sectarianism is not.
This simple observation should make all scholars who
analyse sectarianism (or communalism) pause and re-
flect on the nature of the problem that they are so
often called upon to explain. In Lebanon and else-
where – in India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the
Balkans – religious violence and sectarian political dis-
course have not diminished in the modern world, and
in fact, in many instances have been exacerbated in it.
U n d e r s t a n d i n g
S e c t a r i a n i s m
The dominant paradigm to explain sectari-
anism has long insisted that modernity is
one thing – invariably defined as secular
and Western – and sectarianism another.
This secularist paradigm insists that reli-
gious feelings, beliefs, culture, and passions
are insidiously persistent and immutable.
Sectarianism, therefore, is almost always
identified as a problem affecting less devel-
oped countries, or those peripheral regions
of Europe such as the Balkans or Northern
Ireland. The destruction by Hindus of a
mosque in the late 20t h-century India is
often comprehended in light of a long histo-
ry of antagonism between Hindus and Mus-
lims in South Asia. The Maronite conflict
with Druzes in Lebanon is similarly under-
stood against the backdrop of an age-old
clash of civilizations in the eastern Mediter-
ranean. The power of such a paradigm is
rooted in a simple observation: that the dis-
course accompanying and justifying sectari-
an violence is itself expressed in a language
that leaves little room for historical nuance.
More often than not, this language evokes a
longue durée of antagonisms that mark Mus-
lims, Hindus, Jews, or Christians as irrecon-
cilably different, as inherently violent, and
as incorrigibly hostile to a particular group’s
collective identity. Moreover, such a reas-
suringly simple paradigm of age-old hostili-
ty is constantly reinforced by every act of vi-
olence that occurs between religious com-
munities in the modern world, regardless of
the specific historical context.
Historians’ constructions of
s e c t a r i a n i s m
For many observers, the case of Lebanon
has bolstered the notion that sectarianism is
an age-old problem. Because the recent civil
war (which ostensibly ended in 1990) mim-
icked many of the aspects of an earlier 19t h-
century conflict between Druzes and Ma-
ronites that devastated the region in 1860,
Lebanon has been written about as if its re-
ligious antagonisms stemmed from ancient
grievances that would forever rob it of an
opportunity to ‘become’ modern. Book after
book, speech after speech, and article after
article have repeated this so often that few
bother to look to closely into the origins of
sectarianism in Lebanon. Most Lebanese
themselves are convinced that sectarianism
is endemic in Lebanese history. Prominent
Western historians have claimed that sectar-
ianism represents a Muslim reaction, indeed
a rage, against the modernization policies
advanced by the Ottoman reform move-
ment which declared the equality of Muslim
and non-Muslim and which began a whole-
sale administrative, cultural and military
transformation of the Ottoman Empire. The
polemical implication of this argument as-
sumes that the Muslim majority could not
be really modern – that is to say, Muslims
could never accept Jews or Christians as
equals, but had to be cajoled into a Western
and presumably alien modernity by author-
itarian regimes. Invariably the only evidence
presented to support this interpretation is
the testimony of contemporary European
sources or the fact of the violence itself as if
the outbreak of religious hostilities in 1860
in and of itself was sufficient to prove a the-
sis of age-old sectarianism. Other historians
have stressed social and economic pres-
sures and dislocations caused by the impact
of European industrialization on, and the
consequent decline of, the Syrian textile in-
dustry. And still other historians have
claimed that European rivalries played a de-
cisive role in fomenting sectarian divisions.
Historians, in short, have sought to explain
the secular context of sectarianism; few
have ever seriously grappled with sectarian-
ism itself except to treat it as an easily
grasped phenomenon, a cultural essence, a
tribal will, a primordial religiosity that is an-
tithetical to a liberal, egalitarian and secular
m o d e r n i t y .
Interpretation of Ottoman
r e f o r m
To the extent that sectarianism in modern
Lebanon is religious in articulation it is in-
deed antithetical to a Western-style secular-
ism which ostensibly separates religion
from politics. But to the extent that sectari-
anism emerged out of a 19t h-century inter-
section of Ottoman reformation and West-
ern intervention, it should not be classified
as antithetical to modernity. Before the
1860 massacres, social status, not religious
affiliation, defined politics in Mount Leba-
non. While in the Ottoman Empire as a
whole, and in urban areas in particular, Mus-
lims enjoyed political and cultural primacy
over non-Muslims, the operative social and
political distinction in rural Mount Lebanon
was between knowledgeable elites and ig-
norant commoners regardless of religious
affiliation. Both Christian and Druze reli-
gious authorities legitimized the traditional
secular political and social order. It was the
Europeans, who insisted on saving the ‘sub-
jugated’ Christians of the Orient, that sin-
gled out religion in Mount Lebanon as the
basis for, and sign of, modern reform. In the
m i d - 1 9t h century, European powers inter-
vened in the region on an explicitly sectari-
an basis. The French championed the Ma-
ronites and the British protected the Druzes.
In an effort to resist European encroach-
ment and to construct a notion of a secular-
ized Ottoman subject-citizen, the Ottomans
in Mount Lebanon guaranteed Muslim (and
Druze) and non-Muslim (Maronite) commu-
nities equal political representation and tax-
ation. At one level, the problem facing Euro-
pean powers, Ottoman authorities, and
local elites was how to transform religious
communities into political communities,
while also preserving a hierarchical social
order. On another level, communal politics
inadvertently democratized politics as non-
elites forced themselves to the forefront of
sectarian mobilizations which, in turn, often
violated traditional hierarchies. For exam-
ple, Maronite commoners interpreted Ot-
toman reform to mean social as well as reli-
gious equality, whereas the Maronite
church interpreted Ottoman reform to
mean a ‘restoration’ of an imagined Ma-
ronite Christian emirate in Mount Lebanon
(which had never existed as such). Both in-
terpretations of reform constituted visions
of liberation. Both either entirely excluded
or subordinated the Druze inhabitants of
Mount Lebanon. The religiously mixed na-
ture of the region and the growing interven-
tion of European powers who insisted on
partitioning Mount Lebanon into pure
Christian and Druze districts only exacerbat-
ed communal tensions.
Ultimately, it was conflicting interpreta-
tions over the meaning of Ottoman reform –
not age-old religious antagonisms – that led
directly to the sectarian violence in Mount
Lebanon in the 1840s and culminated in the
massacres of 1860. And it was an attempted
solution to this ‘age-old’ problem that led
Ottomans and Europeans to construct a sys-
tem of local administration and politics ex-
plicitly defined on a narrow communal
basis. Indeed the emergence of an explicitly
sectarian political practice in Mount
Lebanon can be dated precisely to the early
1840s. It was reinforced after 1860 when the
Ottoman government created the religious-
ly balanced Administrative Council to aid
the non-native Christian Ottoman governor
appointed by the Sublime Porte in consulta-
tion with the European powers. And it
reached its most complex and theoretically
sophisticated form in the modern Lebanese
state which divides power on a supposedly
proportional (hence theoretically equitable)
basis exclusively amongst the major reli-
gious communities of Lebanon.
To be clear, this is not to say that sectari-
anism is ‘good’ because it is ‘modern’. It is
not being suggested that sectarianism is the
only kind of modernity, as sectarian ideo-
logues would have it. Nor is it suggested
that sectarianism is an ideal system. Clearly
it is not: it is chronically unstable because
constant struggles between and within reli-
gious communities to define political con-
trol of, and the limits to, these communities
consistently overwhelm every attempt to
build a national platform. The articulation of
a broad, national, and secular Lebanese citi-
zenship will always be sacrificed on the altar
of narrower communal interests because it
was upon these communal interests that
the state was founded and it is these inter-
ests that continue to dominate the state.
Rather, while it is important to reject sectar-
ian history, which can interpret the past
only in light of supposedly unchanging
Muslim, Christian or Jewish communal iden-
tities, it is also important to realize that the
simplistic equation of sectarianism with
atavism indicates the poverty of secularist
imagination. It is also not adequate to un-
derstand sectarianism simply as a colonial
construction. In the case of Mount Lebanon,
sectarianism represented the transition
from a pre-colonial and pre-reform Ot-
toman history to a post-reform history dom-
inated by the West.
In the final analysis, what makes sectarian-
ism so tenacious in Lebanon today is that it
is a profoundly problematic component of
the modern nation: it represents conflicting
interpretations of a discourse of equality
which, because of a 19t h-century history that
brought together European ‘humanitarian’
intervention, Ottoman reform and local as-
pirations, made the religious synonymous
with the communal, and the communal par-
allel to the individual. In the social context
of Mount Lebanon, sectarianism allowed
non-elites to involve themselves in politics
to an unprecedented degree precisely be-
cause politics was defined along communal
rather than exclusively elite lines. In the con-
text of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, and
against the backdrop of several hundred
years of Muslim rule over Christian minori-
ties, sectarianism represented no less a pro-
found change: the state no longer had a ma-
jority and several minorities defined in ex-
clusionary religious terms, but a series of in-
terdependent religious communities whose
members were granted equal social and po-
litical status before the law. That this sectar-
ian revolution was radically distorted by
French colonialism during the post-Ot-
toman era to favour the Maronites (which
ultimately led to two civil wars to redress
this imbalance) should not obscure its cru-
cial break with an Ottoman history that priv-
ileged Muslim over non-Muslim and elite
over commoner. Without recognizing the
historical, social and political complexity of
sectarianism, the secular criticism of it will
continue to be little more than indignant
sound and fury – as impotent as it is misdi-
rected. It will continue to miss the point, the
intensity and the persistence of sectarian al-
legiances and antipathies. Sectarianism is
not a disease but a modern reality that must
be understood before it can be dismantled.
R e c o n s t r u c t i n g
downtown Beirut.
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AR M A N D O  S A L VA T O R E
A growing body of scholarly work is devoting atten-
tion to how Muslim traditions articulate notions that
might fit the standards of a modern polity.1 This re-
search focus calls into question the extent to which
such notions become ingrained in the norms of mod-
ern public spheres, which represent the communica-
tive and legitimizing basis of potentially democratic
political systems. The reconfiguration of the norma-
tive discourses and the institutional footing of Islam-
ic ‘reform’ movements in the framework of public




Even in times of burgeoning forms of social
association and mobilization carried under
Islamic banners, which are based on local
(sub-national) and (global) transnational
levels, it should be acknowledged that the
nation-state framework has been historical-
ly the major platform for the rise of such
norms of public Islam. Egyptian society and
its history present an interesting case for re-
locating the notion of the public sphere
within nation-state building. The specific in-
terest in analysing public Islam relates to
how the self-reforming impetus of religious
traditions impacts notions of social justice,
welfare and governance as well as ‘social
health’, and on the political process at large.
The public sphere and
‘ p u b l i c I s l a m ’
That Muslim reformers were the hub of the
public sphere at the stage of its emergence
in the second half of the 19t h century and for
several decades thereafter, might seem to
clash with Habermasian presuppositions
that see a modern public sphere as free from
the allegedly ritualistic and ‘representation-
al’ features of traditional notions of public-
ness. Several other scholars have, however,
stressed that also in Western societies the
role of puritan and pietistic socio-religious
movements and reformers has not been the
exception, but the rule. The public sphere is
the site where contests take place over the
definition not only of the ‘common good’,
but also of the catalogue of virtues, obliga-
tions, and rights required of the members of
society (in due time citizens of the nation-
state). The emergent sense of public goes
hand in hand with the diffusion of norms
whereby a member of the community is de-
fined as an autonomous moral-social agent,
and is simultaneously expected to be com-
mitted to the collective goals of the commu-
nity. Therefore, it should not be surprising
that reformed religious traditions play a role
in the process. It would be impossible to un-
derstand the political and legal philosophy
of Locke outside of the framework of Calvin-
ist reform theology.
In a comparable vein, from the 1870s on-
wards, Muslim reformers in Egypt, acting
not only as writers but also as editors, pub-
lishers and sponsors of new and largely au-
tonomous press organs, expanded the area
of Islamic normative discourse into issues of
collective concern like state law, distribu-
tion of wealth, and work ethics, which are of
vital significance for any modernizing soci-
ety. As shown by Michael Gasper, the Islam-
ic reform movement (i s l a h) established the
conceptual frame defining the external
boundaries of the ‘society’ on the basis of
which the nation-state was defined, includ-
ing the lines of exclusion and inclusion. The-
orizing about ‘social ills’, they saw in proper-
ly intended Islamic traditions the cure at
hand. A contemporary of Muhammad CA b-
d u h, CA b d a l l a h al-Nadim (1845-1896), de-
fined virtue not just in terms of the canoni-
cal injunction al-amr b i - l - m acr u f wa al-nahi
ca n a l - m u n k a r (enjoining good and forbid-
ding evil), but as tied to economic develop-
ment and ‘industriousness’.2
However, we cannot assume that the pub-
lic intellectuals of the Islamic reform were
just playing into the hands of the nation-
state. They influenced state educational and
legal policies, and initiated autonomous
projects within the associational life of the
main urban centres, whilst backing up both
activities with a public discourse that
brought to bear a distinctive view of the
Muslim moral being. From that historical
moment on, a whole spectrum of differenti-
ated attitudes of personalities, groups and
movements of public Islam has developed
as to how to manage the state and its ambi-
tion to normalize and incorporate public
Islam into the normative standards of the
nation-state framework (first and foremost
‘citizenship’, and a culturalization of Islam
into a major factor of national identity also
acceptable to non-Muslim minorities).
The reformers’ intervention in Muslim tra-
ditions in the context of the formation of a
modern public sphere did not collapse tra-
ditional notions of personhood, community
and authority into the modern model of
personal responsibility and loyalty to the
nation-state. On the other hand, state poli-
cies could only gain coherence in an episte-
mological terrain that the emergent ‘public
Islam’ foregrounded no less than colonial
policies did. The bottom line is that it would
be very difficult to prove that the emer-
gence of public Islam was either purely
functional or merely reactive to the process
of nation-state formation.
If the normative framework associated
with public Islam does not perfectly fit na-
tion-state building, this is because the virtues
propagated by the reformers, whilst indeed
favouring social mobilization and disciplin-
ing in the framework of the nation-state,
were not conceived in terms of formulas of
citizenship within a civil law setting, but were
seen as rooted in s h a r ica. This notion, more
than ‘Islamic law’, signifies something like ‘Is-
lamic normativity’ or ‘Islamic normative rea-
son’ (at least as used and implemented in the
discourse of modern Muslim reformers).
Mustafa Mahmud
This pattern of disjunction and partial con-
vergence between nation-state building and
public Islam that we meet in the reform dis-
course of CA b d a l l a h al-Nadim is still found a
century later – under modified circum-
stances of the state-society relationship – in
the work of Mustafa Mahmud, probably the
main personality of public Islam in Egypt. In
the period of his ascent to public moral au-
thority in the 1970s and 1980s, the cleavage
between state-loyal vs. oppositional, or ‘in-
tegrationist’ vs. ‘isolationist’ Islam, not un-
problematic if applied to the period be-
tween the 1920s and 1960s, becomes ever
less capable of capturing the reconfigura-
tion of public Islam v i s - à - v i s the nation-state.
The principal generator of public moral au-
thority in Islamic terms that Mustafa Mah-
mud was able to play upon was the idea of a
continuity between personal excellence and
rectitude on the one hand, and commitment
to the welfare of the community on the
other. Mustafa Mahmud impersonated this
script of public virtue as the founder of the
most famous new Islamic j a mci y y a ( w e l f a r e
association) in Cairo, and as the author and
moderator of a very popular television docu-
mentary series on a l -ci l m w a - l - i m a n ( s c i e n c e
and faith), where he has proven capable of
swaying Islamic discourse back and forth
across the thin border between the edifying
and the entertaining. Through this television
programme that he set up from scratch in
the early 1970s, Mustafa Mahmud belongs
to the pioneers of Egyptian television, a
medium that rapidly spread into middle
class households. In the post-Nasser political
context – where the repressive capacities of
the state with respect to its citizens are tech-
nically intact or even refined, although they
no longer enjoy a solid legitimacy – the pub-
lic styling of self-correctness and its rooting
in religious credibility and authority have
been crucial conditions for the efficacy of
discourse, as the success story of Mustafa
Mahmud shows. This credibility is also sup-
ported by the social work of the j a mci y y a
Mustafa Mahmud founded in 1975: growing
in size and range of (mainly medical) services
up to the present (see photo).
As also shown by the path of Mustafa
Mahmud, the acquisition of credentials of
public Islamic authority is subject to increas-
ing differentiation: v i s - à - v i s the state, public
Islam might be in a relation of collaboration,
complicity, indifference, suspicion, hostility
and outward opposition to terrorism (at the
level where Islam eclipses from public visi-
bility). Moreover, the success of one or the
other new Islamic spokesmen is certainly
dependent on an increasing degree of ca-
pacity to match the needs and orientations
of a composite public. This makes the state’s
task of controlling public Islam ever more
difficult. More generally, and in a line of con-
tinuity from the early stages of public Islam
in the late 19t h-century Egypt till today, the
state is not the source of authorization of
even state-friendly forms of public Islam.
A balanced notion of
p u b l i c I s l a m
The Habermasian claim that the public
sphere creates social cohesion through
mechanisms alternative to state coercion
and market interest is still basically valid,
and also applies to public Islam. More than
that, this force of cohesion is exactly what
religious-civilizing traditions, as major
sources of collective identities, have been
capable of doing since times long prior to
the rise of modern nation-states. Therefore,
in the rise and transformation of public
Islam one can find instances of how reli-
gious traditions justify claims of member-
ship within the community that articulate
the tense relationship between individual
salvation and social order.
If the Habermas framework is too narrow to
capture the way public Islam is rooted in Is-
lamic traditions and their ongoing reform, di-
luting public Islam into a ‘post-modern’ kind
of politics of subjectivity, visibility and im-
agery does not do justice to how reformed Is-
lamic traditions authorize views of social jus-
tice and practices of social welfare. By linking
collective identity to forms of subjectivity
that might prove difficult to ascertain, or to a
plainly staged visibility as a ‘politics of dis-
play’ of signs, post-modern accounts of pub-
lic Islam fail to duly link Muslim identity to
welfare and justice, and also fail to focus on
the mechanisms of recognition that autho-
rize identity and legitimize visibility. The pos-
sible usefulness of a transculturally feasible,
post-Habermasian notion of the public
sphere that can be applied to the transforma-
tion of religious traditions and the emer-
gence of a vast array of socio-religious move-
ments, is in helping to frame the platform
where nation-state projects on identity, jus-
tice and welfare intersect and overlap with –
and sometimes are challenged by – move-
ments and projects grounded on (often con-
sciously reformed) religious traditions.
Cover of a l - i s l a m
fi khandaq,
b y M u s t a p h a
M a h m u d .
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F OR O U G H  J AH AN B A K H S H
Abdolkarim Soroush (b.1945) is an Iranian philoso-
pher-thinker whose innovative ideas on religious re-
form are sure to win him a place among the most
prominent Muslim reformers of this century. A grad-
uate of Tehran University in pharmacology, Soroush
undertook postgraduate studies in history and the
philosophy of science at the University of London in
the early 1970s. His searching mind, already familiar
with Islamic and Western classical philosophical tra-




Soroush’s goal goes beyond unsystematic
reforms in certain selected, mostly legal,
matters and his plan is multidimensional. Of
its two major aspects, one is to prune ele-
ments and understandings that are consid-
ered superfluous and stagnant and have
often obscured the essence of religion. The
other is to equip religion with extra-religious
means and values, chiefly in reconciling rea-
son and revelation.
Reason and revelation
His pathology of contemporary Islam sur-
faces numerous ills. Although post-revolu-
tionary conditions in Iran are central to his di-
agnosis, Soroush has no difficulty identifying
these problems all over the Muslim world.
First, he sees the ideologizing of Islam, the
prevalent mode of Islamic resurgence since
the 1960s, as detrimental to the essence of re-
ligion. Among other things, it makes religion
an instrument for attaining goals. It promotes
a dogmatic understanding of religion con-
cerned with exoteric, accidental aspects, ig-
noring deeper meanings and resulting in in-
tellectual rigidity and exclusivism. It fixes one
understanding of religion as final, absolute,
official, and beyond criticism. Demanding its
official interpreters, it entrusts the clergy with
a priori privileges and gives access to reli-
gious totalitarianism at societal and political
levels. Soroush calls this the ‘Islam of identity’.
At best, it is an ideological means that may
help Muslims overcome their modernity-in-
spired ‘crisis of identity’; whereas the ‘Islam of
truth’, understood as the essential truths to
which prophets have invited humankind, is
only remotely related to this ‘expediental’
Islam.
A second problem is the undue emphasis
given to legal aspects of Islam (sharicah and
fiqh) at the cost of ethics and theology.
Soroush’s critique of this imbalance targets
traditionalists and some modernists alike, the
former for reducing Islam to fiqh. The latter,
trapped in this short-sightedness, have lost
their ability to recognize ills at a deeper level
and have thus reduced reform to partial and
unsystematic legal solutions. Soroush does
not underestimate the significance of fiqh
and sharicah. What he argues against is ascrib-
ing to it primacy, comprehensiveness and fi-
nality. Inspired by his ‘mentor’ Al-Ghazali, he
believes that fiqh is neither the core of Islam
nor its totality and should thus be confined to
its own sphere. Moreover, a fiqh-based under-
standing of Islam puts a premium on camal
(outward practices) rather than iman (inner
faith). It envisions a society wherein the en-
forcement of the sharicah, ritualism and uni-
formity in religious experience prevail. This
absence of plurality leads to hypocrisy and
monopoly on truth.
These two ills have not only caused a stag-
nation in religious thought, they have pro-
moted a ‘maximalist’ view of religion. They
have prevented a dialogue among Islamic re-
ligious sciences and between Islam and the
human sciences, necessary components to a
revitalization of Islamic thought. Only
through such recognition and willingness to
enter into a give-and-take process will Islamic
thought break the shackles of rigidity and ab-
solutism. This is a summons to the invigorat-
ing role of reason, a call deeply aligned with
Muctazilite rationalism and resonating with
the pleas of Muhammad Abduh and Muham-
mad Iqbal.
A ‘maximalist’ view of religion affirms that
what Muslims need to solve their problems or
administer their public and personal lives is all
provided in Islam as if religion were a reposi-
tory of pre-packaged solutions for all prob-
lems at all times. This deprives Muslims of the
intellectual challenge and benefit of other
means and values. In practice, it recedes to
fiqh, which, in its most lively manifestation,
ijtihad, is ironically the most in need of extra-
religious knowledge. A ‘maximalist’ view of
religion is perhaps best exemplified in the
prevailing discourse on Islam and politics. It
teaches that sharicah is an all-comprehensive
system of law that provides for political
needs. This juridical approach to politics not
only disregards the very nature of the matter,
it ends in some un-resolvable contradictions.
Islam and democracy
Soroush argues that discussion about Islam
and politics should be approached from out-
side of religion. Reconciling religion and
democracy is of the same nature as reconcil-
ing reason and revelation; both involve extra-
religious values and means. In essence, the
nature of the state and values and methods of
governance are not matters of religious ju-
risprudence but belong to political philoso-
phy. With regard to religion, they should be
addressed in kalam (theology). Human be-
ings qua human beings are entitled to a priori
rights, including political ones. Pivotal values
of democracy – justice and freedom – are
extra-religious, though upheld by religious
systems. Methods of governance are also
non-religious. Administering public life is a ra-
tional matter that should benefit from mod-
ern social sciences, economics and adminis-
tration. Fiqh is neither a science of administra-
tion nor a government platform. Anything
found in religion in this respect is ‘minimal’
and ‘accidental’; it is not ‘essential’ to religion.
Arguing for the possibility of a religious de-
mocratic state, Soroush believes that if
democracy is irreconcilable with the norma-
tive legal reading of Islam, it can be compati-
ble with another understanding that accords
primacy to human values such as rationality,
justice, freedom and human rights. Therefore,
democracy can work in a religious society
only if the respective theoretical foundations
are harmonized.
Islam and modernity
Acutely aware of an epistemological break
between the old and modern worlds, Soroush
believes that any serious attempt at Islamic
modernism should begin by equipping itself
with modern concepts, perceptual outlooks
and intellectual means. Of the several issues
addressed by Soroush, two are modern: criti-
cal reason vs. traditional hermeneutical rea-
son, and rights vs. duties.
Modern Muslim thought needs to adopt
critical reasoning, a tool that not only involves
a critical historical approach to traditional reli-
gious paradigms but can also suggest alter-
natives. One of the most decisive paradigmat-
ic changes of the modern world is that most
of its concepts and institutions are right-
based, reflecting the shift in human self-per-
ception from duty-bearing to right-bearing.
Equally critical of the shortcomings of the
past duty-oriented mentality and the current
right-oriented mentality, Soroush proposes a
third paradigm in which elements of rational-
ity and rights are tempered by a form of reli-
giosity that prevents human beings from as-
suming God-like characteristics and obliges
them to God. However, the nature and defini-
tion of this religiosity and obligation differ
radically from conventional notions that are
primarily geared to external behaviour.
Far from inviting secularism, Soroush ad-
vances a learned and examined kind of reli-
giosity. This dimension of his project deals,
one might say, with reviving a higher mystical
type of religiosity. It is an ‘experiential reli-
giosity’ based on the love of God, the proto-
type of which is the ‘prophetic experience’ of
Muhammad. What the demystified modern
world is in need of is an ‘experiential’ not ‘ex-
pediental’ religiosity where God is experi-
enced as a gracious Beloved, not as a stern
Law-giver. His commands are observed not
out of obligation to legal duties but out of
compulsion of love.
Soroush’s reform plan targets the short-
comings of both tradition and modernity.
While advocating adoption of certain modern
elements to strengthen the tradition, it
searches the deep layers of tradition to offer a
remedy for the spiritual impoverishment of
the modern age. In order to become function-
al in the modern world, religion needs to in-
teract meaningfully with modern concepts,
outlooks and institutions. To this end,
Soroush moves reform from the plane of fiqh
to deeper levels of theology and philosophy
where essential concepts of God, humankind
and religiosity are to be redefined. This is
predicated on the recognition of the need for
a dialogical pluralism between inside and
outside of religious intellectual fields. The
complementarity of Soroush’s project lies in
the fact that it invigorates the intellectual ra-
tional tradition of Islam and at the same time
accentuates its spiritual richness. The effect is
to restrain the arrogance and self-centred-
ness of modern humankind.
A b o l k a r i m
Soroush at the
ISIM Muslim
I n t e l l e c t u a l s
C o n f e r e n c e ,
A p r i l2 0 0 0 .
Prior to postgraduate work, Soroush was
long preoccupied with textual interpreta-
tion – a product of his extensive, systematic
study of Qur’anic exegesis, and classical the-
ological, mystical and philosophical works
such as Rumi and Al-Ghazali. These joined
with new insights to draw him into a vortex
of intellectual activity aimed at re-evaluat-
ing traditional metaphysics in order to find a
convincing solution to the relationship be-
tween science and metaphysics/reason and
revelation. Context has also contributed to
Soroush’s intellectual fruition as a Muslim
reformer. In the 1960s, as a religiously com-
mitted and socio-politically concerned stu-
dent, he pondered revivalist literature from
Al-Afghani to Ali S h a r ica t i. Since returning to
Iran shortly after the 1979 revolution, he has
experienced the rule of an Islamic govern-
ment, the supremacy of an ideologized
Islam, and the implementation of a jurispru-
dential understanding of Islam.
Contraction and expansion
His turbulent yet rewarding intellectual
journey culminated in the development of
his epistemological/hermeneutical ‘Theory
of Contraction and Expansion of Religious
Knowledge’. This theory, constituting the
foundation stone of Soroush’s reform plan,
distinguishes him from other revivalists.
Notwithstanding his deep appreciation of
their endeavours, Soroush believes that his
theory provides a hitherto absent but vital
contribution, that is, an epistemological
structure. To reconcile the immutable (reli-
gion) with change (dynamic world) it is nec-
essary to distinguish between religion and
religious knowledge. Religion is divine, eter-
nal, immutable and sacred, while human un-
derstanding of it is in constant exchange
with every field of human knowledge. As
such, religious knowledge is in flux, relative,
and time-bound. This recognition means
that issues of reform can be addressed with-
out compromising the sacredness of reli-
gion. Revivalists’ neglect of this foundation
has diverted their attention from fundamen-
tal questions. Consequently, solutions,
though valuable, have been provisional.
Nevertheless, Soroush claims neither perfec-
tion nor finality for his approach.
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R e - I s l a m i z a t i o n
AM R  H A M ZA W Y
The periodical al-Manar al-Jadid was first published
in January 1998 in Cairo. In the words of its editor-in-
chief, Gamal S u l t a n, its aim is: ‘To establish a civilized
and authentic intellectual forum, to combat the
waves of westernization, arbitrariness and oppor-
tunism in the Islamic world.’1 The initiators of the
publication include such prominent Islamists as
M u h a m m a d cI m a r a, T a r i q al-Bishri, Yusuf Q a r a d a w i,
and Rashid al-Ghanushi, as well as activists of the
younger generation, like kamal h a b i b, a leading
member of the Jihad Group in the 1980s. The new pe-
riodical is obviously linked to the famous a l - M a n a r




D i s c o u r s e
By constructing a historical continuum from
the situation of the u m m a at the end of the
1 9t h century to the state of the Islamic world
at the threshold of the 21s t century, a l -
Manar al-Jadid emphasizes its lineal ties
with R i d a and his initial goals. ‘R i d a a l r e a d y
understood that the u m m a required a step
forward into the future […]. A new future, at
which horizon it would free itself from the
heavy burden of stagnation, technological
and scientific backwardness, and civilizatory
sloth […]. Today, at the end of the 20t h c e n-
tury, these hopes and fears are still on the
agenda of most Arabic and Islamic soci-
e t i e s . ’2 In light of this analogy, the leading
article written by R i d a in 1898 and repub-
lished in the first issue of al-Manar al-Jadid,
entitled ‘Risalat al-Manar’ (The Message of
al-Manar), stands as a policy statement for
the new periodical. In addition to the revival
of umma thought, it also intends to provide
new impulses to the tradition of i s l a h ( r e-
form) and tajdid (renewal) and to bring the
century-old aims of a l - M a n a r to the centre
of contemporary attention.
Revival of a religious
t r a d i t i o n
With his motto, tajdid al-tajdid3 ( r e n e w a l
of the renewal), M u h a m m a d cI m a r a is repre-
sentative of the way in which historical
analogies are constructed and arguments
relevant to the present times are articulated
i n al-Manar al-Jadid. Apart from R i d a, cI m a r a
refers to the writings of Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani and M u h a m m a d cA b d u h. He sees
the efforts of these reformers as an attempt
to develop the fundamentals of a civilizato-
ry societal project that is in harmony with
Islam and contemporaneity and that calls
into question both the blind copying of the
West and the uncritical following of the first
generation of Muslims. He argues that the
main goals of the early reform were: oppos-
ing the ‘harmful’ Western influence; formu-
lating an authentic understanding of
progress on the basis of the totality of Islam
as religion, society and state; liberating
Islam from the b i dca (innovations); promot-
ing contemporary interpretations of the
s h a r ica; and mobilizing the forces of renewal
in the u m m a. Finally, he emphasizes the
gradual nature of reform in the Islamic tradi-
tion, contrasting it to the secular idea of the
necessity of a radical break with the past.
cI m a r a sees a continuity of history and con-
tent from the old reform tradition to the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which he re-
gards as the first modern embodiment of
the Islamist tendency. In fact, its founder,
H a s a n al-Banna, took over the publication of
a l - M a n a r after the death of R i d a in 1939. In
cI m a r a ’ s opinion, the initial goals of a l -
M a n a r remain of importance, given the un-
broken dominance of the West, the contin-
ued stagnation of the Arabic-Islamic soci-
eties, and the marginalization of authentic
Islamic thought.
The analysis of cI m a r a provides an essen-
tialist discourse. His argument that the
u m m a has remained in a state of stagnation
reveals a one-sided understanding of devel-
opments in the 20t h century, depicted as a
history of decadence. As is frequently en-
countered in the modern Islamist historiog-
raphy, he explains this history as a depar-
ture from the fundamentals of a Golden
Age, the original state of grace of the com-
munity at the time of the Prophet. The same
understanding of history informs his evalua-
tion of transitions in contemporary Islamic
thought, which he explains as an internal
fall from a correctly guided tradition (i s l a h) –
a situation that is to be redressed with the
help of al-Manar al-Jadid.
The notions of continuity and change in
the discussions found in al-Manar al-Jadid
have two central themes: the persistence of
decadence as a general tendency of human
societies and the desirable return to an ide-
alized moment in history. The notion of
change is only relevant as an embodiment
of the transition from the current deca-
dence to the restoration of the Golden Age
and of the rediscovery of a religiously ap-
propriate approach to the needs of the
u m m a. This highly retrogressive aspect of
the continuity-change dichotomy means
that some of the writings in al-Manar al-
J a d i d lose their future-oriented substance.
However, the revival of the ideal of reform
works against the backward-looking limita-
tions in the contemporary Islamist discourse
and extends the limits of what is change-
able in Islamist thought.
The contributions of the ‘new reformers’ in
al-Manar al-Jadid reveal two approaches.
Firstly, the strategies and approaches of Is-
lamist efforts since the 1970s are subjected
to critical scrutiny. Secondly, on the basis of
the so-called ‘teachings of the past’ there is a
debate on the prospects of theoretical and
programmatic change in the Islamist spec-
trum. Within this framework, the process of
rethinking is legitimized by emphasizing the
overall societal changes and the diversity of
experiences in the Islamic world. In other
words, the primacy of continuity, which is
central to the revival of the reform tradition,
is substituted by a dynamic perception of
the realities of modern Arabic-Islamic soci-
eties. Subsequently, the phenomenon of Is-
lamism becomes a matter of pragmatic ap-
proach. This marks a shift of focus in the dis-
cussion of future-oriented reforms. While
the link to the past remains the main legit-
imizing paradigm of the Islamist thought, it
is qualified by a link to contemporary mat-
t e r s .
On the fallibility of
contemporary Islamism
The Tunisian scholar Rashid al-Ghanushi
sees Islamism as a mass movement, as the
‘[…] sum of the individual and collective ef-
forts of numerous faithful men and women
in order to lead Muslims back to their merci-
ful God’.4 Islam being the only true source of
orientation, the Islamists have the duty to
start a process of re-Islamization in all
spheres of life by means of legal and educa-
tional reforms. Thus they make it possible to
realize a model of society and politics based
on the authentic principles of s h u r a ( c o n s u l-
tation) and s i y a s a s h a rci y y a (rule of Islamic
law). The relevance of contemporary Is-
lamism is felt by Al-Ghanushi to lie in the vi-
tality and uniqueness of its role. In his argu-
mentation the transformations of the 20t h
century constituted a break within Islamic
history. The rise of modern nation-states
put an end to the old separation of power
between rulers and religious scholars,
which was based on a functional distinction
between the spheres of politics and society.
In his view, the traditional role of the cu l a m a’
was to sanction political power and to pro-
tect people against despotic rule. However,
this lost its significance within the context
of the nation-state. New authoritarian elites
rejected the participation of any forces
other than their own in the formation of the
new national society. They degraded reli-
gious institutions to state instruments serv-
ing to preserve their own power and even
adopted religious contents and symbols for
their own secular goals. According to Al-
Ghanushi, the cu l a m a’ had the option to ei-
ther obey the rulers and thus ensure a mini-
mum amount of freedom (in the education-
al sphere in particular) or to inspire opposi-
tion in order to free religion and society
from secular nationalist rule. The Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood was a typical result of
the latter option, and with the works of Al-
Banna and Sayyid Q u t b it paved the way for
numerous other movements aimed at re-Is-
lamizing the state and society.
Although Al-Ghanushi continues to see
this goal as essential, he emphasizes that
the ‘painful experiences’ of the past three
decades make it necessary to reassess the
strategies used and to examine their confor-
mity to Islamic values as well as their politi-
cal efficacy. The radical and violent ap-
proach characteristic of many attempts to
bring about change in the 1980s and 1990s,
he argues, is in stark contrast to the authen-
tic concept of gradual change in Islamic
thought. These attempts damaged the
credibility of the Islamists, the majority of
whom have come to see in recent years that
neither violence nor a complete rejection of
modern social structures offers prospects
for the future. He therefore pleads for turn-
ing away from the militant paradigm of
Q u t b and for a ‘return’ to the reform tradi-
tion of Al-Afghani, cAbduh, and R i d a, and
above all to the pacifist, ethical-moral prin-
ciples of Al-Banna. By emphasizing gradual
change and relevance to the present as the
main criteria for evaluating social activity,
Al-Ghanushi opens the way for a critique of
the central principles of contemporary Is-
lamist practice.
The plea for an appropriate return to the
gradual reform tradition and the ethical be-
ginnings of modern Islamism indeed marks
a break with the dominant radical under-
standing of politics and society over the
past three decades. While since the 1970s
such negative evaluations have been a
prime feature of the secular criticism of Is-
lamism, the fact that they are adopted in
current Islamist discourses indicates a fun-
damental change. The inclusion of historical
and contemporary processes of change in
determining the societal goals and strate-
gies of Islamism means a reversal of the rad-
ical assumption that social structures must
be (re-)formed according to a(n) – essential-
ized – religious world-view and by political
means. This gives relevance to the question
of the social plausibility of certain religious
contents and the form in which they are me-
diated in the public sphere. The primacy of
adapting to ‘changeable’ social conditions
becomes a central element of the discourse.
The persistence of the notions of ‘return’
and ‘beginnings’ justifies the adaptation to
the present by emphasizing a conceptual
and symbolic affinity to the old reform tradi-
tion and, moreover, to the dominant, back-
ward-looking paradigm of Islamist thought
during the last decades. The call to rediscov-
er the ethical-moral dimensions of Islamism
represents a response to the immanent ten-
sion between continuity and change in reli-
gious discourses. By restoring the separa-
tion between timeless (ethical-moral) and
changing (society-related) elements in
Islam and by taking the former out of the
sphere of politics, the religious ideals are re-
sacralized and freed from the secular con-
straints of social reality.
The review in al-Manar al-Jadid of the Is-
lamist experience over the past three
decades has led to a renewal of the reli-
giously influenced understanding of politics
and society. The backward-looking notion
of change should not obscure the signifi-
cance of the reform proposals originating
from the discussions in the periodical. Re-
verting to authentic experiences (early-Is-
lamic period) and traditions (reform tradi-
tion of the early a l - M a n a r) is re-valued and
reduced to the functionality of stabilizing
the sacral reference system and the legit-
imization of renewal. Thus a new scope is
provided for discourse in which, by taking
account of religious ideals and historical
transformations, answers can be formulated
to the tensions generated by the demands
of continuity and the need for change.
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So uth As ia
P E T E R  G OT T S C H A L K
An annual religious procession makes its way along
darkened brick-paved and packed-earth streets
through the various neighbourhoods of Arampur, a
village in Bihar, India. Young men chant formulaic
slogans while ritually clashing in shows of weapon-
handling. Women, men, and children stand in the
night or sit on string beds outside their homes watch-
ing the lively action come and go on their otherwise
non-eventful street. Occasionally they shout their
support for the prancing adolescents. In this village
with nearly equal numbers of Hindus and Muslims, is
this procession Hindu or Islamic?
Scholars have become increasingly aware of
how political interests have depicted
‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ identities as artificially
singular to suit their own agendas, whether
of the colonial state, Pakistan movement, or
Hindutva cause. Despite their disapproval of
militant attempts to both equate ‘Indian’
with ‘Hindu’ and denigrate Muslims, schol-
ars demonstrate far less cognizance of their
own acceptance of a monolithic under-
standing that suffuses post-colonial West-
ern scholarship regarding South Asian cul-
tures. This is to say, Western scholars may
recognize the socio-political ramifications
of essentialized religious identities but do
not often enough practise scholarship in
ways that challenge problematic categories.
The example of the procession described
above demonstrates a crisis in identification
for religious studies, the import of identity
politics on the national level, and the dy-
namics of identity practices on the local
l e v e l .
The description could accurately portray
two different annual processions in Aram-
pur: one which occurs on Muharram and an-
other on Durga Puja. Attempts to categorize
these events as Muslim or Hindu demon-
strate both the multiple meanings each
term allows and the uncertainty which com-
monly accompanies their use. With equal vi-
tality and energy for the proclamation of
their heroes, the boys and young men of
each procession brandish long, hardened
bamboo staves and differ only by the he-
roes they memorialize: Muslims commemo-
rate Husain and Hindus celebrate Durga.
However, the participation of both Muslims
and Hindus among the watching, if not
cheering, crowd problematizes efforts at
exact labelling.
Problems of definition
Efforts to label such rituals as ‘Islamic’ or
‘Hindu’ often rely on unclear definitions and
thus overlook the often shared identities and
participation in each other’s lives. Three op-
tions for determining the religious character
of each ritual come to mind: historical origin
of the ritual, essence of the ritual, and identi-
ty of the participants. We might label the
Muharram procession as Islamic and not
Hindu (or Sikh or Christian) because it origi-
nated as a commemoration of the martyr-
dom of Husain. Yet, if the historical origin
alone determined the assessment of a
memorial day’s character, would All Souls
Day then be defined as pagan instead of
Catholic based on the primacy of its begin-
nings? Secondly, Muharram might be de-
fined as Islamic simply because it is accepted,
assumedly, as essentially Islamic by Muslims
in Arampur. In fact, however, some Muslims
in the Arampur area, not to mention else-
where in the world, disparage such rituals as
counter to Islamic principles as they under-
stand them. Finally, the Durga Puja proces-
sion might be labelled Hindu because those
processing identify themselves as Hindu. Yet
can the event be so narrowly described as to
define participation solely based on the pro-
cession? The audience, which includes Hin-
dus and Muslims for both events, does in-
deed participate in each procession, if only
by attendance. To label it as ‘Hindu’ disre-
gards the presence, support, and involve-
ment of many Muslims. Overall, then, no sin-
gle criteria exists for the application of the
descriptors ‘Islamic’ and ‘Hindu’. Rather, the
use of either term can refer to any of the
three criteria given above (if not others) and
thus the meaning remains unclear.
In contrast with the elusive definitions of
‘Islamic’ and ‘Hindu’, the term ‘communal’
conveys a very specific meaning in South
Asian studies. The Anglophonic use of ‘com-
munal’ has come to commonly assume
nothing less than acrimonious relations be-
tween antagonistic religious groups. The
pervasive dominance of this expectation re-
garding community in South Asia demon-
strates the degree to which scholarship has
been shaped by a focus on religious com-
munities imagined to be monolithic in com-
position, exclusionary in principle, and hos-
tile in practice. When the term ‘communal-
ism’ is used in an Indian context, the burden
of anticipated religious exclusivity prohibits
the imagining of any shared community
among Muslims and Hindus.
Hindu, Muslim or modern
Caught between secular expectations and
communalist rhetoric, scholarship often
struggles against three contingent, essen-
tializing assumptions: firstly, that Islam and
Hinduism in India (if not elsewhere) are not
‘just’ religions, but lifestyles. That is, the first
assumes that most Muslims and Hindus es-
chew the possibility of a shared secular pub-
lic sphere because they allow their respec-
tive religious traditions to pervade com-
pletely their lives.1 Too often the additional
assumption follows that, this being the case
and because Hindus and Muslims embrace
practices and beliefs entirely apart from the
other community, they are either Hindus or
Muslims and seldom, if ever, share an identi-
ty. The third assumption is that not only do
the personal identities and cultural spheres
of Hindus and Muslims not overlap, they
stand in binary opposition to one another
(e.g. cow veneration versus beef consump-
tion, iconic representation versus strident
iconoclasm). Despite the professed secular-
ism of India’s democracy, scholars expect
most social and cultural phenomena to be
uniformly Hindu, Muslim, or – when neither
term fits – modern. The current spate of
Hindu nationalist language that has been
the focus of ample Indian and Western
scholarship has only intensified the expec-
tations among many that Hindus and Mus-
lims live in irreconcilably different cultures.
Trapped by secular presumptions that reli-
gion can and should be safely isolated from
the public sphere for the preservation of so-
cial order, scholars often deride the political
use of communalist language while accept-
ing its underlying assumptions regarding
the social divergence of Hindus and Mus-
l i m s .2
In fact, the terms ‘Islamic’ and ‘Hindu’ are
inherently multivalent. This is because reli-
gions in India (and in much of the West) are
not purely self-contained systems which re-
side neatly behind definite boundaries.
Rather, religious symbols, terminology, and
behaviour permeate the public cultures
within which they thrive and a wide variety
of phenomena can be ‘Islamic’ or ‘Hindu’ in
myriad ways. Further, what these terms de-
fine – what practices, beliefs, dispositions,
emotions, and physical manifestations they
include – vary so greatly even among the
residents of a single village that, were Hin-
duism and Islam to exist within tangible and
mutually exclusive limits, their internal vari-
ation would challenge any notion of consis-
t e n c y .
These problems may impel some, like Wil-
fred Cantwell Smith, to declare that religion
is too ill-defined to be an adequate concept.
But increasingly people perceive these reli-
gions as objective systems within which
they involve themselves and so their acade-
mic rejection would be naïve.3 Smith also
called for a study of believers in context; that
we must look through their eyes at the uni-
verse and see what they see.4 Issues of the
limits of this ideal aside, Smith is right insofar
as this universe also includes the broad
socio-cultural world of believers. The reli-
gious lives of Hindus and Muslims are in-
formed by the relationships of diffusion and
antagonism with other religious and non-re-
ligious cultural traditions. When scholars
imagine that they see the world through the
eyes of believers, they too frequently suffer a
far-sightedness that overlooks neighbours,
classmates, and teammates who may share
in any dimension of life except religion.
We must be sure to recognize that few
Muslims and Hindus understand themselves
solely as such. They not only see differences
among the members of their own religious
communities broadly construed, but they
also understand themselves as members of
communities without an explicit religious
character. Each resident of Arampur recog-
nizes not a single identity but multiple iden-
tities with which they navigate through the
multiple social interactions and associations
as they live their lives. As they consider pub-
licly and privately their own meaning of
‘Islam’ or ‘Hinduism’, they do so within a
web of conversations and interactions
which shape their thinking and identity
practices. Because identity is more than
how one thinks – it is perhaps even more
how one communes bodily – we must more
extensively explore the fuller range of inter-
relations among Muslims and those living in
the broader cultural realm along with them.
So perhaps, for example, one of the audi-
ence members who watches the Muharram
procession pass by her house and identifies
herself as a Hindu will think about Au-
rangzeb’s infamous deprivations against
Hindus and wonder whether any of the
cheering young men would be a future
iconoclast. Can Muslims ever truly be loyal
Indians like she and her family are? But
while such thoughts may prompt her to
ponder Hindu-Muslim differences, they may
not come to mind as she prays at any of the
local d a r g a hs for the intervention of a Sufi in
her life. Or a boy, who identifies himself as
Muslim, takes part in the procession and
feels encouraged by hearing the narrative of
Husain’s sacrifice. He is following a very de-
liberate path through the village – a path
along which he and many others – Hindus
and Muslims alike – use their bodies to af-
firm that they all belong to the village, not
unlike his local cricket team. In these two
imagined but not impossible moments,
identities of Hindu and Muslim mingle with
those of nation and village, family and team.
Part of the answer to this crisis in religious
studies lies in expanding the contextualiza-
tion of religious traditions, not only in the
multi-religious cultures in which most Indi-
ans live, but also in the socio-economic en-
vironments in which they thrive as individu-
als with multiple identities, shared and not
shared, in varying combinations among
t h e m .
M u h a r r a m
s w o r dp l a y .
The Problem of Defining
Islam in Arampur
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South As i a
FR A N C I S  R O B I N S O N
The Farangi Mahall family of learned and holy men is
remarkable in the history of India. Indeed, it would
be in any society. Claiming descent from Ayyub
Ansari, the host of the Prophet at Medina, through
the 11t h-century saint cAbd Allah Ansari of Herat,
their ancestors migrated to India in the early years of
the Delhi sultanate. One branch settled around Pani-
pat, close to Delhi, and in recent times produced:
Altaf Husayn Hali, the great poet of the Aligarh
movement; Khwaja Ahmad Abbas, the progressive
writer; and Dr M.A. Ansari, the pan-Islamic leader
and president both of the Indian National Congress
and of the all-India Muslim League.
A second branch established itself in
Awadh. Documentary evidence of its exis-
tence begins with the first known farman of
the Emperor Akbar which made a revenue-
free grant to one Mulla Hafiz in 1559. The
family can be traced through such docu-
ments down to the time in 1692 when the
Mulla’s great-great-grandson, Qutb al-Din,
was murdered in a squabble over land. In
consequence the Emperor Awrangzeb
granted his family the sequestered property
of a European merchant in Lucknow which,
in 1695, the family occupied. Over the years
they came to occupy a considerable m u h a l-
l a, which was named Farangi Mahall.
We know something of the lives of almost
every male descendant of Qutb al-Din from
the early 18t h century to the mid-20t h c e n t u-
ry. They are important in four main ways.
They were scholars and teachers, the great
consolidators on Indian soil of the rational-
ist traditions of Islamic scholarship derived
from Iran. These they encapsulated in their
dars-i nizamiyya curriculum, which became
the dominant system of education for Indi-
an Muslims until it was overcome by the
twin forces of Islamic reform and Western
education in the 20t h c e n t u r y .
Such men of learning were also religious
leaders. They offered guidance to society
through their commentaries on the great
books in the m a d r a s a curriculum, through
the f a t a w a they issued and through the
counsel they gave, both public and private.
Those with spiritual vocations, moreover,
were models of right behaviour, their deeds
and sayings being passed on by word of
mouth and on occasion in written form, as
guidance for their own time and for future
generations. Two great Sufi lines ran
through the family: the Chishti-Sabiri from
Shah Muhibb Allah of Allahabad (d. 1648),
spiritual confidant of Dara Shikoh and de-
fender of Ibn cArabi, and the Qadiri line from
Sayyid Shah cAbd al-Razzaq of Bansa
(d.1724), spiritual guide of Mulla Nizam al-
Din of Farangi Mahall and reviver of the
Qadiri s i l s i l a in northern India.
Such religious leaders were, of course, de-
fenders in the public sphere of their under-
standing of Islam. Up to the mid-19t h c e n t u-
ry this largely involved, apart from the odd
exchange with a Christian missionary, con-
testing the claims of S h ica cu l a m a or of re-
formist Sunnis. From the mid-19t h c e n t u r y
their prime concerns were the threats to
Islam presented by British power in India
and elsewhere. In the 20t h century these
came to a head in a wave of protests and or-
ganizational developments reaching from
the first decade through to the mid-1920s.
Farangi Mahallis were at the heart of the
foundation of the Jamiyat a l -cUlama-i H i n d
and the All-India Khilafat Committee, as well
as a host of smaller activist organizations.
Finally, the Farangi Mahallis are of impor-
tance simply as a family. We can see how
they responded to the challenges of
Mughal, Nawabi and British rule, and subse-
quently to partition and independence. In
the 18t hand 19t h centuries we can trace their
movements as they sought service in the
courts of Lucknow, Rampur Farrukhabad,
Buhar (in Bengal), Arcot and Hyderabad. In
the 19t h and 20t h centuries the princely
states remained a haven, in particular Hy-
derabad, but many also found employment
in British India as cu l a m a, hakims, publish-
ers, newspaper editors, and administrators
in government and commercial concerns.
Throughout the family, education –
whether traditionally Islamic or Western –
has remained highly valued. Now they are
spread throughout the world: from Aus-
tralia, through South Asia, the Middle East,
Europe and North America. A good number,
now joined by their womenfolk, maintain
the family traditions of scholarship, but
more often than not in universities.
Research concerns
I first encountered the Farangi Mahallis in
the mid-1960s as I began the research
which was published as Separatism Among
Indian Muslims: the Politics of the United
Provinces’ Muslims 1860-1923 ( C a m b r i d g e ,
1974). I was much puzzled that they figured
prominently in the imperial record but not
in the historiography then current. S e p a-
r a t i s m established their central role in the
Khilafat movement. The book itself led the
head of the family, Mawlana Jamal Miyan, to
come to London from Karachi in 1976. He
told me that the records available for the
study of his family were much richer than
what I had been able to consult in Lucknow.
There followed several years of research in
Karachi and Lucknow, but also in Hyderabad
and Madras. Throughout, family members
were teachers and guides of great kindness
and generosity. This research led to a deep-
ening of my understanding of Islamic civi-
lization, and not least of the role of cu l a m a
and Sufis as guardians, interpreters and
transmitters of the central messages of Is-
lamic culture. This understanding profound-
ly influenced my approach to subsequent
work, for instance, my Atlas of Islam since
1 5 0 0 (Oxford, 1982) and the Cambridge Illus-
trated History of the Islamic World ( C a m-
bridge, 1996).
All but one of the essays in the cUlama o f
Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South
A s i a have been published over the past
twenty years in different places, most of
which are not particularly accessible. The
aim of publishing them together is to en-
able an understanding of the achievement
and importance of the family to be per-
ceived more readily. Three of the essays –
‘Perso-Islamic Culture in India from the Sev-
enteenth to the Early Twentieth Century’,
‘Scholarship and Mysticism in Early Eigh-
teenth-Century Awadh’ and ‘Ottomans-
Safawids-Mughals: Shared Knowledge and
Connective Systems’ – illustrate the role of
the Farangi Mahallis as the consolidators
and the defenders both of rationalist tradi-
tions of scholarship and of Ibn al-cA r a b i ’ s
Sufi understandings in northern India. The
last of the above-mentioned places their
achievement in the context of the wider Is-
lamic world and the movement of ideas
from the 17t h century onwards. Two essays –
‘The cUlama of Farangi Mahall and their
Adab’ and ‘cAbd al-Bari and the Events of
January 1926’ – set out to evoke what it was
to be a learned and holy man in the Farangi
Mahalli tradition. Of particular value here is
the way in which the m a l f u z a t literature and
private correspondence enables Farangi
Mahallis to speak for themselves. Four es-
says – ‘Problems in the History of the Faran-
gi Mahall Family of Learned and Holy Men’,
‘Al-Nizamiyya: A Group of Lucknow Intellec-
tuals in the Early Twentieth Century’, ‘cU l a-
ma, Sufis and Colonial Rule in North India
and Indonesia’, and again ‘cAbd al-Bari and
the Events of January 1926’ – all deal with
the family’s responses to British rule. We see
them responding as jurists, as educators, as
spiritual leaders and as young intellectuals,
and in doing so for the most part we sense
the moderate and balanced judgement
which was the hallmark of their rationalist
tradition. In the cAbd al-Bari essay we wit-
ness the life and ideas of a man who epito-
mized the Farangi Mahalli tradition in his
time, but whose death in January 1926
brought with it the end of the tradition’s
g r e a t n e s s .
It is to be hoped that the publication of
these essays as a book will establish the sig-
nificance of the Farangi Mahall family of
Lucknow alongside that of the Wali Allah
family of Delhi in the Islamic history of India.
They are but a starting point; there is more
research on this family to be done.
The cUlama o f
Farangi Mahall
and Islamic Culture
Degree in Eastern European and Mediterranean Civilizations
The opening of the EU to Eastern Europe
and Mediterranean countries facilitates
the widening of international relations and
at the same time exacerbates the need for
people who have profound knowledge of
these areas, which constitute the ‘Europe
of the future’. With contemporary society
becoming increasingly multicultural, ex-
perts who can solve the problems deriving
from the coexistence of citizens from dif-
ferent social and cultural backgrounds will
be indispensable.
The University of Bologna at Ravenna’s
Faculty for the Preservation of Cultural
Property is now offering a degree in ‘East-
ern European and Mediterranean Civiliza-
tions’, aimed at offering students a solid
basic knowledge – comprising juridical,
economic, political, social and historical
aspects – so that it will be possible to
analyse and understand the political, eco-
nomic and social systems of Eastern Eu-
rope and the Mediterranean region, or the
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equipped with the knowledge necessary
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g r a m m e .
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* The plural for d a i is dai duat. I have used d a is
f o r smoother reading.
Rehana Ghadially is professor at the Department
o f Humanities and Social Sciences at the Indian
Institute of Technology, Mumbai, India. She was
a visiting fellow at the ISIM in spring 2001.
E-mail: rehana@hss.iitb.ac.in
So uth As ia
R E H A N A  G H A D I A L LY
The religious life of the Daudi Bohras – an Ismaili sect
of South Asian Shici Muslims – comprises a rich pat-
tern of beliefs and rituals. Its members adhere to
seven pillars of Islam. Besides the well-known five,
the other two include w a l a y a, or devotion to the
Prophet and his relations, and obedience to the
twenty-first hidden imam. Visits to tomb shrines con-
stitute a significant expression of devotional obser-
vances. Distinct from the Hajj, this type of pilgrimage
is known as z i y a r e t in Bohra usage. The following
concentrates on domestic pilgrimages or visits to
tombs of d a is* (leaders of the missionary effort) and
other functionaries in India.
Women Pilgrims
Boons and Bonds in
a n Ismaili  Sect
The Daudi Bohras are an endogamous Gu-
jarati-speaking group, numbering a million
and scattered across fifty countries, the
largest concentration being in South Asia.
They are urban-based, the majority living in
their ethnic enclaves, and are small shop-
keepers, with professionals among their
youth. As a sect, the Daudi Bohras are rela-
tively prosperous. The religious life is over-
seen by a hierarchically organized, exclu-
sively male class of clerics headquartered in
Mumbai city. The spiritual leader is variously
known as d a i, s y e d n a or m a u l a. The s y e d n a i s
the custodian of all shrines and under him
the religious establishment works like a cor-
porate structure, offering spiritual services
in exchange for cash or kind. Although
women may be more visible at shrines than
men, they play no role in their management.
The missionary effort of the sect was
transferred from Yemen to India in the 16t h
century and thereafter d a is of Indian origin
graced the leadership. The tombs of the
twenty-seven d a is (numbers 25 to 51) and
their deputies constitute the sacred space in
India. This space stretches across four states
in northwestern India, including fifty sacred
spots, the highest density of which is found
in the state of Gujarat, home to the largest
concentration of the Bohras. While Bohras
previously travelled annually on saint’s day
for z i y a r e t, the post-independence spurt in
year round travel may be attributed to the
s y e d n a ’ s agenda to modernize the facilities
as well as the prosperity of the community
from migration and expansion of road and
rail connections.
Pilgrims, sacred journeys,
a n d other trips
Love for the prophet and his relations is in-
cumbent on all believers and in the spirit of
this obligation, the faithful – irrespective of
class, gender, age, educational background
and geographic location – undertake the sa-
cred journeys to tomb shrines (ziyaret). How-
ever, women more than men (middle-aged
and older women more than younger
women) and the orthodox take this journey.
On the occasion of the saint’s day a substan-
tial presence of men can be witnessed. The
older men come to sponsor meals and the
younger to serve the influx of pilgrims. Pil-
grimages are never solitary journeys. Women
travel with their families or with their hus-
bands, but more importantly in all women’s
groups. They travel by train, hired vehicles,
and state-run or private buses and taxis. A
common method is to travel by train to a
major shrine centre and hire a vehicle to com-
plete a selected circuit. By far the most popu-
lar circuit is the density of shrines in the state
of Gujarat, popularly referred to as Kathiawar
ni ziyaret, which takes eight to ten days.
In addition to the common practice of trav-
elling for ziyaret, women also travel for do-
mestic, social, leisure, and business purposes
making practised Islam indistinguishable
from other aspects of their lives. In short,
shrines provide vital links to what is central to
a woman’s world. Given the expansion of
women’s motives to travel, shrines have
evolved from being exclusive centres of de-
votion to being refuges from domestic and
urban life, serving as picnic spots or even hol-
iday resorts that provide inexpensive lodging
facilities.
Devotion and earthly boons
The devotional expression of the Daudi
Bohras is simple and requires no presence of
a cleric. Unlike the mosque and the commu-
nity hall, space is not gendered inside the
shrine. Women do need to be ritually clean
and the covering dress (r i d a) is mandatory.
Men may be in traditional attire or Western
clothes. The pilgrims enter the mausoleum
(r o z a ) barefooted and with their heads cov-
ered. They bend from the waist, moving the
right hand rapidly between the floor and
the forehead, signifying greeting. As a mark
of respect they half prostrate before the
tomb. They then press their forehead and
kiss the sides of the tomb. Additional devo-
tional expression may include an offering of
flowers or cash, and prayer. These are usual-
ly accompanied by a small request.
The Bohra worldview gives insight into
women’s motivation for undertaking the
pilgrimage. One such motivation is the be-
lief that every earthly possession is a gift
from God and that piety thus enhances the
possibility of material provisioning. Further-
more, one can accumulate religious merit
(s e v a b) from devotional acts, which can off-
set the weight of minor sins. Although the
primary intention of the women is to ex-
press devotion and reaffirm their faith in
their spiritual leaders, it is quite clear that no
woman leaves the shrine without making a
request. The most powerful method is to
pray, express one’s wishes, and express
hopes for an earthly boon.
Whereas visits to shrines of d a is are moti-
vated by respect and the hope to have a re-
quest fulfilled, pilgrimages to shrines of holy
men known for their service and sacrifice
are motivated by the taking of vows. The
frequency and nature of vows vary with
gender and age. Women take more vows
than men, older and middle-aged women
doing so more than younger women. Unlike
Hindu women’s fasting vows, which focus
on the well-being of sons and husbands,
Bohra women take vows for their own con-
cerns, followed by vows taken for the bene-
fit of their children and the family as a unit.
The content of women’s requests and vows
reflects traditional life cycle concerns. Vows
related to children centre on their health
and safety. A popular vow is one taken with
a view to the economic sustenance (r o z i) of
the family. Men’s vows are generally related
to (un)employment and success in business.
Vows may be fulfilled by a variety of acts
or gifts. Acts may include undertaking a pil-
grimage for a stipulated number of days or a
pilgrimage on saint’s day; or sponsoring a
sweet dish, a meal tray for eight, or a reli-
gious gathering followed by a meal for all.
Occasionally a ritual sacrifice of a goat may
constitute the fulfilment of a vow. All meal-
related offerings involve cash payment to
the clerics. Gifts may include a bed of flow-
ers (c h a d d a r) or richly embroidered silk and
velvet tomb covers (g h a l e f). More common-
ly, dates or other fruits and sweets are
blessed at the tomb and distributed among
those present. Vow-related offerings must
be construed as the giving of thanks for the
saint’s blessing and intercession, thus not as
an exchange for boons delivered, for even
in the absence of boons these must be hon-
oured. Lastly, women undertake pilgrim-
ages as an act of piety with the intent to ac-
cumulate merit.
Status quo or emancipation?
The pilgrimage ritual may be conceptual-
ized as serving a political and social pur-
pose. Women’s hegemony over popular
Islam can be seen as their having strategi-
cally hijacked a ritual to suit their own needs
and concerns. Secondly, through a tripartite
division of labour, women counteract the
economic control of the men and the ideo-
logical hold of the religious establishment
maintaining a power balance within the
family and the sect. The spheres are unequal
in status and prestige, but each is vital and
all are strongly interdependent. Women
cherish the gender roles prescribed within
Islam. At the same time, within the bounds
of a traditional setting, they increasingly ne-
gotiate the distribution of power and re-
sources within the household and the com-
m u n i t y .
It is important to contextualize what con-
stitutes emancipation. At the micro-level,
education, control over personal property,
assistance in family business and power
within kinship networks have given women
space to enhance their status. At the macro-
level, the economy must allow for jobs that
provide enough pay and status to make
them worthwhile. With limited opportuni-
ties for well-paid employment, coupled with
perceived discrimination of Muslims in the
job market, women are predisposed to
structure their status within the convention-
al framework. Piety is a source of protection
to women providing opportunities for
agency and action. A woman’s ability to
communicate with the d a is and to evoke
their favour is the same as that of a man.
Given the primacy of traditional gender
roles it is not surprising that women seek
control over sexuality and reproduction.
Through the popular vow taken with a view
to economic sustenance, women’s centrali-
ty in (the success of) their family businesses
is symbolically assured, and by implication
their role in the sustenance of the sect is ac-
k n o w l e d g e d .
By portraying saints as androgynous –
having male qualities but more importantly
female qualities such as service and sacrifice
– the pilgrimage ritual is an occasion to cele-
brate femininity. Through devotional en-
gagements women have assured control
over personal time and surplus family in-
come. As one male noted: ‘When women ask
to go to z i y a r e t, men immediately open their
pockets.’ Sacred journeys widen women’s
horizons and offer valuable lessons in nego-
tiating with the world on their own.
Besides being a pious exercise, the pil-
grimage is a significant part of women’s so-
cial life. On the road in a mini-bus, women
pray in unison, roll the t a s b i (strung beads),
talk, joke, munch on snacks and stop by the
wayside to eat and drink. The marble plat-
form (s e n) around the tomb and the bench-
es outside the rooms provide space for in-
teracting, sharing common concerns and
exchanging news about the happenings in
the community. Bonds are fostered as
women mix with (female) strangers in the
(segregated) activities of prayer at the
shrine mosque, religious gatherings and
communal meals. Despite the vibrant char-
acter of the women’s sub-culture, it is not
aimed at revolutionizing the power struc-
ture maintained in the (male-dominated)
economic and religious spheres. It is rather
aimed at extracting greater freedom and
improvement of the status of Bohra women.
Since these devotional practices do not
challenge the primary duties of women as
homemakers and the wider culture remains
indifferent to their aspirations, a genuine
transformation of their status remains prob-
l e m a t i c .
A shrine in
G a l i a k o t .
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No r th Af r i ca
AB DE L  W E D OU D O U L D  C H E I K H
The expansion of Islam in northwest Africa has been
very much associated with the spread of brotherhood
movements (t u r u q). Religious and educational prac-
tices as well as collective rules of conduct carry the
imprints of these movements, the political and eco-
nomic influence of which has been – and remains – de-
cisive in vast regions from Mauritania to Nigeria, from
the Sudan to Senegal. Recent developments, howev-
er, indicate an increase in power of a neo-fundamen-
talist inspirational Islam originating in the Middle
East, which presents itself as a rival to the ideas and
practices developed by the local versions of t a s a w w u f




The following proposes to underline more
particularly the ‘gender’ dimension of local
Muslim practices as it manifests itself both in
‘tradition’ and in certain recent challenges to
it. The focus is limited to the Moorish society
of Mauritania, although it is most likely that
the transformations experienced by this so-
ciety have affected its neighbouring soci-
eties in an analogous way.
Although it is not necessary to offer a gen-
eral presentation of Muslim brotherhoods
or the t a s a w w u f as such,1 it should be noted
that the brotherhoods are religious organi-
zations centred on the person of the s h a y k h:
a master and educator par excellence (m u-
r a b bı̄ ) whose authority is part of a chain (s i l-
s i l a) of authorities leading back to the
Prophet of Islam. He is perceived by his dis-
ciples (t a lāmı̄d h, m urı̄dūn) as a guide, an in-
tercessor who must be served and obeyed
without reserve until he leads them, his dis-
ciples, through the chosen trials to the point
of mastering ‘the way’ (t arı̄q a). They can
then, after a rite of enthronement, leave the
‘guide’ as they now hold their own title of
‘master’ (s h a y k h) or ‘licensed’ (m u q a d d a m)
and are authorized to guide others. In prac-
tice, the transmission of material and sym-
bolic capital (b a r a k a) associated with the di-
rection of the t arı̄q a is generally carried out
by the descendants of the founding s h a y k h,
but not without competition and dissent
amongst the various candidates of the in-
h e r i t a n c e .
In the Moorish territory, which has often
constituted a place of transit and transmis-
sion of Maghrebi or Middle Eastern brother-
hood organizations heading for Sub-Saha-
ran Africa, the principal t u r u q comprise the
following: the s hād h i l i y y a in its nās i r i y y a
variant, inaugurated by the Moroccan
Muhammad b. Nās i ra l - D i rc ı̄ at the end of the
1 7t h century; the qād i r i y y a, associated prin-
cipally with the legacy of Al-Shaykh Sı̄ d a l -
M u k h tār a l - K u n tı̄ (d. 1811), the movement’s
great Saharan renewer of the 18t h c e n t u r y ;
and finally the t i jān i y y a, the dissemination of
which in the Moorish territory and its confines
is accredited especially to Al-Shaykh Muhamd
al-Hāfiz al-cAlawı̄ (d.1830/ 31). An e n t a n g l e d
network of ramifications emerged f r o m
these main brotherhoods, associating indi-
vidual initiatives, inheritance quarrels, tribal
ca s a b i y y a (group solidarity), and even politi-
cal allegiances. The search for autonomy
manifests itself most notably in the creation
of centres that often become places of in-
struction, agricultural production, and com-
mercial exchange.
Formally, the t u r u q appear as miniature
reproductions or ‘clones’ of their mother re-
ligion: they reduplicate the initial messen-
ger (the Prophet Muhammad) with a second
messenger who ‘descends’ from him – ei-
ther doctrinally, by the s i l s i l a, or ‘biological-
ly’, by the sharifi n a s a b, to whom a number
of brotherhood founders/transmitters are
linked – and often ‘repeats’ the key traits of
his biography. This is essentially a male af-
fair: the founders and their ‘chains’, the
m u q a d d a mı̄n, and the successors counting
no women amongst them.
Nonetheless, women are not absent from
the brotherhood movements. Islam extract-
ed from the common basis of the two pre-
existing monotheisms the theme of the fe-
male temptress and it tends to regulate with
a certain rigour the contacts and relations
between men and women. In addition,
Islam is profoundly suspicious of celibacy.
Albeit in vain, the mystical propaedeutic ex-
alts the refusal of all pleasures of the flesh;
rarely has it arrived at a definitive separation
of men and women. Inversely, certain broth-
erhood movements in the Saharan region
arouse rumours and concern over the
promiscuity these movements supposedly
authorize, meaning the male-female con-
t a c t s .
Extreme variations on
t h e gender issue
Two communities, belonging increasingly
to the same tribe (I d a y b u sāt) and cohabit-
ing in the same space (within the confines
of Tagant and Assaba), serve to illustrate
contrasting positions. On the one hand is
the branch known as the g h u z f i y y a of the
s hā d h i l i y y a, founded by Al-Shaykh Muham-
mad al-Aghzaf a l - Dāwūdı̄ (d. 1801), to which
diverse accounts, notably colonial,2 a t-
tribute orgiastic practices leading at times
to births out of wedlock, these children
being baptized a w lā d a l -nūr (sons of the
light). On the other hand is a scion branch of
the qā d i r i y y a initiated at the end of the
1930s by Al-Shaykh Muhammad cAbd Allāh
wuld Adda (d. 1963), who went as far as to
initiate celibacy amongst his adherents,
thus engendering a small community of
monk farmers at a place called Būm d a y d, in
central Mauritania.
Another group, this one originating from
the Ibrahimian t i jā n i y y a of Kaolack (Senegal)
made itself known in the 1950s by a co-gen-
dered existence considered suspect by the
vox populi of the region in which it emerged:
its adherents were conferred the sobriquet
ahl al-gazra, i.e ‘the unsubdued’, ‘margin-
als’. The group recently recalled the origi-
nality proclaimed by certain brotherhood
movements in treating the question of gen-
der relations in Moorish space. The context
of the polemic that this incited should be
briefly reiterated here: a polemic that illus-
trates in particular the opposition evoked
earlier in this article between the local Islam
of the brotherhoods and the new global
Islam of neo-fundamentalist influence.
In order to correctly perceive the stakes of
the controversy incited by the position
taken by the movement’s s h a y k h, Wuld
S i dı̄ n a, it is appropriate to underline the fact
that in Moorish society, all physical contact,
and notably the salutatory handshake, is
traditionally prohibited between people of
the opposite sex unless they belong to the
class of those who may have physical con-
tact between sexes (m a hā r i m) – a class de-
fined by blood or milk kinship, and within
which marriage is prohibited. Wuld S i dı̄ n a
was to publicly rise up against this tradition
that organized the separation of men from
women by designating amongst them who
could touch one another and who could
n o t .
He takes the pretext of an interview for
the unofficial journal a l - S h acb on 21 Novem-
ber 1989 of two Sudanese academicians vis-
iting Mauritania, under the title: ‘The Su-
danese woman is at parity with man as
much in rights as in duties. A Sudanese
scholar offers his opinions on the issues of
speaking to a woman or shaking her hand.’
In substance, one amongst them declared
that there is no harm in a man and a woman
shaking hands a jā n i b, that is to say non-
m a hā r i m, as a salutation. Basing himself on
this declaration, Wuld S i dı̄na pronounced a
j a wā b, disseminated in the form of a tract, in
which he declared that it is licit for a man
and a woman, no matter who they are, to
shake hands. He thus publicly opposed tra-
ditional rules of male-female contact in
Moorish society, founded on kinship rela-
t i o n s .
This position taken by the t i jā nı̄ s h a y k h,
whose community already had a reputation
of non-conformism with respect to male-fe-
male relations, incited a unanimous con-
demnation by the Mauritanian religious es-
tablishment. This position has also recently
fed the stigmatizing discourse of certain for-
mer members of Wuld S i dı̄na ’s community
criticizing it adamantly for, amongst other
things, the promiscuity (in their eyes scan-
dalous) instituted among men and women.
Wuld S i dı̄ n a and his disciples did not re-
main without reaction in the face of these
attacks. They themselves engaged a vigor-
ous polemic, specifically against their for-
mer companions that had renounced them
and that they accused of being in the pay of
W a h h a b i s m .3
What can be concluded from the above-
mentioned observations in terms of the
evolution of gender relations amidst the
brotherhood movements and in a larger
sense within Moorish society in its entirety?
Even if the communities mentioned are de-
mographically small, it is appropriate to un-
derline the diversity and the non-conformi-
ty to a certain representation of Sunni ‘or-
thodoxy’ that they bring into the gender re-
lations in Moorish society. The recent up-
heavals experienced by this society (mas-
sive sedentarization of former nomads, un-
precedented swelling of the urban popula-
tion, substantial progress of elementary reli-
gious education, etc.) tend to modify the
very foundations of the rules of life in collec-
tivity on which it is based. In the context of
the nomads, the residential unities (en-
campments), generally small in size, were
constituted, above all, based on tribal kin-
ship. The tent was not very conducive to
keeping women inside. In fact their pres-
ence in the public sphere, although it has a
certain sense in this type of context, did not
pose a particular problem. The statutory
parity and the genealogy offered the safe-
guard necessary to govern the contacts be-
tween individuals and between the two
sexes. With the exception of the marginal
cases previously mentioned, the brother-
hood movements’ management of commu-
nity affairs was part and parcel of a tradition
marked by monogamy and by a certain
women’s ‘liberty’ that belonged to the prac-
tices and collective representations of
Moorish society. The social upheavals men-
tioned here planted the seeds of new re-
compositions. The rural communitarism
that served as the substance for the forming
of brotherhoods gave way to anomy, or at
least the threat of anomy, in the new cities.
The b a r a k a of the s h a y k h was progressively
effaced before the individual adhesion to a
‘reinvented’ Islam – that of neo-fundamen-
talism. And the grand villas of the new pious
bourgeoisie offer from then on the possibil-
ity to separate the female space from public
space and from masculine space. It is to be
feared that in this precise context, the for-
mula of Max Weber, according to which ‘the
city liberates’, is not to be verified.
N o t e s
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M O H A MM E D  H A M DO U N I  A L A M I The Fiction of
Architectural Identity
in Contemporary Morocco
The question of the political use of architec-
ture and urban design as a means to create
and promote cultural identities through
which social control and coercion are imple-
mented is of great political and academic in-
terest. It has generated a wealth of literature
and heated debates. Yet it has mainly been
addressed within Western and colonial con-
texts, and largely ignored with reference to
the post-colonial period. In the context of a
developing country such as Morocco, marked
by the perception of architecture and urban
design as a formative dimension of cultural
identity, the intervention of international or-
ganizations in development and housing pro-
grammes is often perceived as biased and ne-
glectful of basic cultural phenomena. For in-
stance, relying on a fundamentalist discourse
on authentic traditional Moroccan family life
style, government officials oppose the eco-
nomic standards of international organiza-
tions and their disregard for the Moroccan
cultural requirement for specific forms of
space and ownership. No matter whether the
claim is contradicted by the informal and for-
mal practices of urban production, the official
discourse stands as political defence of na-
tional cultural identity.
The forms of urbanization and the spread of
shanty towns and informal housing in the
new urban landscape, along with a succes-
sion of spectacular urban riots (1981, 1984,
1990) have been reflected upon in different
ways by national and international scholars.
But the problem with existing approaches is
that they are dominated by concerns of pop-
ulation, urban geography, and academic
compartmentalization. To address this lacu-
na, at one level, it is crucial to remember that
the urban context is not simply a reflection of
the demographic and economic evolution of
society. Indeed, the well-documented and
frequently researched notion that urbanism
uses space to ‘regulate’ the economy and
grant financial opportunities and subsidies to
targeted groups obscures a much deeper po-
litical process in the construction of urban
space: the maintenance of social control and
coercion not only through a Haussmannian
conception of space (Walter Benjamin) but
also more subtly through the construction of
a politics of cultural identity embodied in
urban design.
While colonial architecture and urbanism
have received substantial scholarly attention
in the last two decades, post-colonial urban
design has yet to be seriously studied. Stu-
dents of the colonial period have generally
shared the assumption that a politics of urban
design shaped colonial architecture and city
planning. They all suggest that colonial archi-
tecture and urban design were a medium for
the production of images of cultural identity
and otherness.
The question of traditional architecture and
its relevance for contemporary practices in Is-
lamic countries was addressed by the pro-
gramme of the Aga Khan Award of Architec-
ture through many seminars and publica-
tions.
The Moroccan case
The galloping urbanization of the last
decades and the ensuing social and housing
problems have attracted the attention of
many academics and international organiza-
tions. Unfortunately the literature concerning
these issues is extremely limited. But the poli-
tics of urban design did not receive much at-
tention from scholars in the field. Despite the
consistent and conspicuous involvement of
the state in defining a new architectural cul-
ture, and its claim of initiating a revival of au-
thentic national identity, scholarly works con-
tinued to view urbanism as limited to its role
in the regulation of economy and regional
planning.
It is vital to study the implementation of
that politics and to show how and why, de-
spite its alleged rejection, the colonial archi-
tectural legacy has been a main source of in-
spiration to the foundation of a nationalist
discourse on architecture.* This nationalism is
clearly both a discursive entity created by nar-
rativity (Homi Bhabha 1990) and marked by a
distinction between the political realm of na-
tionalism, which is influenced by metropoli-
tan precedents, and the cultural realm, where
different ‘nationalist’ patterns are perpetuat-
ed (Partha Chatterjee 1986 and 1993). More-
over, the implementation of that politics
does not rely only on narrativity, it also calls
in different institutional and legal strategies
and tactics, rituals and economic practices. In
a word, it is a complex power strategy in per-
petual adaptation (Foucault 1979). This strat-
egy aims to maintain social control through
the fiction of an architectural identity.
By deconstructing the ideological fiction of
architectural identity in contemporary Mo-
rocco, a space can be created for architectur-
al and urban criticism: lifting the taboos im-
posed on architectural style and urban de-
bates. It is therefore necessary to discern the
many components of this architectural refor-
mulation, pointing out their intricacies:
– The construction and ritualization of an offi-
cial discourse on architecture: Le Discours sur
l’Architecture. To commemorate the signifi-
cance of the King’s 1986 speech, ‘Le Jour de
l’Architecture’ (Architecture Day) was official-
ly declared by the Minister of the Interior in
1992. It is celebrated each year by the Min-
istry of Urbanism in collaboration with the
Ordre National des Architectes (National
Order of Architects). The commemoration has
been constructed as a ritual. The ceremony
starts with a Qur’anic recitation and a show-
ing of His Majesty’s 1986 Speech on Architec-
ture. Nothing could be more telling since any
religious ceremony begins with a Qur’anic
recitation.
– Institutional strategies, and reformation of
laws: The second important effect of the royal
speech comprises the reform of the law on ur-
banism and the creation of new institutions of
city planning. After the 1981 urban riots in
Casablanca, urbanism strongly attracted the
strategic attention of the state. The political
reaction to these riots was to reform the ad-
ministrative organisms of that city and to cre-
ate a state agency specialized in urbanism.
Following the royal speech, with its diverse
guidelines for architecture and urbanism, it
was considered time to reform the law on ur-
banism, which was inherited from the French.
The reformation of law and the institutional
changes functioned as complementary de-
vices of denial of the failure of the national
policy and of coercion in the management of
urban development.
– The share of the professionals: One of the
strategies of the new politics was related to
the need to mobilize all the actors involved in
architectural production. The professional as-
sociations, and in particular that of the archi-
tects, were called to play a major role in the
policy of the style. However, most of the reac-
tions remained unspoken. Why is it that, in a
country where democratization is supposed
to be progressing, and where architectural
production is far from being uniform, such an
important debate has to be avoided?
It can be hypothesized that because of the
weaknesses of their professional status, the
controversies about their knowledge, and the
competition with other professionals, most
architects became part of the game by sup-
porting it, or by not publicly taking any critical
position. Building on Foucault’s view (1997)
that power is productive of knowledge, it can
be argued that the architect’s political in-
volvement was the opportunity to promote
the profession of architect and to re-create a
professional knowledge.
– Architectural conservation and the negation
of history: Conservation of historic buildings
and urban sites was first introduced to Moroc-
co by Maréchal Lyautey, the Résident Général
of the French Protectorate. In the 1970s, after
a long period of neglect, the Moroccan gov-
ernment with the help of UNESCO turned
back to that politics.But this politics has had
little effect in the field. Interestingly the few
works of conservation which took place do
not respect the international norms: the
buildings are reconstructed anew with the
pretext that ‘Moroccan architectural tradition
has never died.’
The claim of continuity of that tradition
used as a metaphor of cultural perennial is in
fact a pure denial of history.
– The fiction of architectural identity: The actu-
al development of Moroccan architecture
suggests that the new politics of urban de-
sign is mainly a fiction. Indeed, the first official
urban project of independent Morocco is
strikingly modernist: the city of Agadir, which
was rebuilt after its destruction in the earth-
quake of 1960. On the other hand, there is a
great architectural diversity.
Here the hypothesis is that the fiction of ar-
chitectural identity functions as a Freudian
negation, adenial of the actual hybridization
of contemporary Moroccan architecture.
– Refashioning the urban landscape: A deliri-
ous reshaping of the urban landscape took
place after the royal speech on architecture of
1986. Soon this refashioning resulted in a dis-
astrous uniformity of the urban landscape.
Through the analysis of the architectural re-
fashioning projects it is possible to point out
that despite the promotion of narratives
about Moroccan architectural identity, the
implementation of that politics was practical-
ly mimicking the French colonial politics of
urban design. It is also possible to realize that
the creation of a fiction of architectural identi-
ty functions as a Freudian denial of the objec-
tive stakes of urban development (housing
problems, spatial control, and hidden distrib-
ution of subsidies). This could function only
because many patterns of cultural national-
ism were available in the political nationalist
realm.
On 14 January 1986, H.M. Hassan II, the late King of
Morocco, delivered a speech on architecture. The
speech was addressed to a small gathering of archi-
tects selected by the Ministry of the Interior as repre-
sentatives of their profession. The King of Morocco,
unlike Prince Charles, was a true ruler and his speech
was not meant as an art critique. Rather, it was in-
tended to clarify a new incipient politics of urban de-
sign. This new politics, which intended to promote a
return to ‘traditional’ architectural culture, was in
open contradiction to the former official discourse of
modernization. How can one understand this return
to traditional forms? Was this an index of failure in
the process of modernization initiated by the state
after Independence, or rather an issue of strong soci-
etal resistance towards modernization, calling for a
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TA I R  F AR A D O V
The religious situation in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan has
been dramatically changing in recent years. Unlike in
the Soviet times of total state control over religion,
‘scientific atheism’, suppression, and intolerance of
believers, religion is currently enjoying conditions of
relative freedom. Indeed, the constitution guarantees
the freedom of religion as a right. Religious views and
information have been very rapidly spreading among
the population. Public interest in Islam, which has
very deep historical and cultural roots and a rich spir-
itual tradition in Azerbaijan, has considerably in-
creased in recent years, particularly among intellec-
tuals and the youth. In fact, religion is becoming one




A number of vital theoretical and practical
questions arise from the current circum-
stances of religion in Azerbaijan: What are the
factors preconditioning the growing popular-
ity of religious views among citizens? What is
the degree and level of adherence to Islam
and other religions? What is the concept of
‘religion’ in mass consciousness? How do
people view the place and role of religion in
public and private life? Finding answers to
these questions led to the organizing and
conducting of a large-scale sociological sur-
vey.*
The first stage of the survey was conducted
from September 1999 to February 2000 in five
regions of Azerbaijan, the number of respon-
dents interviewed totalling 1,000 persons.
The main purpose of the survey was to obtain
comprehensive data concerning the peculiar-
ities, dynamics and basic trends of religiosity
in Post-Soviet Azerbaijani society, as well as to
explore the basic sociological characteristics
and parameters of public religious awareness
and behaviour.
The respondents were distributed over the
following religious affiliations: Islam, 94.0%;
Orthodox Christianity, 3.7%; Judaism, 1.2%;
and representatives of other religious confes-
sions (Lutherans, Baptists, Catholics, etc.),
1.1%.
Judging from the data obtained, such typo-
logical groups of religiosity as ‘believers’ and
‘hesitant’ are dominant. The survey identified
the following break-down of respondents de-
pending upon their attitude towards religion
(on the basis of their confessional self-identifi-
cation). ‘Believers’ constituted 63.4% of all re-
spondents, while 6.7% consider themselves
even ‘firm believers’; the groups of those hes-
itating between belief and non-belief com-
prised 10.4%; non-believers made up 7.1%;
and 8.6% indicated being indifferent to this
issue. Lastly, a small 3.8% of respondents con-
sider themselves ‘firm atheists’.
Dynamics of religiosity
It was important to follow up on the dy-
namics of the changing attitudes of the popu-
lation towards religion over the last years. The
data provide a rather complicated picture of
the dynamics of religiosity in Azerbaijan, but
in general it can be said that religiosity is on
the increase. Some two-thirds of the respon-
dents (62.0%) indicated having maintained
their previous level of religiosity. Half of the
respondents (52.3%) said that they were and
still are believers, while 9.7% pointed out that
they ‘have never believed before and do not
believe now either’. However, a third of the
respondents (35.1%) confirmed having
changed their views in the direction of
greater religiosity and 9.3% said that they had
never believed before, but have now become
believers. One out of four (25.8%) respon-
dents stated that he/she believed before, but
has become more religious now. Finally, a
very small portion of the respondents
claimed to have estranged themselves from
religion (1.9%) or to have changed their reli-
gion (1.0%).
A tenth of the respondents (10.4%) said that
a ‘tremendous importance’ was attached to
religion in their lives; while 26.1% of the re-
spondents feel it occupies ‘an important
enough place’ in their lives. Religion was con-
ferred a ‘moderate’ role in the lives of 41.8%
of respondents and an ‘insignificant’ role for
12.5%. Those for whom religion ‘does not
play any role at all’ amounted to 9.2%.
The motives and reasons for religiosity
amongst respondents are directly linked to a
wide variety of factors. The first cluster is
comprised of social and socio-psychological
factors. Firstly, it seems that the family and
immediate surroundings are relevant to
one’s religious experience: 15.7% of respon-
dents indicated that their having adopted re-
ligion is explained by their ‘family traditions,
because this has been accepted in the fami-
ly’, while 16.1% of respondents affirmed that
they were nurtured in a religious spirit since
childhood and received a religious upbring-
ing at home. For others, religion was more
predetermined by their ethnic and cultural
identity and thus acts as an element of na-
tional consciousness. In this vein, approxi-
mately one out of seven (14.2%) respondents
adopted religion because it corresponds to
their national customs and traditions. Adher-
ence to Islam was explained by one out of
five (19.7%) respondents by the fact that ‘we
are a Muslim nation and our entire nation is
Muslim’. Among the individual and personal
stimuli or reasons for adopting and practis-
ing religion, the most frequently encoun-
tered were the following: ‘this helps moral
self-perfection’, 18.3%; ‘it is easier for me to
live this way, it has created an interest and
meaning in life’, 7.8%; ‘this has become my
inner need’, 5.7%; and ‘it has been caused by
my personal life circumstances, personal
hardship and difficulties’, 1.9%. Among rea-
sons for pubic interest in religion, there were
also responses such as ‘tribute to fashion’
(0.6%) and ‘ordinary human curiosity’. Clearly
homogeneity does not exist in this complex
of factors and circumstances, but future re-
search into this matter could clarify the an-
swers further.
Knowledge of the s h a r i a h a n d
religious observance
Adherence to the Islamic faith envisions
familiarization with the s h a r i a h. The respon-
dents were asked about the extent of their
knowledge of s h a r i a h rules and laws. A sub-
stantial 58.7% confirmed having ‘a certain
idea’ and 16.8% feel they are ‘quite well’ fa-
miliar, 18.4% being ‘absolutely unfamiliar
with the s h a r i a h’. A mere 6.1% stated that
they know the s h a r i a h principles ‘very well’.
In the survey context, the respondents were
also asked about their understanding of
some key dogmas, principles and under-
standings of Islamic belief (e.g. Islam, iman
and i b a d a t). It turned out that very few have
a clear understanding of the meaning and
essence of these terms.
The observance of religious command-
ments varies: 6.3% of the respondents as-
serted that they fulfil all commandments in
all life situations; 16.2% try to fulfil com-
mandments to the greatest possible extent;
19.9% fulfil some of the commandments
partially; and 57.6% do not fulfil them at all.
The daily prayer is generally seen as one of
the most important obligations for Muslims.
The survey shows that 17.7% of ‘believer’ re-
spondents pray the n a m a z. Corresponding-
ly, 82.3% of the respondents do not abide
by this core ritual. Another important oblig-
ation for believers is to observe the fast. The
survey illustrated that 28.6% of believers
fast during the Ramadan. Respondents also
appear to respect the religious prohibitions
of gambling (76.3%), eating pork (59.8%),
and drinking alcoholic beverages (52.6%).
The frequency of visits to mosques is one of
the most obvious indicators of the level of
religiosity. Respondents who visit mosques
‘from time to time’ totalled 35.1%; those
who ‘do not go to mosques at all’ amounted
to 32.8%; those who only visit mosques ‘on
holidays and special occasions’ comprised
23.1%; while those ‘permanently’ at
mosques totalled 6.4% and those that at-
tend mosque ‘every Friday’ just 2.6%.
Role of religion in public life
The respondents were invited to express
their opinions concerning the role religion
currently plays in society and how its social
impact has changed over the last several
years. More than half of the respondents
(54.4%) think the role of religion has been ‘on
the increase’ recently, that it has ‘started play-
ing a more noticeable role in society’; while a
mere 3.8% indicated that this role may be
growing, ‘but only for the time being’. A large
share of the respondents (41.3%) believes
that the role of religion in society and its so-
cial impact ‘remain unchanged’ (i.e. ‘just like
before, in the socialist time’). Only 4.3% of re-
spondents feel the role and influence of reli-
gion at the present time ‘is weakening’.
Respondents were asked to mention
spheres of the social life which, in their opin-
ion, are to function according to religious
regulations and norms. Religious influence is
supposed to be distributed, in the respon-
dents’ views, over such spheres as ‘public
morality’ (83.9%), ‘culture’ (70.6%) and ‘fami-
ly’ (71.2%). Most consider religion not to be a
factor in economic or political life in Azerbai-
jan, and a large majority suggested that nei-
ther economics (74.1%) nor politics (90.7%)
should be influenced by religion on any ac-
count. This confirms the assumption that the
concept of ‘religion’ at the level of public
consciousness is predominantly considered
in moral terms, having an ethical content.
Religion is primarily regarded as a main and
effective regulator of the everyday life and
behaviour of Azerbaijanis, and not more.
Public perceptions of Islam
When asked about their opinions concern-
ing the role of Islam in the historical, cultural
and spiritual development of the Azerbaijan
nation, the majority (62.7%), including some
adherents to religions other than Islam, indi-
cated seeing this role as an exclusively ‘posi-
tive’ one. In their comments, the respondents
most frequently used the following argu-
ments and comments: ‘Islam gave the impe-
tus to the development of national culture,
science, philosophy, and art’; ‘Islam has
taught us to tolerate others’; ‘we owe Islam all
our merits’. A smaller part of the respondents
(28.5%) implied that this role has been dual: in
some sense as ‘positive’ and in another sense
‘negative’. Only 6.9% see this role as ‘not quite
considerable’ or as ‘negative’ (1.9%).
Overall, the empirical data illustrate the
process of a growing level of religiosity of the
Azerbaijani population. Over the last years,
the process has assumed quite an intense
and dynamic nature, which is reflected in the
increased number of (practising) believers.
Public opinion is giving a high assessment of
the role and place of religion in public and
private life. Moral and ethical interpretations
and understandings of religion prevail in
public consciousness. An important role is
also played by traditional and ethnocultural
components of religious perception. Another
peculiarity of the present religiosity is inten-
sification of the ritual and cult aspects of reli-
gion. At the same time, however, religious
adherence is not always accompanied by the
observance of rituals.
These research findings provide a basis for
elaborating our understanding of the reli-
gious situation in such a transitional society
as Azerbaijan. They may also serve as the
point of departure for comparative analyses
of religious situations in other post-commu-
nist countries.
N o t e
* The survey was carried out by the author of
t h i sa r t i c l e .
Dr Tair Faradov is a senior research fellow at
t h e International Center for Social Research (ICSR)
i n Baku, Azerbaijan. The survey was supported by
t h e Research Support Scheme of the Open Society
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Table 2. Evaluations of the Civil Code
*Don’t know/No answer
1 0 04 . 24 5 . 35 0 . 5T o t a l
D K / N A *
Religious wedding
should also be legal
Present application
should continue
In Turkey only the civil wedding is legally accepted but those who wish may go through a religious
ceremony (imam wedding). Would you approve of having a religious wedding as legally valid or should
t h e present regulations continue?
1 0 07 . 57 8 . 51 4 . 0T o t a l
D K / N A *
Would not accept changing the
present Civil C o d e
Would accept changing
t h e present Civil C o d e
According to Islamic law a man can divorce his wife without going before a judge. However, according
t o the present Civil Code, divorce requires a court case and a judge’s decision. Would you accept changing
t h e present Civil Code so as to allow divorces to be regulated according to Islamic law?
1 0 04 . 78 1 . 41 3 . 9T o t a l
D K / N A *
Would not accept changing
t h e present Civil C o d e
Would accept changing
the present Civil C o d e
According to Islamic law women receive a smaller share of their parent’s inheritance. However, according
t o the present Civil Code both men and women get an equal share from inheritance. Would you accept
changing the Civil Code so as to give men the right to obtain a larger share of the inheritance than women?
1 0 04 . 38 5 . 01 0 . 7T o t a l
D K / N A *
Does not approve of marriage
according to Islamic law
Approves of marriage according
to Islamic law
According to Islamic law a man is allowed to be married to up to four women. However, at present
polygamy is outlawed. Would you approve of changing the system of marriage in accordance with Islamic
law, so as to allow the marriage of men with up to four women?
T u r k e y
A L I  Ç A R K OĞ L U
Despite the centrality of the rising tensions between
secularist and pro-Islamist groups with respect to the
future of Turkish politics, little empirical analysis ex-
ists on the cleavages between the two groups. The Po-
litical Islam in Turkey (PIT) project* provides extensive
opportunities for such an analysis as well as analyses
of many other aspects of Islam in modern Turkey. The
following focuses on the levels of support for the con-
troversial policies in recent years aimed at regulating
the role of religion in Turkish social life.
Religion and Public
Policy in Turkey
Several memorable incidents occurred during
the establishment of the secular Republican
regime and its immediate aftermath in which
the reactionary peripheral forces gathered
around a loud reactionary demand for şeriat
and the protection of the sultanate and
caliphate. Tension between the secularists and
pro-Islamist forces resurfaced with the success
of the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi),
first in the local elections of 1994 and then in
the general elections of 1995. Ever since, ques-
tions concerning the popular bases of şeriat
rule have been used in public opinion surveys.
The wording of the questions usually refers to
an unspecified group of people that suppos-
edly think that Turkey should be governed ac-
cording to şeriat rules. The respondents are
asked whether they would agree with this
idea. These simplistic evaluations cannot be
taken as a reflection of a demand for ̧seriat rule.
Perhaps more seriously, the respondents are
not even given a description of what is meant
by şeriat, nor are they asked about specific im-
plications of şeriat rules.
Table 1 shows the findings in three consecu-
tive opinion polls conducted in 1995, 1996 and
1998. What is striking in these figures is that
over the years concerned at least one out of
five voters expressed their approval of şeriat
rule in Turkey. A year before the peak of ten-
sions between the military and the pro-Is-
lamists during the so-called ‘28th of February
process’, the approval rate peaked with slight-
ly more than 25% of the voters supporting the
idea. Nearly a year after the start of the
‘process’ the approval rate dropped to its 1995
level.
The straightforward wording of the question
used in the PIT stressed the necessity of the es-
tablishment of ̧seriat rule: ‘Would you or would
you not favour the establishment of a şeriat-
based religious state in Turkey?’ Answers to
this question in February 1999 indicate that
approximately 21% of the voters approve.
Several additional questions (Table 2) in the
PIT concerning the Civic Code could be used to
provide some content to the above findings.
When posing these questions on the present-
day Civic Code regulations on marriage, di-
vorce and inheritance, the wording specifically
allowed for a clear comparison with arrange-
ments in accordance to the Islamic law.
The overwhelming support for the secular Re-
publican Civic Code is evidence of the prob-
lematic nature of the word şeriat for the Turk-
ish electorate. A significant number of the
ship (practice) requirements of Islam. Those
who indicated that people in Turkey are not
free to fulfil these requirements totalled
nearly 31%. People were also asked whether
religious people are oppressed in Turkey.
Compared to the question concerning the
freedom to fulfil requirements, those who
believed that oppression exists with respect
to religious people is higher – at approxi-
mately 42%.
Those who indicated that oppression of
religious people exists in Turkey were also
asked in an open-ended question to provide
examples of this oppression. Of the 1,254 re-
spondents who indicated that oppression
exists towards the religious people, 812 – or
nearly 64% – gave an example related to
banning of headscarves or the turban. Inter-
estingly, the closure of Imam Hatip schools
and Qur’anic courses constitute the second
largest group of examples, which were
given by about 13% of the respondents. In
short, examples of policies that are directly
related to oppression in the perceptions of
the people are primarily related to educa-
tion policies. These examples were evoked
by 77% of respondents who claim that reli-
gious people are being oppressed in Turkey.
The very low number of examples for op-
pression of religious people that included
oppression of worship practices such as
daily prayers (n a m a z), fasting and the like is
also worth noting. Similarly, very few an-
swers note oppression targeted at the Alevi
community. Despite Turkish media’s intense
coverage of the closure and prosecution of
Islamic brotherhoods (t a r i k a t s), answers in-
dicating this comprised only about 1% of all
examples given. Surprisingly, the military
appears only in a total of 33 answers as an
example. Clearly, within the context of an
open-ended question about oppression of
religious people, the military does not re-
ceive much blame.
electorate seems unable to refute şeriat rule.
However, as Table 2 shows,once given a clear
choice between the secular and Islamic legal
arrangements, preferences clearly shift to-
ward the secular arrangements.
An integral part of the Republican civic law
was the abolishment of religious ceremonies
or clerical marriages (imam nikahı). Under the
Republican arrangement the only lawful mar-
riage is civil marriage. However, it is well
known that a sizeable proportion of the cou-
ples that marry in a civil ceremony also under-
go a religious ceremony in which an imam
concludes the marriage contract. When asked
whether the religious wedding with an imam
and the civil marriage ceremony should both
be counted as official, nearly 45% of the re-
spondents answered favourably to having
both become legally binding.
Table 3 presents answers in support of
some assertions concerning the role of reli-
gion in Turkish society and general evalua-
tions of the social and political life of the
country. It seems that nearly three quarters of
the respondents support assertions about
women having the right to cover their heads
if they want to in the universities as well as in
government jobs. Other statements about re-
ligious expression in social life were strongly
supported. However, despite overwhelming
agreement with statements backing a reli-
gious point of view, nearly 67% agree with
the statement that having religion as a guide
in state affairs is detrimental. Could these
agreements be taken as a disguised support
for secular principles? The fact that those who
agree with this statement seem very unlikely
to support şeriat rule seems to support this
view. Similarly, nearly 77% of the respondents
agree with the statement that Republican re-
forms have helped Turkey to progress.
Recently the role of the Directorate of Reli-
gious Affairs (Diyanet I
.
şleri Başkanlığı) in regu-
lating the role of religion in Turkish society
has come under attack. Despite its large bud-
get, the Directorate’s services concentrate
Table 1. Approval of ş e r i a t r u l e
June 1995 March 1996 May 1998
A p p r o v e s 1 9 . 9 2 6 . 7 1 9 . 8
Does not approve 6 1 . 8 5 8 . 1 5 9 . 9
Don’t Know/No Opinion 1 8 . 4 1 5 . 2 2 0 . 2
Source: TÜSES (1999, 68–69)
Would you favour the establishment of a ş e r i a t-based religious state in Turkey? 
W o u l d Would not D K / N A *
f a v o u r f a v o u r
T o t a l 2 1 . 0 6 7 . 9 1 1 . 1 1 0 0
Source: Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000, p. 16) *Don’t know/No answer
primarily on Sunni rather than Alevi commu-
nities. Nonetheless, the harsh reactions to the
Directorate do not seem to find much sup-
port among the population at large; only
about 8% seem to support the idea of aboli-
tion of the Directorate. But when it comes to
the functions it fulfils the reformists dominate
the answers: nearly 70% of the respondents
agree with the statement that the Directorate
should provide services to the Alevi as well as
the Sunni communities.
Another facet of state-society relations in
Turkey concerning religiosity, religious ser-
vices and worship practices is an implicit
concern, or explicit claim, that religious peo-
ple are being oppressed. Although some
state policies are not fully supported by the
people, it is not clear whether these policies
are perceived to be oppressive.
The PIT includes a question as to whether
people in Turkey are free to fulfil the wor-
N o t e
* Carried out by myself and Binnaz Toprak
w i t ht h e funding of the Türkiye Ekonomik ve
Sosyal Etüdler V a k f ı - T E S E V .
Ali Ç a r koğ l u is associate professor at the Department
of Political Science and International Relations at
Boğ a z i ç i University, Istanbul, Turkey.
E-mail: carkogla@boun.edu.tr
Table 3. Approval of various assertions
A g r e e U n d e c i d e d D i s a g r e e D K / N A *
All Muslim women should cover their heads. 5 8 . 9 6 . 4 3 2 . 6 2 . 1
I don’t approve of teenage boys and girls being
educated together in the same classroom. 3 8 . 5 6 . 8 5 1 . 9 2 . 7
I don’t approve of girls and young women wearing
short skirts. 5 7 . 1 8 . 8 3 1 . 6 2 . 5
Women state employees should be allowed to cover
their heads if they want to. 7 4 . 2 5 . 8 1 7 . 4 2 . 5
Girls should be allowed to cover their heads in
the universities if they want to. 7 6 . 1 5 . 6 1 6 . 0 2 . 3
I don’t approve of men and women sitting next
to one another in inter-city bus travel. 6 0 . 2 7 . 1 3 0 . 7 1 . 9
Selling of alcohol during the month of Ramadan
should be banned. 7 0 . 5 5 . 4 2 2 . 3 1 . 8
Religious guidance in state affairs and politics
is detrimental. 6 7 . 2 9 . 5 1 6 . 4 6 . 9
Work hours should be arranged according to Friday prayer. 6 6 . 4 7 . 5 2 2 . 2 3 . 9
Earning interest from money invested in banks is a sin. 6 2 . 6 6 . 1 2 8 . 1 3 . 2
Republican reforms have advanced this country. 7 7 . 3 9 . 0 8 . 3 5 . 4
Source: Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2000, p. 59) *Don’t know/No answer
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Mid dl e Ea st
B E T H  K A N G AS
Biomedicine’s ability to postpone death and prolong
life generates ethical dilemmas that are best an-
swered in their cultural context. Medical anthropo-
logical fieldwork conducted in Yemen1 has allowed
for an exploration of doctors’ and religious scholars’
responses to the interesting cross-cultural issue of
whether to inform patients of their terminal condi-
tions. This research is part of a larger study on
Yemeni patients and family members who leave their
country for reliable, high-tech medical care only
available abroad.
I n f o r m i n g
Terminally ill
P a t i e n t s
in YemenFor Yemen, international medical travel is
not limited to the wealthy and well connect-
ed. Nonetheless, economic disparity does
exist in terms of the ease with which certain
patients and companions can travel, the
medical conditions for which they seek
treatment, and their therapeutic destina-
tions. While families with abundant re-
sources are said to bypass local facilities for
even basic check-ups and minor complaints,
those with few resources often make large
sacrifices to provide a lifesaving cure for a
seriously ailing loved one. Bombay and
sanctioned Iraq offer the least expensive
care. Jordan and Egypt are more expensive
but also more popular. Germany provides
excellent care but at a high price. Britain and
particularly the United States are desired
destinations, but are accessible only to
high-level government officials or wealthy
b u s i n e s s m e n .
D i s c l o s u r e
Doctors in four governmental hospitals in
Yemen’s capital said they generally do not
inform their patients directly about their
condition, imparting the information to
family members instead. More specifically,
165 out of the 205 doctors (or 80%) said
they would not tell a patient if he/she were
almost certain to die within a short time.
Eighty-four per cent said in that in the same
situation they would indeed inform the fam-
ily. If the patient has a 50% chance of dying
shortly, almost 90% of the doctors said they
would not inform him/her, while 77% said
they would inform the family. The approxi-
mately 10% greater unlikelihood of inform-
ing either the patient or the family in the
case of a 50% chance of dying is probably
due to the possibility of a wrong prognosis,
which would unnecessarily upset the family
and hurt the doctor’s reputation.
In a follow-up question concerning what
occurs if the patient specifically asks about
his/her condition, the number of ‘yes’ and ‘it
depends’ responses increased in both the
‘almost certain’ and ‘50% chance of dying’
cases. Doctors said they would be more like-
ly to tell an inquiring patient if he/she
demonstrated the ability to understand the
disease and prognosis, or had complete
faith in fate and destiny. One doctor, how-
ever, said that in Yemen patients do not
usually ask, making the added survey ques-
tions somewhat hypothetical.
Doctors listed several common reasons
for not informing patients of their condi-
tion. First, learning about their fatal condi-
tion would harm patients psychologically,
which would contribute to their further
physical demise. Second, doctors explained,
life and death are in God’s hands and much
depends on a l - q a d a ' wa al-qadr – fate and
destiny – so there is always room for mira-
cles. Indeed, when reviewing an initial draft
of the survey, one doctor recommended to
change the original ‘a patient is almost cer-
tain to die within six months’ to ‘a patient is
almost certain to die within a short time’
since only God can specify a time. Moreover,
most patients come to the hospital at the
final stage of their illnesses, generally imply-
ing a prognosis for life expectancy much
shorter than six months. And finally, doctors
said that if terminally ill patients learned of
their condition, they would discontinue
treatment, leaving the doctors even more
ineffective than they would be otherwise.
Readers familiar with Middle Eastern soci-
eties will recognize a general preference for
not telling someone bad news outright, es-
pecially when the recipient lacks the neces-
sary social support to help him/her cope
with the distressing information. For exam-
ple, a Yemeni, Iraqi or Afghan living in the
United States whose father has just died
back in their home country might be first
told he is sick, then worsening, then close
to death, and then recently deceased. In-
forming the person is a gradual process,
whereas the death may actually have oc-
curred well over a year prior. In this way, the
person far from home is protected from
shock, or f i ja', believed to lead to ill health2
and from the desire to join the grieving
family when circumstances are not con-
ducive to this. If people are reluctant to tell
even healthy individuals disturbing news
for fear of its deleterious effect on their psy-
chological and physical well being, why
would they tell the patient, who is just
barely holding on to life as it is?
Doctors said that they generally tell the
patient: ‘Everything is fine. You are getting
better. I n s h a l l a h, you will recover soon.’
They then tell the family: ‘The patient’s con-
dition is very bad. You had better prepare
yourself for the worst.’ The family needs to
know, doctors said, so that the death does
not surprise them and so that they do not
blame the doctor instead of the disease.
Most family members, doctors said, are also
inclined not to inform the patient, although
they thought that a very few might prefer to
offer the patient a chance to repent for his
sins, return any entrusted items, and write a
will. Along with physicians, the family tries
to raise the patient’s morale by hiding the
truth and speaking only words of encour-
agement. Doctors’ opinions differed widely
on whether patients suspect the true nature
of their disease. Some said patients sense
the proximity of their death, particularly
from overheard conversations, looks of
worry and grief on their family members’
faces, and a lack of physical improvement.
Other doctors believed that patients never
know when they are about to die.
Treatment abroad
One clear indication that a patient’s condi-
tion is serious is the need to go abroad. Any-
one with a progressive life-threatening ill-
ness, such as cancer, heart conditions, or kid-
ney failure, cannot be treated in the country
and must pursue advanced medical care
elsewhere. Hearing they must go abroad
alerts patients to their condition. Doctors
were divided on the consequences of pa-
tients learning their diagnosis and prognosis
in a foreign country where disclosure prac-
tices might be different. Some maintained
that the news would be as devastating as in
Yemen. Others said patients would accept
reality when hearing it from a foreign doctor
whom they may tend to trust more than a
Yemeni one. Still others said patients could
cope with the news in an environment with
suitable medical capabilities, especially
when seeing their family’s efforts to care for
them by taking them abroad.
Two patients of the 71 Yemeni medical
travellers interviewed in Jordan and Bom-
bay stand out as not knowing the full extent
of their medical conditions. One whose can-
cer had spread throughout his body, pro-
ducing further complications as well,
praised the Jordanian doctor for all he had
done for him and for his vast improvement.
His young son inquired later, outside of his
father’s hearing range, if there were perhaps
other countries where a cure could be found
for his father, in Germany or anywhere else.
The other patient was a woman in Bombay
who cried about having to sell their house
to seek treatment. This interview was abbre-
viated as her son had previously requested
that no questions be asked about the partic-
ularities of her condition. That is the difficul-
ty inherent in research on patients’ perspec-
tives on disclosure of terminal illnesses. One
cannot very well ask: ‘So, what is it like to
have cancer and not know about it?’
Other Yemeni patients, particularly those
in one governmental hospital’s radiation
department in Jordan, said unhesitatingly
that they had cancer. Progressing through a
course of radiotherapy surrounded by their
compatriots also undergoing such treat-
ment no doubt sustained their hopes of re-
c o v e r y .
The most detailed religious opinion col-
lected on informing terminal patients, par-
ticularly in light of treatment abroad, came
from the deputy mufti, or n a ' i b a l - m u f t i. In
his written answers, a l -ca l l a m a Hamud cA b-
bas al-Mu'aid responded: ‘The doctor
should not frighten the patient. It is better
to tell him “I n s h a l l a h we hope for your re-
covery and health”, so he comforts him and
does not frighten him.’ Shaikh a l - M u ' a i d
then elaborated, drawing on religious texts
and practical experience:
‘It is from a l - s u n n a [the ways of the
Prophet] that a person gives the patient
good news so as not to frighten him. How
many very sick patients have received their
cure from Allah, and how many healthy peo-
ple has death taken suddenly? And how
many dead persons have come back to us
from London, or Germany, or India, or
Amman, where the patient had travelled for
a cure but only his corpse returned. This […]
matter is mentioned by our Almighty God:
“If Allah touch thee with affliction, none can
remove it but He” [wa an yamsuska allahu bi
durin fa la kashifa la hu illa huwwa]. Also,
“And when I am ill, it is He who cures me”
[wa idha muradtu fa huwwa shafini] . ’
As the doctors also indicated, it is God
who ultimately decides who lives and dies.
Informing patients of a terminal illness
could cause a shock that proves more detri-
mental than the disease itself. Doctors and
family members should reaffirm the possi-
bility of a cure rather than speak perhaps
unnecessary words of doom.
Answers to bio-ethical questions will sel-
dom be universal, given varying cultural
ideas of what constitutes a good life and
death. Approaches contradictory to one’s
own can appear inhumane, often rendering
cross-cultural debates unyielding. Most
Yemeni doctors spoken to were appalled to
hear that in the United States, doctors al-
most always tell patients their diagnosis and
prognosis. Also unsettling to them was the
fact that patients, usually visiting doctors on
their own, are then the ones to tell their
family about their grave illnesses. For some-
one already struggling with a serious dis-
ease, they said, this is unnecessary and
cruel. Examining practices in their sociocul-
tural context can help us in understanding
the ‘humaneness’ in others’ actions.
N o t e s
1 . In 1998, the author surveyed 205 doctors in four
governmental hospitals in S a n ' a, the capital of
Yemen, on whether they inform terminally ill
patients of their condition. All but 19 doctors were
from Yemen. Ten were from Iraq, five from Cuba,
and four from Egypt. Additionally, opinions were
solicited from nine religious scholars concerning
treatment abroad and advanced medical care in
general. These scholars ranged from the mufti to
heads of s h a r ica courts to s h a r ica law college
professors. In addition to fieldwork in Yemen,
Yemeni medical travellers in Bombay and Jordan
were interviewed.
2 . Cf. Swagman, Charles F. (1989), ‘Fija’: Fright and
Illness in Highland Yemen’, in Social Science and
M e d i c i n e 28 (4), pp. 381-388. See also Good, Byron
J. and Delvecchio Good, Mary-Jo (1982), ‘Toward
a Meaning Centred Analysis of Popular Illness
Categories: Fright Illness and Heart Distress in
Iran’, in Cultural Conceptions of Mental Health and
T h e r a p y, Marsella, Anthony J. and White,
G e o f f r e y M. (eds.), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 141-166.
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Mi ddl e Ea st
P E N E L O P E  L A R Z I L L I E R E
The latest Intifada has once again brought to the fore
all the national themes of resistance inherited from
the first Intifada. The same songs, the same poems and
the same symbols are used. The Palestinian television
constantly mingles images of the first Intifada with
those of the present uprising. Unlike the first Intifada,
however, there is no massive commitment on behalf
of the youth to the cause of the Intifada Al Aqsa. The
following is concerned with how the attitude of the
young Palestinians towards the national struggle has
evolved, which could explain the difference in their
level of commitment to the two uprisings.
The Intifadas and
the Palestinian
Y o u t h
The young stone-throwers are but a minori-
ty, most of them coming from the more dis-
advantaged sections of the refugee camps.
As for the groups fighting Israeli strong-
points, the majority come from youth move-
ments linked with Palestinian parties, and
mobilize a different kind of population:
namely people who were often more specif-
ically affected by the first Intifada. Still, in
that case as well, we cannot say that there is
a massive commitment.
The main difference now is that most
youngsters do not believe that the fight will
succeed in the short term, although they
think that it is a necessity. They adhere to
the nationalist themes which are leading
the present fight, because they think that
the construction of an independent state is
the only way to obtain their rights and en-
able the expression of Palestinian identity.
Most of them no longer believe in the possi-
bility of making this state come true
through short-term confrontation, which is
precisely the contrary of what the youth of
the first Intifada thought. Palestinians are
thus trapped by the contradiction between
their support for the principle of a fight for
independence and their scepticism as re-
gards how effective such an uprising is.
From national hope to
i n d i v i d u a l i s m
The evolution in the their way of thinking
stems from the extreme disappointment
which has grown among the youth from
1995 onwards, on account of the gap be-
tween what they fought for and the reality
of the current Palestinian Authority. At the
same time, opposition parties were not be-
lieved to have any constructive suggestions
for an alternative. Islamist parties alone
were able to take advantage of the situa-
tion. For all the (relative) scepticism which
prevailed regarding their strategy of con-
frontation, they alone were thought to be
taking up the gauntlet and defending Pales-
tine’s ‘lost honour’, when they decided to
continue the national struggle after the fail-
ure of the Intifada. Israel’s withdrawal from
Lebanon, being interpreted as Hizbullah’s
own victory, gave credibility to that feeling.
That analysis of the political situation led a
large part of the youth to bitterness and de-
spair since they could not see any way out
of an extremely difficult situation, unstable
and dangerous, with an economy in ruins.
They have tried to reconstruct their lives by
drastically lowering their hopes and con-
centrating on projects which they could
control and which would never be jeopar-
dized by an unstable and economically de-
graded situation. This self-restructuring cor-
responds to a will to find a field in which it is
possible to act without systematically being
alienated by an oppressive situation. So,
projects like beginning a family, studying
abroad if possible, or finding a job, have be-
come solutions. To a certain extent, these
are attempts to forget a political situation
that is increasingly restricting their horizons
with each day that goes by. This refocusing
is therefore made most of the time with a
certain degree of bitterness and appears
more as a last resort than as a real alterna-
tive, because it is built on failure and not on
a real sense of fulfilment. In short, the at-
tempt to reconstruct a small but indepen-
dent life for oneself is in contradiction with
the Intifada Al Aqsa.
This self-restructuring is challenged by
the present mobilization of nationalist
themes as the unique meaning of the Intifa-
da Al Aqsa. In fact, bringing again to the fore
the nationalist themes, coupled with the ac-
ceptance by some of the youth to sacrifice
their very lives for these principles strongly
discredits all attempts to initiate projects
which are not linked with the national strug-
gle. Anyhow, the serious degradation of the
political and economic situation has re-
duced their scope for these projects. For the
most disadvantaged Palestinians, such pro-
jects as finding employment or marriage are
impossible, simply out of reach.
Sacrificing oneself to the cause of the pre-
sent Intifada is mostly the choice of young-
sters from the latter category. This logic of
self-sacrifice makes it possible to solve the
contradiction between adhesion to the goal
of creating a State and scepticism about the
possibility of achieving that goal in the
short term.
The use of martyrdom
The shahid (martyr) actually produces two
about-turns. On the one hand, the s h a h i d r e-
moves the national struggle from a short-
term temporal frame and places it in a thou-
sand-year-old frame. This change in tempo-
rality enables a change in status, from that
of victim to that of fighter of a victorious
struggle, the Jihad, for which Israel is just a
passing event. The second about-turn is at
the personal level. A youth who accepts the
perspective of personal sacrifice is then able
to remove from his shoulders the burden of
conflict between adhesion to nationalism
and self-fulfilment since he transcends his
own story by associating it to the victorious
figure of the s h a h i d: my self-fulfilment will
come from the national struggle which for
sure has little chance of succeeding now,
but it does not matter since I am ready to
sacrifice myself for a goal which is above
and beyond me.
Such a commitment that enables them to
be involved in the logic of victory and no
longer in the logic of failure requires sacri-
ficing their history as an individual. This
choice made by a small minority of Palestin-
ian youths invalidates any attempts at self-
fulfilment through personal projects which
would mean abandoning the fight for the
superior objective of the national struggle.
This is why the decision to resume the fight
and accept the sacrifice made by a very
small minority of the youths is going to re-
duce the identity resources available. The
Palestinian field of identity resources is to
become more and more univocal. National-
ism tends to become both the sole way of
interpreting reality and the framework with-
in which actions must take place in order to
be socially legitimate.
This resumption of the fight will not
change the way the majority of the youths
view the possibilities of change. We can wit-
ness a cleavage between, on the one hand,
talk of unconditional backing for the strug-
gle, and on the other hand, a real commit-
ment. They do in fact think that the fight
must continue because the situation is un-
acceptable. They have waited long enough
and heard enough promises, which were
never kept. They also have the feeling that if
they stop now, they will lose everything. But
if they support the objectives of the fight,
they do not believe that throwing stones or
even shooting is effective. A growing f e e l-
ing is that martyrs have died for nothing. At
the most, only the attacks would seem to
them to be able to establish a real power re-
lationship. So the Palestinian youths who
are not getting involved in a logic of sacri-
fice are caught between a nationalist ideol-
ogy which they stand for and which is be-
coming the only source of legitimacy, and
their refusal to get involved in a fight which
is extremely costly in terms of lives and
which makes already hard living conditions
even harder. That is why they are searching
for alternative ways of keeping up the fight
such as boycotting Israeli products or mak-
ing international opinion aware through
means of the internet.
Still, that does not seem enough to them,
and this despair leads to the idea that either
they do not have competent leaders to guide
them to more efficient ways of resisting, or
that they are in a total deadlock because of
Israeli intransigence. That general feeling of
an impasse makes a large number of these
youths think about going abroad, especially
those who can afford it. It seems to them one
of the last few possibilities that remain, in
order to lead a normal life and to find more
acceptable living conditions – in short, be-
come the actors of their own story.
C r o s s r o a d
‘ C i t y Inn’ at
E l Bireh (suburb
of Ramallah) 
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The Islamic community of Romania is concentrated in
the Dobrudja, a southeastern province of Romania
lying between the Danube River and the Black Sea.
The community comprises an ethnic mosaic of Turks,
Tartars, Albanians and Gypsies.1 Muslim Gypsies
identify themselves as ‘Horahane Rroma’ – Horahane
meaning Turkish in the Rromani language. The Mus-
lim community accepts the Horahane Rroma as be-
longing to the Islamic religion, but otherwise does
not affiliate with them. The great majority of the Ro-
manian population rejects Horahane Rroma because
of their adherence to a religion different from the
‘national’ Orthodox Christianity. For the other Gyp-
sies, they are simply known as ‘Turks’.
The Muslim Gypsies
in Romania
The official number of the Rroma, or Gypsy,
population of Romania is still based upon
the 1992 census: 409,723 persons, or 1.8% of
the entire population. However, unofficial
estimates by Rromani associations amount
to approximately 2.5 million people. A very
small part of this Gypsy population (10,000-
15,000) is estimated to be Muslim, and is dis-
tributed over a dozen towns and villages.2
Because very few written records have sur-
vived little is known of the history of the
Muslim Gypsies in Dobrudja. It is thought
that they arrived in the area in the early 16t h
century as a s a n j a k (division) of a specific
category of Gypsies serving in the Ottoman
army. This hypothesis is sustained by the
Special Law for the Gypsies of Rumelia, pro-
mulgated by Sultan Suleiman the Great in
1530, and by the Law for the supervision of
the s a n j a k of Gypsies of 1541. Others may be
descendants of Gypsies that came from the
other territories to the Ottoman dominions
that embraced Islam. Muslim Gypsies in Do-
brudja have no written culture, but they
have a rich oral tradition, which includes
fairytales, legends, riddles, charms, and
songs. Unfortunately this tradition has been
recorded only sporadically thus far and it has
not been analysed at all. The study of these
cultural expressions would certainly lead to
a greater understanding of their history.
Ancestral beliefs and Islam
The Muslim Gypsies in Romania are Sun-
nites of the Hanafitic rite. Identifying Islam
with the Ottoman civilization, some of them
proclaim: ‘We are Muslims, so we believe in
the God of the Turks.’ The other Muslim in-
habitants of Dobrudja often stress that the
Gypsies do not have much knowledge of reli-
gion. They name them Allahsiz insanlar, God-
less people, because they do not live a mani-
fest religious life. They go to the mosque only
on the occasions of great Islamic festivals,
such as the Id al-Fitr and the Id al-Adha. Pejo-
rative allusions are sometimes made by other
Muslims of Dobrudja to the old dualist reli-
gion (Devla-God/Benga-Satan) of the Gypsies.
Generally Gypsies are capable of adapting,
at least superficially, to all sorts of circum-
stances while maintaining their identity. This
phenomenon may also be noticed at the level
of religion. In spite of their declared affiliation
to Islam, many of their ancestral religious rep-
resentations, beliefs and practices are still
present, such as belief in demons, totemism
and divination. Of interest is that the two Is-
lamic categories halal (allowed) and haram
(prohibited) have been superposed on two
categories of the ancestral culture of Gypsies,
namely ujo (pure) and melalo (impure). This
taboo system is regulated by rituals, such as
the use of charms, and not by resorting to Is-
lamic teachings.
Another illustrative example of the syn-
cretism that characterizes their worldview is
the annual Hirdelezi festival, an occasion on
which the dead are commemorated. This fes-
tival takes place on the 6 th of May and is cele-
brated by all the Muslims in Dobrudja. Fire
plays a central role for the Gypsies on this spe-
cial day. Fires are lit in front of their houses
and the members of the family jump over
them in order to purify themselves from sins
and liberate themselves from bad spirits. This
ritual is similar to the Newroz festival celebrat-
ed by Kurds, Iranians and others. The Hirdelezi
festival is sometimes called ‘Turkish Easter’,
because the Gypsies also light candles in their
houses.
Linguistic aspects
Name-giving among the Muslim Gypsies
reflects the pragmatic and eclectic ap-
proach of this small community living in a –
sometimes – hostile environment. Often
their names are a combination of a Turkish
(Islamic) name and a Romanian (sometimes
even Christian) name. For example, the
name of the b u l i b a s h a (community head) in
the town of Babadag is Recep Lupu, Lupu
being a name from the Romanian bestiary,
meaning wolf. The women in the communi-
ty have at least two names. For example,
one of the outstanding women in the com-
munity of Babadag is called Maria Rubie.
Depending on circumstances, some of
them declare themselves Romanians and
Christians, making use of the Romanian
name only, while at the other occasions
they proclaim themselves Turks and Mus-
lims, making use of the Turkish name.
Muslim Gypsies in Dobrudja present a
typical case of languages in contact. A num-
ber of languages – Horahane (a Rromani di-
alect), Turkish, and Romanian, as well as va-
rieties of these are widely used in everyday
interactions. The choice of using a particu-
lar language is governed by social factors.
For instance, the Horahane dialect is spo-
ken inside the community, especially by
women and children. The type of Turkish
used is linked to a whole spectrum of vari-
eties ranging from the Ottoman Turkish,
used for the invocation of God, to the
everyday Turkish variety spoken in the area.
A kind of pidgin Turkish is also used. Classi-
cal Arabic is used for the Islamic prayer ritu-
al, the n a m a z, and some religious expres-
sions derived from Arabic – but with a very
specific pronunciation – are part of their
spoken language. Romanian, the official
language, is normally spoken by the major-
ity of Gypsies.
A direct result of this situation is the ap-
pearance of the phenomenon of code-
switching, which is defined as the alternate
use of two or more languages in the same
sentence or in the same discourse.
Changing lifestyles
Muslim Gypsies, once nomads, used to
travel as artisans and seasonal labourers by
tilt wagons from village to village offering
their services, such as tinning kitchen dish-
es, in exchange for agricultural products or
for money. However, modern industries led
to a crisis of the traditional craft practised
by the Muslim Gypsies. Taking also into
consideration the forced sedentarization
policies of the communist authorities, their
entire way of life was changed. Without the
traditional skills they once had, nowadays
the Muslim Gypsies are seeking employ-
ment opportunities outside of their com-
munity. Attracted by the economic activi-
ties of the large cities, a considerable num-
ber of them migrated, usually settling in the
city outskirts as petty traders, domestic ser-
vants and day labourers. Their cities of pref-
erence are Constantza and Bucharest in Ro-
mania and Istanbul in Turkey. Those re-
maining in villages are also involved in
petty trade and domestic service. One can
often find them travelling with their mer-
chandise from one village to the other in
the area, by car or sometimes still by tradi-
tional tilt wagon.
The Muslim Gypsies can be said to still have
close-knit communities. The tradition of
‘Hanamic’ is a way to construct strong rela-
tionships between families: More powerful
than blood kinship, the parents vow, before
their children are born, that their offspring
will intermarry when they have reached the
proper age. As of yet, mixed marriages are
very rare. This may nonetheless change: It
seems that the Muslim Gypsies could lose
their distinct identity through assimilation.
However, through the strengthening of rela-
tions with the Muslim Gypsies in other parts
of southeastern Europe, especially in Bulgar-
ia and Turkey, a revival of their ethnic identi-
ty indeed belongs to the future possibilities.
The women and
children of the
b u l i b a s h a’s family
in Babadag
Cinema, Media and the Middle East: ‘The Maghreb’
Urgent Change:
The forthcoming conference on ‘Cinema, Media and the
Middle East’ has to be postponed due to unforeseen or-
ganizational circumstances. It will be held from 24 to 25
October 2001 at the Department of Film Studies on the
campus of the University of Mainz, Germany.
The interdisciplinary research network on ‘Cinema,
Media and the Middle East’ is organizing its third in-
ternational conference in Mainz from 24 to 25 Octo-
ber 2001. The conference will take place on the cam-
pus of the University of Mainz, which is located only
30 km from Frankfurt airport.
Papers, in German and English, will be given on var-
ious aspects of cinema and mass media representa-
tions of the Maghreb. Studies will cover film produc-
tion, cinematic depiction of the everyday and the un-
derlying political and economic structures of these
media images. In addition to the latter, studies will
also focus on gender, social class, culture and other is-
sues raised by various disciplines. The conference
aims to bring together scholars from different re-
search areas and media professionals. The conference
will be hosted by Prof. Anton Escher (Geography,
CERAW (Centre for Research on the Arab World)) and
Prof. Thomas Koebner (Film Studies).
In order to register for the conference, please contact the co-
organizer, Dipl.-Geogr. Stefan Zimmermann:
Centre for Research on the Arab World (CERAW)
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1 . See also Grigore, George (1999), ‘Muslims in
Romania’, ISIM Newsletter, 3.
2 . The towns of Babadag, Harsova, Constantza, and
Medgidia, and the villages of Cobadin, Negru-
Voda, Dobromir, Baneasa, Lespezi, Valeni, Castelu,
Mihail and Kogalniceanu.
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The wearing of headscarves by three Moroccan girls in
a French public school in the autumn of 1989 was con-
sidered an affaire d’état, debated up to the highest of-
ficial level. For most Dutchmen this turmoil was quite
amazing. In the Netherlands, earlier that same year,
echoes of the Rushdie case did lead to a heated debate,
which reached cabinet level. However, public polemics
on Islam soon settled down and henceforth the few
controversies over the wearing of headscarves in pub-
lic schools and other similar incidents were usually set-
tled quickly at the level of school or, in the worst cases,
municipal administrations. Since a year and a half ago,
however, a series of incidents seems to indicate that
something has changed in the Netherlands.
H e a d s c a r v e s ,
H o m o s e x u a l s ,
a n d I m a m s
in the Netherlands
The incidents began with the publication of
an essay by Paul Scheffer in the 29 January
2000 issue of the prestigious NRC Handels-
b l a d daily. In his text entitled ‘The Multicul-
tural Drama’, this Dutch publicist warned
that the integration of immigrants into
Dutch society was threatened with failure
and that the development of a class of so-
cially marginalized persons, mainly of immi-
grant origin, was imminent. In the ensuing
debate, from the observation that most
people concerned are Muslims to the con-
clusion that the problem is somehow relat-
ed to Islam was but a small step. Next, not
directly connected to Islam or even to Mus-
lims, but pertinent to the development of
Dutch public debate, came a discussion on
the attitude of registry officials who had
conscientious objections to the authoriza-
tion of marriages between persons of the
same sex. In November, an alderman of the
capital city publicly announced that he
would fire any civil servant refusing to apply
the new legislation. One month later, a dis-
cussion broke out when the principal of an
Amsterdam public school refused Muslim
pupils the use of an empty classroom, dur-
ing breaks, to perform the ritual prayer. A lit-
tle afterwards, Dutch media devoted much
attention to the cancellation of an opera en-
titled Aisha and the Women of Medina, after
Assia Djebar’s novel Loin de Médine, sched-
uled as one of the ‘intercultural’ perfor-
mances that would offer a special flavour to
Rotterdam as this year’s cultural capital of
Europe. The Moroccan artists had with-
drawn under the pressure of certain Muslim
circles that considered this play, staged
around one of Prophet Muhammad’s wives,
unacceptable. One of the local Muslim lead-
ers who, in a subsequent public debate, op-
posed the performance was Khalil El Moum-
ni, the Moroccan imam of the Al Nasr
mosque in Rotterdam. The declaration of
the editor-in-chief of the Dutch feminist
monthly O p z i j , that she would in no case ac-
cept a woman with a headscarf as an editor
of her magazine, aroused yet another public
debate. The refusal of an applicant of Turk-
ish origin for the position of assistant clerk
at the court of the city of Zwolle gave rise to
a larger debate, concentrating on the ques-
tion of whether, as a symbol, the headscarf
impaired the neutrality of the court.
The El Moumni case
The most recent incident originated with
the May 3rd broadcast of Nova, a popular tele-
vision programme offering almost daily back-
ground information on current news issues.
The attention of the Nova editors had been
drawn to the increasing harassment of homo-
sexuals by youths of Moroccan origin. They
asked Imam El Moumni for a comment. His
opposition to the violence of Moroccan
youngsters against homosexuals was not
transmitted. In a short statement that was
broadcast, El Moumni declared that homo-
sexuality was a dangerous illness that, if not
halted, might contaminate Dutch society as a
whole and thus lead to its extinction. These
words aroused a wave of indignation in wide
circles of homosexuals and defenders of their
rights. For well over a month, they were dis-
cussed in newspaper comments and letters
to the editors. Several persons and organiza-
tions lodged complaints against El Moumni
and other imams who had voiced similar
ideas in later newspaper interviews, accusing
them of defamation. The Public Prosecutor
began an investigation to determine whether
any penal offence had been committed.
Members of parliament commented on the
issue and some demanded El Moumni’s extra-
dition.
Apart from the proportions it took, this
most recent debate was interesting because
of the transformations the subject underwent
in a relatively short period. From the original
question, the harassment of homosexuals by
Moroccan youths, the topic shifted to the
opinion of imams, considered persons of
moral influence among the Muslim popula-
tion. Some even held the imams responsible
for the behaviour of Muslims. This became
clearer at the next stage of the issue, when
Imam El Moumni had fallen short of expecta-
tions and some considered his declaration of-
fensive to a component of the Dutch popula-
tion and indirectly inciting to violence. More
generally, the discussion turned to the inca-
pacity of the imams available so far in the
Netherlands – almost all of whom have been
trained abroad and practically ignore Dutch
society, its institutions, or even its language –
to play the prominent role many Dutch politi-
cians wish for them to play in the integration
process of the Muslim minorities in Dutch so-
ciety. Then the discussion turned to the place
of Islam and Muslims in general in Dutch soci-
ety. Finally, the discussion took an unexpect-
ed turn when prominent members of both
liberal parties, VVD and D’66, suggested that
the attitude of Muslims towards homosexual-
ity and the attitude of Christian political par-
ties with respect to this question and such
questions as euthanasia were similar. This
short metamorphosis of the debate was a re-
hearsal for next year’s general election cam-
paign and reveals the broader framework of
the issue.
One might begin the analysis of this frame -
work by a comparison with the 1989 Rushdie
case. Mainly because of its origins from vari-
ous countries, characterized by sharp politi-
cal, social, and ethnic divisions, the Muslim
community of the Netherlands is extremely
diversified and divided, and no particular or-
ganizations, institutions, or persons can be
considered as its representatives. As in 1989,
this circumstance has led to much confusion,
repeated misjudgement, and unwarranted
expectations among Dutch cabinet ministers,
journalists, and other participants in public
policy and debates. The excessive concentra-
tion on ethnicity in their analyses has only di -
minished slightly, their ignorance of Islam
hardly at all. The refusal to admit any role of
religion in public life has even spread wider.
This has to do with one of the main causes for
the fact that controversies relating to Islam
and Muslims have recently taken unprece-
dented proportions: the tendency of the
Dutch state and society to relinquish its tradi-
tional model of verzuiling and move towards
the French model of laicité.
Religion and the public sphere
Verzuiling, usually translated as ‘pillariza-
tion’, is the unique mechanism through
which, during the 19th and 20th centuries, var-
ious Dutch communities, such as the Protes-
tants, the Roman Catholics, and the labour
class of social-democratic conviction, each
through the development of their particular
cultural, labour, and political organizations as
well as their own educational institutions,
could achieve a respected place within the
Dutch society and state. Avoiding a detailed
historical, political, and philosophical discus-
sion of complicated concepts, the French no-
tion of laicité may be explained as the total
absence of religion in the public space, even
in the form of comparative studies respectful
of all denominations and non-religious world-
views in public schools. According to a num-
ber of authors, from a situation in which vari-
ous communities were sharing the public
space on the basis of respect for certain com-
mon rules and principles and diversity in
other matters, the Netherlands is moving to-
wards a society in which expressions of cul-
tural and particularly religious specificity are
banned from the public sphere. In a very ex-
treme form, the latter situation was defended
in a letter by a professor of women and law
studies on the Zwolle court case to the editor
of the daily newspaper Trouw, stating that
people should ‘live and indulge in their own
cultural identity during their own time off.’
A related tendency in contemporary Dutch
society is the development of a dominant cul-
ture and set of opinions, the adherents of
which, by imposing their version of tolerance,
leave no room for difference. It is they who
determine the standards of ‘political correct-
ness’ and the zeal of some of them reminds
one of ultra-French Jacobinism. James
Kennedy, historian, has described this trend
as the development of a liberal, secular, and
white majority culture, and Bas van der Vlies,
a Christian member of parliament, has spoken
of a ‘new state religion’. In the El Moumni
case, some of those who took offence at his
statement called for the repressive means of
prosecution and extradition. Recourse was
also had to curious arguments to defend fun-
damental liberties against the ideas of the
imam: reference was made to the fact that El
Moumni had been banned from preaching in
Hassan II’s Morocco and not only the French,
but even the Turkish state were mentioned as
examples worthy of being followed for their
attitude towards religion. It was even men-
tioned that the historical freedom of religion
guaranteed by the Dutch constitution had
only been intended for diverse Christian de-
nominations. Various others who do not
share El Moumni’s opinions, Muslims and
non-Muslims, rejected excessive reactions.
The growth of the Muslim population in the
Netherlands is reason for concern among var-
ious categories of inhabitants. Among them
are those groups within the political and so-
cial elite who were just rejoicing over the
gradual advance of laicité. Their attitude is a
fundamental factor in the recent debates
about Islam in the Netherlands, of which a
conflict between the constitutional rights of
freedom of religion and speech and a particu-
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South Ame ri c a
S C O T T  DA R R E L  M O R R I S O N
The following description of contemporary Muslim
worship in Sao Paulo, Brazil, is part of a larger inquiry
into the Syrian-Lebanese diaspora community of the
city. The research was conducted in June and August
2 0 0 0 .
Muslim Life 
in Sao Paulo
relevance to the Muslim world and to Mus-
lim participants in the Brazilian polity. It
deals with ‘human justice’ in Islam, with an
explanation of the concept of ‘consultation’
– presumably the article, written in Por-
tuguese, is referring to s h u r a – and its im-
portance in the protection of political liber-
ty, with quotations from Muhammad Abdu
and Rashid Ridda.
In the context of religious holidays and
devotional duties, the unity of the larger
whole of Muslims was exemplified by a re-
port on the Hajj with photographs overlook-
ing the Kaaba in Mecca. On the back cover
of the issue, Muslims gathered for prayer,
wearing white clothing and skull caps, in-
side of an unnamed mosque with the head-
line in Arabic: ‘The Hajj is a world Islamic
congress’. Back in Sao Paulo, for the celebra-
tion of the Feast of the Sacrifice, for which a
sheep was sacrificially slaughtered at the
Sultan Club, meals were served at various
mosques in the community.
Sunni and S h ici
Informants at the S h ici mosque reported
cordial relations with the Sunni mosques.
One informant, the president of the congre-
gation, said that he did not like to use such
categories at all, not only sectarian cate-
gories within Islam, but also the distinctions
between religions in general: Christianity
and Islam, for example. This was justified by
his view that such categories were divisive
and even harmful. The mosque offers Arabic
lessons for children, while m a d r a s as, s e p a-
rate from this mosque elsewhere in the city,
also offer Arabic instruction. Both the Sunni
mosques and the S h ici mosque include large
assembly halls for functions other than
prayer: ci d a l - f i t r, the Ramadan, the
Prophet’s birthday, marriages, parties and –
in the case of the S h ici mosque – the birth-
Of the eight mosques in Sao Paulo, all are
Sunni except for one Shici mosque. The S h ici
mosque, founded in 1983, located on Elisa
Whitaker Street in Bras, a commercial district
famous for its inexpensive clothing stores.
On the Muslim sabbath, a visit was paid to
the latter. The mosque is walled, and the
gated main entrance of the building is cov-
ered with marble. Featuring two bronze-
coloured minarets and an exposed orange
brick tower, the mosque is apparently under
construction. The Sunni mosques found in
the area of this S h ici edifice stand in sharp
contrast due to their angular, unadorned
c o n c r e t e .
The mosque houses a library with a collec-
tion of Arabic works on philosophy, eco-
nomics, religion, a collection of works trans-
lated into Portuguese (e.g. What is Islam?
a n d The History of Islam), and pamphlets
from Tawheed (a publishing house in
Teheran, Iran) concerning religious holi-
days, duties and doctrines, some of which
have Qur’anic verses in Arabic transcribed
into Roman characters. The S h ici m o s q u e
also distributes a bimonthly magazine, CU r u-
b a, the latest cover of which features a pho-
tograph of a line of men with hands crossed
at their bellies and bowed heads, praying in-
side another mosque – the Mosque of Brazil
(the actual sanctuary of which was closed
during the author’s visit, due to a flood at
the beginning of the year). Eight or ten
pages at the end of the magazine are writ-
ten in Arabic, but the remaining, larger por-
tion is in Portuguese. CU r u b a provides cov-
erage of recent events, such as the visit of
the Pope to Jerusalem, Israeli attacks on
Lebanon, and a story presenting ‘Our posi-
tion on the settlement’, which discusses the
status of negotiations with Israel. Doctrinal
treatises on Islam and politics appear with
days of the twelve imams, and ca s h u r a.
Women do not attend j u mca at the S h ici
mosque, and only a few could be seen in the
back of the Sunni mosque at the time of the
author’s visit.
Inside the sanctuary itself, the floor is cov-
ered with eight grey patterned rugs, upon
which was printed in English and Arabic: ‘To
Sao Paulo mosque from the Islamic Republic
of Iran’. At the cultural centre annexed to
the Mosque of Brazil, where prayer was tem-
porarily held, there is a surprising recurring
image, that of a kneeling camel. Around the
freshly painted white walls of the Shici
mosque are the names and birth dates of
the twelve imams (the people of the house –
ahl al-bait), and the s h a h a d a, all printed in
Farsi Arabic script. At the centre of the sanc-
tuary is a m i h r a b, with a rectangular tile de-
picting the ‘visit of Hussein’ (z i y a r a t a l - H u-
sein) next to it. There is also a podium with
pictures of the al-Aqsa Mosque and the
Great Mosque in Mecca. The windows at the
top of the rectangular dome and along the
walls are frosted white and green, diffusing
white light throughout the space, while a
breeze wafts in traffic noise from the open
front door. A bookshelf containing Qur’ans
donated by Saudi Arabia can be found
along with disassembled Qur’an stands.
Above, on a balcony railing, there is a large
painting depicting Karbala.
Ninety per cent of those who frequent the
S h ici mosque are Lebanese, with other con-
gregants in small numbers from around the
Arab world, including Syria, Libya, Iran, Jor-
dan, and Egypt. The Mosque of Brazil is
equally dominated by Lebanese adherents,
purportedly with few Syrians and Palestini-
ans. The number of Brazilian converts at the
S h ici mosque was approximately 30, the
Sunni mosque counting approximately 500
members. The main outreach programme of
the S h ici mosque was the three-month-old
‘Imam Hussein Project’ for distributing food,
clothing and toys, or other items donated to
the mosque, around the city.
Imam and shaykh
Newly arrived from Iran, an imam swept
in, dressed in a white cloth turban, a long,
brown outer cloak, and a grey vest. He wore
a beard and brown tinted glasses. The son
of the permanent imam, who was out of
town at the time, reported that the purpose
of the imam, in addition to his recitation and
sermon for j u mca, was to help the members
solve problems and to interpret Islamic law:
for example, to determine whether particu-
lar goods purchased in Brazil, a non-Muslim
country, were permissible. Sometimes there
would be no imam for a week or two. The
imam from Iran circulated with a charismat-
ic air, shaking hands and greeting the 25
men assembled by this time. He then read
from a prepared text.
The shaykh at the Mosque of Brazil was
from al-Azhar in Cairo and reported that all
of the shaykhs in the Sunni mosques of Sao
Paulo were Egyptians from al-Azhar. He at-
tributed this presence of al-Azhar shaykhs
to an outreach programme implemented by
Nasser. The shaykh recited the Qur’an with
the aid of a simple microphone for one
hour. A one-page summary of the text was
translated into Portuguese and distributed
prior to the service. The majority of the con-
gregants apparently could not follow the
sermon (although many did speak Arabic),
as they were unaccustomed to the Arabic of
the Qur’an.
At the S h ici mosque, after the imam spoke,
the worshippers prayed between four white
lines in the front of the room, before the
m i h r a b, while latecomers arrived unnoticed.
Most of the men, wearing socks or nothing
on their feet, after leaving their shoes in the
h a m m a m just behind the sanctuary, re-
moved their belts and picked up a plastic,
beige-coloured disk (m a s b a h) from a wood-
en box. After prayer, reverting to Por-
tuguese, the men talked and made plans.
The imam, now more casual and curious,
asked how long I had studied Arabic, and
where. He asked about religious studies in
the USA, whether it was called ‘theology’,
and whether there were religious universi-
ties. When I left, he was sitting in a pool of
sunlight, leaning against a column in the
s a n c t u a r y .
Scott Darrel Morrison is a Ph.D. candidate at
t h e Department of Political Science, Columbia
University, USA. His research focuses on
contemporary Arab-Muslim perspectives
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pression continue to create new waves of em-
igrants, including highly skilled groups, pro-
fessionals, investors and the youth.
Twenty years after the revolution, diasporas
have gained in importance and they impact
in diverse ways the political environment in
Iran. Some members of the exilic community
engage in political activisms aimed variously
at the reform or overthrow of the Islamic
regime. Moreover, members of the diaspora
influence the foreign policy of the countries
where they have become new citizens. Not
surprisingly, a struggle has ensued over the
control of the diaspora.
Iran’s policy of controlling the diaspora is
complex, diverse, and implemented through
the chain of embassies, consulates and all the
power that diplomacy and statehood bring
into play. Moreover, Tehran uses satellite
broadcasting; allows artists, film makers,
films, singers, and sport teams to travel
abroad; builds mosques and religious centres;
offers material rewards for those using these
services; and gathers information on exilic
communities.
The opposition in exile was quick to note
the shift in policy. Debates have been going
on about the extension of state repression to
the diaspora and how to confront it. Accord-
ing to one political trend, the Islamic regime
should not be allowed any space in the dias-
pora. This involves a boycott of its export
products, sports and art groups, and other in-
tellectual inroads into the exilic community. It
also dismisses return to the homeland, or en-
gaging in intellectual and publishing activi-
ties there.9 However, a large number of Irani-
ans who do not support the Islamic state
demonstrated strong attachment to their first
homeland when a soccer team visited Aus-
tralia, Canada and the U.S. in the late 1990s.
The visit of the pop singer Googoosh to Cana-
da and the U.S. in 2000 also rallied tens of
thousands of nostalgic audiences to her per-
formances. She had been denied the freedom
to perform in Iran since 1979.
The de-territorialization of a sizeable popu-
lation of Iranian dissidents has a far-reaching
impact on the political destinies of Iran.
Today, the struggle between the diaspora
and the Islamic state goes on everywhere – at
conferences and demonstrations, in print and
broadcast media, and on the internet. How-
ever, convergence of political interest be-
tween the two sides has developed in the
wake of the rise of ‘the reformist movement’
in and outside the government. Browsing
through the diaspora press, it is often difficult
to distinguish between the reformist trend in
Iran and in exile.
N o t e s
1 . These are quotations from the first part of a well-
known panegyric q a i s d a by Sa’di.
2 . Cited in Navid Azadi, ‘Gharib-e dar sarzamin-e
g h a r i b - e -h-a ’ (Strangers in the land of strangers),
S h a h r v a n d, Vol. 9, No. 452, 28 January 2000, p. 20.
3 . Canadian Almanac and Directory 2000, Toronto:
Micromedia, 1999, p. 1-48.
4 . Aryanpur-Kashani, A. and M. (1983), The Concise
Persian-English Dictionary, Tehran: Amir Kabir
P u b l i c a t i o n s .
5 .I b i d .
6 . The exact words, s -a l - e now-e m il -a d i r -a be co m u m - e
h a m v a t an -a n - e masih-i tabrik migu’im, can be
found in other papers (e.g. S -a y eb -a n, Vol. 1, No. 1,
January 1998, p. 2).
7 . See, for instance, Himani Banerjee (2000), The Dark
Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism,
Nationalism and Gender, Toronto: Canadian
Scholars’ Press.
8 . Navid Azadi, ibid. footnote 3 above.
9 . For a survey of the politics of return see, for
instance, Azadeh Sepehr, ‘Honar-e b-a z g a s h t va 
b -a z g a s h t - e honari’ (The art of return and the
artistic return), published first in Q -a s e d a k ( E u r o p e ) ,
reprinted in K -a r ik -a t o r, Toronto, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1997.
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I ISMM Re sea rc h P ro gr a mme
A G N È S  DE VI C TO R C o n t e m p o r a r y
Artistic Creation
in Societies of Islam
Several years ago, the West began to discov-
er Algerian rai music, the films directed by
Kiarostami, and the novels authored by
Mahfouz. However, other artistic sectors,
clearly less widespread, still remain little ap-
preciated. Research in the domains of social
science, sociology or the history of art are
making but minor advancements in the
field of contemporary art and in the phe-
nomena of creative production and dissem-
ination of works in the highly diversified po-
litical and cultural contexts of the Muslim
world. Organized by the IISMM, special one-
day seminars devoted to music, literature,
cinema, theatre, architecture, painting, the
plastic arts, and dance aim to explore the
dynamics at work and to reveal the rapport
between aesthetic modernity and tradition
that is inherited or re-appropriated in the
various Muslim societies.
The influence of Islam varies according to
national contexts and geographic zones,
but also according to the different aesthetic
supports. It is through the joint perspective
of specialists in the social sciences, those in
charge of institutions, and artists, that ques-
tions arise concerning the dynamism of
artistic creation, aesthetic and technical
modernity, and also the role of the state and
private actors (sponsorship, censure) in con-
temporary artistic creation in Muslim soci-
eties. The objective of the programme on
‘The contemporary artistic creation in Islam-
ic regions’ is to present an overview of con-
temporary works in the various Islamic re-
gions, so as to offer new insight into this
p h e n o m e n o n .
During a first meeting on 24 November
2000, the coordinators of the various one-
day seminars formulated the most salient is-
sues within contemporary artistic creation
in Muslim countries, thus inaugurating the
programme with ambitious research per-
spectives. Already, the relations that artistic
creation maintains with the West, with tra-
dition, and with Islam presented themselves
as determining factors in the different sys-
tems of creative production.
Hadj Miliani, professor of literature at the
University of Mostaganem, Algeria, in
charge of the one-day seminars devoted to
music and to theatre, encourages reflection
centred more on the modes of production
than on an aesthetic evaluation of the works
at hand, which leads to favouring the collec-
tive rather than the individual. With the
Maghreb as point of departure, he proposes
four axes of reflection: the definitions of ac-
tors within a culture, the various competing
registers and languages, the relations with
the outside (whether that be an Arab for-
eigner or a Westerner), and the rapport with
heritage, with cultural patrimony.
Sylviane Leprun, professor of plastic arts
at the University of Bordeaux demonstrates
that the nature of the relations between
African artists and the West is such that it is
as if the formers’ creative production could
not exist without reference to, or explicit
markers of, the latter.
Contemporary African plastic arts ap-
peared in the West with the Festival Mondi-
al des Arts Africains (World Festival of
African Arts) of 1966, indicating that Africa
was perceived as a monolithic bloc in terms
of creative production. Nonetheless, the
question of an identity-based art was al-
ready present and still underlies artistic cre-
ation today. Professor Leprun, specializing
in African arts, emphasizes the specificity of
‘installation’ art in Africa – a very dynamic
branch since the 1970s – characterized by
recuperation and re-use. The influence of
Islam is difficult to situate in African cul-
tures, since Western ethnography con-
tributed for almost a century to erasing the
traces. The remarkable use of calligraphy in
these installations is certainly the most
identifiable marker of Islamic influence on
African art that exists today.
Silvia Naef, professor of Islamology at the
University of Geneva, in charge of the semi-
nars devoted to contemporary painting and
to the work of gallery owners, also affirms
the influence of the Western variable on the
elaboration of a contemporary pictorial art
in Islamic regions. Modern art is, for the
Arab world in its entirety, a borrowed phe-
nomenon and corresponds to the theme,
developed in the 19t h century, of r a t t r a p a g e
c i v i l i s a t i o n n e l (civilizational catch-up). In
1951, with the Manifesto of the Bagdad
group, a decisive movement towards a
modern and authentic art was launched in
Iraq – a country that was to remain a leader
in terms of contemporary pictorial creation.
Silvia Naef analyses the strategies devel-
oped by these artists, whose approach con-
sisted in improving their knowledge of for-
eign countries and their local identity so as
to enter the international market. Pre-Islam-
ic and popular art was thus reinvested so as
to create an aesthetic that broke away from
tradition. The affirmation of a lay culture, in-
dispensable to modernity, is recognizable
by the absence of an Islamic referent. In the
1960s, abstract painting asserted itself, still
following the Western influence. But al-
ready the pan-Arab character can be detect-
ed by its recourse to calligraphy that tended
towards abstraction. The 1980s gave sanc-
tion to the Arab identity of these works, al-
beit without constituting a return to Islamic
art, while the last decade has been witness
to a vanishing of this identity-based charac-
teristic. The rattrapage civilisationnel has oc-
curred; the necessity of explicitly defining
an Arab identity has faded. Aesthetic forms
increasingly tend towards a hybridization of
i n f l u e n c e s .
The cinema
Agnès Devictor, researcher at the Institut
Politique in Aix-en-Provence, specialized in
Iranian cinema, is currently attempting to
inventorize the points of convergence
amongst the cinematographies of Islamic
countries and to open new venues of reflec-
tion with respect to the relationship be-
tween cinema, Islam and modernity.
One of the questions posed by cinema
touches upon its very existence: there are
regions that do not (or no longer) have na-
tional cinema productions, whether this be
for economic or technical reasons – or for
religious ones (as is the case in Taliban
Afghanistan, where cinema is forbidden
based on theological arguments). If there is
an inequality of the status of cinema and a
great variety in the dynamics of national
production, in those societies where cinema
does exist, it presents a certain number of
characteristics such as the way the body is
dealt with on screen and most notably
male-female relations.
Also interesting is the relationship be-
tween cinema and the representation of a
Muslim culture on screen. The Islamic Re-
public of Iran is, until present, the only
regime that has attempted to reform its na-
tional production so as to transform it into
an Islamic cinema. Since the 1979 Revolu-
tion, the cultural leaders have been striving
to establish a cinema competitive with that
of Hollywood, totally detached from any
Western references. The state implemented
a censorship that contributed to the cre-
ation of a new cinematographic language
and a new narrative style – the question of
whether a genuinely new aesthetic had
been born still remaining.
Aesthetic modernity, as found in the
works of the Egyptian film director Salah
Abu Saïf, or in the works of Abbas Kiarosta-
mi in Iran, distinguishes itself by its recourse
to new types of narratives, by a more am-
biguous rapport with reality and by a
greater freedom conferred to the audience
in the construction of the work.
As for technical modernity, reflection is
necessary both to analyse the reception of
new techniques in the production of images
and to isolate the registers of the intellectu-
al debates they evoke in the Muslim con-
text. The broadcasting of images on new
supports could comply with the lack of
movie theatres, or resolve the question of
prohibition of image consumption in
groups (as in Saudi Arabia).
Gilles Ladkany, lecturer at the Ecole Nor-
male Supérieure in Fontenay-aux-Roses,
surrounded by Arab writers, gives perspec-
tive to the links between the birth of mod-
ern Arabic literature and its relations with
the West. He investigates the correlation be-
tween the emergence of new themes with
an elaboration of new forms and genres of
l i t e r a t u r e .
Free verse, which appeared at the end of
the 1940s, followed by the poem in prose in
the 1960s, both carriers of literary moderni-
ty, provoked the most profound break
known to the Arabic language in fourteen
centuries by eliminating rhyme and metres.
This literary revolution was accompanied by
a political rupture in which the metaphor –
symbolic detour – occupies the field of
ideas and engagement.
The novel
The novel, new literary genre, from the
beginning of the 1960s confronts the most
severe taboos such as intimacy, sex, the re-
lationship with God, and the rapport with
the West. Fiction offered a view of daily life
and unveiled the troubles of society, pover-
ty and neuroses. Similar to Hadj Milani,
Gilles Ladkany made apparent the renova-
tion language had undergone by the claim
to plurilingualism in fiction.
For the coordinator of the seminar devot-
ed to architecture, Jean-Charles Depaule, di-
rector of research at the CNRS and specialist
in urban sociology and architecture, what
distinguishes architecture from other arts is
that it is part and parcel of daily life – it is
necessarily more frequented. With this ob-
servation, he opened three areas of reflec-
tion: the influence of architecture in the
elaboration of mental structures, the weight
of Islamic heritage, and the particular status
of architects in Islamic regions.
Architecture gives order to space. It con-
tributes to the structuring of the h a b i t u s, to
organizing a certain way of life, and to the
rapport with the ‘other’ within space. It
gives coherence to space and thus to social
relations. Not limiting itself to certain ele-
ments or landscapes, architecture is a veri-
table matrix of signs linked with a tradition.
Islamic heritage in contemporary architec-
ture is very present and the referent to Islam
remains an obligatory discourse. However,
as noted by Jean-Charles Depaule, the sta-
tus of the architect is far inferior to what it
was in France or in Renaissance Italy, never
occupying a central place in the capital.
This programme will produce a collective
publication prepared under the direction of
Jocelyne Dakhlia. The research axes and
problematics presented will be developed
and enriched by the confrontation of differ-
ent regions of interest (Maghreb, Machrek,
Black Africa, Central Asia, etc.) during the
one-day seminars on the different sectors of
contemporary creative production. Before
the end of 2002, a dozen scheduled gather-
ings will offer forums for debate amongst
artists and other creators, gallery owners,
museum directors and art critics.
For a schedule of seminars, please contact the IISMM.
See e-mail address below.
The vocation of the IISMM (Institut d’Etudes de l’Is-
lam et des Sociétés du Monde Musulman) is to make
the contemporary world of Islam known and to stim-
ulate the curiosity of a large audience while develop-
ing various high-level research programmes, the du-
ration of which ranges from two to four years. ‘La
création artistique contemporaine en pays d’Islam’
(The contemporary artistic creation in Islamic re-
gions), a programme run by Jocelyne Dakhlia, direc-
tor of studies at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sci-
ences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris, adheres to this per-
s p e c t i v e .
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E K K E H AR D  R U D O L P H
As Jamal Malik, initiator of the workshop,
pointed out, Islam is constantly being
shaped and constructed by Muslims as ac-
tors. This means that one has to deal with
controversial manifestations of Islam in Eu-
rope, a reality more or less neglected in the
public debate. The workshop emphasized
the notion of societies insofar as they are
able to set norms and to participate in the
hegemonic discourse. The workshop also
looked at Europe as a geo-political and cul-
tural space characterized by an ongoing dis-
cussion about its identity and its bound-
a r i e s .
Of the three panels, the first was devoted
to the process of institutionalization within
Muslim minorities in Europe. The second
panel paid attention to the interaction be-
tween Muslims and their societies of resi-
dence in the social, political and legal
spheres. In the third panel participants dis-
cussed the ways Muslims of different back-
grounds, generation and gender under-
stand, use and transform public spaces.
Ziauddin Sardar, British-Pakistani scholar
and critic (London), raised thought-provok-
ing questions. He stated that Muslims often
perceive their history to be somewhat
‘frozen in time’. Both Muslims and native Eu-
ropeans are dependent on such ‘frozen im-
ages’, which cause acute problems of identi-
ties. To him a solution would require synthe-
sis, meaning appreciation of the integral
role of Islam in the shaping of Europe’s past,
present and future; and acknowledgement
that Muslims must transcend their ‘frozen’
history and reformulate Islam as a contem-
porary global worldview. The development
of a new Muslim identity then is intimately
connected to the development of a new Eu-
ropean identity.
Ataullah Siddiqui (Islamic Foundation,
Leicester) also pointed to the identity prob-
lem when analysing the situation of the
Muslim youth in Britain. According to him,
Europe has a large number of ‘Muslims with-
out Islam’, which belong to a silent majority.
This was contrasted to the media’s mostly
‘noisy picture of Islam’.
Some participants highlighted the am-
bivalent role of written tradition in the com-
munity-building process. P.S. van Kon-
ingsveld (Leiden University) emphasized
the value of texts distributed, for example,
in a great number of Muslim periodicals. He
proposed that these sources should be pre-
served and analysed in the framework of a
European research project.
Stefano Allievi (University of Padova)
pointed to the role of global networks and
New York) asked whether pluralism offered
a means for common agreement on cultur-
al, political and religious values within Euro-
pean societies or whether we are unable to
move beyond shallow civility. Mathias Rohe
(University of Erlangen) dealt with the issue
of adjusting the s h a r ica to the situation of
Muslim believers in a non-Muslim context.
Finally, Valérie Amiraux (European Universi-
ty Institute, Florence) reminded the partici-
pants of the inconvenient but necessary
task of a critical evaluation of scientific pro-
d u c t i o n .
One of the results of the workshop in Er-
furt is the awareness that concepts such as
diversity or pluralism of cultures do not suf-
ficiently meet the concern and self-under-
standing of Muslim minorities in their inter-
action with majority societies in Europe. In
the course of the debate it became clear
that ‘transnationality’ or ‘translocality’ offer
more suitable conceptual frames for future
inter-cultural studies.
Ekkehard Rudolph is assistant professor at the Chair
of Islamic Studies, University of Erfurt, Germany.
E-mail: ekkehard.rudolph@uni-erfurt.de
mass media to demonstrate that new com-
munication technology helps create new
transnational Muslim communities.
Gerdien Jonker (Philipps University Mar-
burg), whose research was based on the Is-
lamic Cultural Centres in Europe (Süleyman-
cilar), demonstrated the ability of an influ-
ential Turkish-Muslim organization to find a
successful balance between continuity and
change in its religious ideas and structures.
Günter Seufert (Istanbul Institute of the Ger-
man Oriental Society) dealt with the Turkish
state’s reactions to institutionalized Islam in
the European Union. Pnina Werbner (Keele
University) spoke on Sufi networks in
Britain, based on empirical research in the
area of Manchester which underlined the
flexibility and transnational perspectives of
British-Pakistani immigrants in the UK.
Referring to the influence of satellite TV
on Muslim immigrants in Sweden, Anne-
Sofie Roald (University of Malmö) showed
the ambivalent relationship of Muslim com-
munities to their countries of residence. She
questioned whether media consumption
had an integrating or segregating effect.
Paul Weller (University of Derby), in his
contribution on the prestigious Discrimina-
tion project supported by the British Home
Office, explained that Britain’s state law
against religious discrimination is highly de-
bated. Jocelyne Cesari (Columbia University,
Muslim Minorities
and European
I d e n t i t i e s
Muslim minorities, having been part of European so-
cieties for generations, are currently going through a
profound process of transformation and differentia-
tion. At the same time Europe is confronted with the
rapid process of political and economic integration,
which raises urgent questions on the state of cultural
and social cohesion. In this context the role of Mus-
lim immigrants within outwardly secular-defined so-
cieties is increasingly reflected in public as well as in
academic discourse. The international workshop on
‘Muslim Minority Societies in Europe’, convened
from 2-3 March 2001 at the University of Erfurt, was
inspired by this dynamic European debate.
Bo o k P re senta ti o n
AR M A N D O  S A L VA T O R E
Muslim Traditions and Modern Techniques of Power,
Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam deals with histori-
cal and contemporary articulations of the relation of
tension between the civilizing impetus of Muslim
traditions, and modern forms, fields and techniques
of power. These techniques are associated with the
process of state-building, as well as with the related
constraints of disciplining, normative cohesion, con-
trol of the territory and monitored social differentia-
tion. 
Yearbook of
t h e S o c i o l o g y
o f I s l a m
The entry point into the investigation is the
following question: Is there any method to
conceive of Muslim traditions in sociological
terms, while at the same time avoiding to
reduce traditions – as Western sociology
mostly does – to either cultural residues of
the social contexts where modernization
did not work out well enough, or to ‘local re-
sources’ for modernization strategies? A
third option (or a culturalist variant of the
second) that has acquired currency in re-
cent years is to see Muslim traditions as a le-
gitimate locus of authenticity within global
m o d e r n i t y .
The fourteen contributions to this volume
basically discard all three options. They con-
ceptualize Muslim traditions as deriving
their legitimacy, authority, as well as norma-
tive and organizing power from being em-
bedded in Islamic discourses and institu-
tions, which constitute one major centre
within world history, by now also encom-
passing Muslim communities within West-
ern societies. The specific context of the
analysis of Muslim traditions is given by the
transformations associated with the dissolu-
tion of the Ottoman Empire and the forma-
tion of modern nation-states, as well as with
the new conflicts taking place in Europe due
to the presence and rooting of migrant
communities of Muslim faith.
Though the approach adopted might ap-
pear at first sight as a move toward re-es-
sentializing Islam, it turns out to be exactly
the opposite. While analysing the multiple
workings of Muslim traditions, the authors
of the volume operate a shift of focus from
the Islam that is the object of a reifying ‘hy-
perdiscourse’ engaging both Western au-
thors and media and their Muslim counter-
parts, to Muslims as individuals, devotees,
and citizens. While they are committed to
various forms of Islamic faith and ‘culture’,
they are also involved with local, national
and global networks and institutions. It is
shown that Islam – through Muslims, their
practices, and discourses – is entangled in a
world of multiple commitments, loyalties
and conflicts, yet as a discursive tradition it
is able to keep some autonomy from social
constraints and structures. It is also able to
engage projects of reform of the discourse
itself as well as of the normative models of
self and of community. Therefore, moderni-
ty impacts Islam not as a ‘rival tradition’, but
as a set of techniques of power which affect
the authority and regulating-disciplining
impetus of Muslim traditions.
Salvatore, Armando (ed.) (2001), Muslim Traditions
and Modern Techniques of Power, Yearbook of
t h e Sociology of Islam, 3, Hamburg: Lit Verlag;
N e w Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
ISBN 3-8258-4801-9
General editors: Helmut Buchholt and Georg Stauth
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I IS  Semi na r  Ser ie s
A M Y N  B .  S A JO O R e v i s i t i n g
t h e M u s l i m
P u b l i c S p h e r e
At the inaugural seminar in this series last
November, Professor Mohammed Arkoun
asked about the relevance of discussing civil
society in contexts where ‘intellectual
modernity’ remains at best a Western im-
port – quite aside from the creeping pace of
democratization. Again, Dr Shirin Akiner
wondered in her January presentation
whether states freshly emerged from civil
war and Soviet rule – like Tajikistan – have
the luxury of discoursing on civic culture
amidst new threats of religious radicalism
and social decay.
One response to such scepticism, by Dr
Olivier Roy in February, was to observe that
‘networks of solidarity’ are a pervasive fea-
ture of the new Central Asia – the more so
because of the weakness of formal state
structures. Whether derived from clan/vil-
lage traditions (as with mahalla or neigh-
bourhood groups) or from Soviet economic
planning (as with k o l k h o z or farm collec-
tives), these networks show the way ahead
for fostering genuine civic engagement in
these non-Western settings. Indeed, Roy ar-
gues that Western policy-makers and their
local interlocutors ignore such indigenous
networks at their peril, in favour of trendy
new institutions of private enterprise and
l a w .
In a different context, Dr Iftikhar Malik
noted in his March seminar that the disrup-
tion of traditional networks as well as the
thwarting of new ones in South Asia – which
would empower civil society actors like
women and minority groups – stems from
the ‘modern’ assaults of colonial domi-
nance, militarism and fundamentalism. In
other words, the notion that civil society is
strictly a contemporary phenomenon that
challenges narrow ‘primordial’ bonds not
based on common citizenship1 is contested.
Indeed, as IIS director Professor Azim Nanji
noted in his subsequent talk on ‘the Good
Society’, the ethical dimension of civic cul-
ture has premodern roots – which under-
scores the need to synthesize tradition and
modernity in fostering democratic legitima-
c y .
Perhaps nowhere is that need more con-
spicuous than in the discourses on gender
in post-revolutionary Iran, the subject of Dr
Ziba Mir-Hosseini’s session in June. In her
now-famous interviews with a broad spec-
trum of Iranian clerics and intellectuals, as
well as in her films that bring those discus-
sions alive to publics abroad, Mir-Hosseini
has shown that for many urban women and
even for an influential modernist thinker
like Abdolkarim Soroush, ‘tradition’ can be
empowering. This is especially so in drawing
upon sacred texts and the corpus of f i q h ( j u-
risprudence) as legitimating claims of equi-
ty – even as ethical critiques are applied to
readings of those sources.
However, to the extent that civil society is
about the public sphere where (after Haber-
mas) ‘citizens want to have an influence on
institutionalised opinion- and will-forma-
t i o n ’ ,2 Mir-Hosseini argued that the con-
straints on feminist expression through
magazines and other media are acute even
in the ‘liberalizing’ Iran of President Mo-
hammed Khatami. This was reinforced by
the glimpse into the private sphere offered
by an excerpt from her latest film, R u n a w a y,
in which the gap between personal aspira-
tion and social reality seemed as oppressive
as ever for a younger generation of reform-
minded Iranian women.
Also at the June session, Professor Abdou
Filali-Ansari (on the Maghreb) and Dr No-
rani Othman (on Southeast Asia) drew at-
tention to the waxing and waning of ‘au-
tonomous’ civic culture in the shadows of
authoritarianism, often condoned by the
prospect of fundamentalist encroachment
– real or imagined. The correlation between
the strength of civil society and that of the
state also remains contested: both may be
weak (Indonesia, Egypt, Algeria, even
Turkey), or both may be robust (Canada, the
Netherlands, Sweden, United States). In-
deed, Filali-Ansari was inclined to question
whether the concept of civil society can
usefully capture the complexities of partic-
ular cultural and historical contexts, or
whether it is too arbitrary in the manifold
uses to which it is put.
What’s in a square?
In any case, from issues of equal treat-
ment under the law to democratic account-
ability and access to political power, there is
more to the quest for civic engagement
than can be captured by easy normative di-
chotomies that tend to dominate debates
about civil society. For some, this may re-
flect the fragmented mess of postmod-
ernism that is our shared reality – magnified
in a public sphere dominated by ‘new
media’, fuelling what Gary Bunt calls the
‘digital umma’.3 For others, it may seem like
the empire striking back, as postcolonial
publics find their voices to re-appropriate
the most basic elements of democratic dis-
c o u r s e .
But whether postmodern or postcolonial,
an aspect of this reality that Muslims are
obliged to confront is: What kind of public
space is civil society to be located in? If it
must be secular, as many observers insist,
then what would be the nature of secularity
in a milieu whose religious tradition actively
merges d i n , duniya a n d d a w l a (faith, world
and state)? Muslim societies offer contrast-
ing, and internally contested, responses to
the nexus between secular/religious space
and the prospects for civil society.4
Certainly this is an issue that the presen-
ters in the IIS series must grapple with in
grounding the idea of civic culture, and in
appraising actual socio-political realities.
In a pluri-cultural and multivocal Muslim
universe, the seminars seek to interrogate
the concept of civil society in terms of its im-
plications for polities and public squares
where tradition and modernity, secular and
sacred, are very much at the forefront of
quotidian experience.
Yet, no matter what the specific perspec-
tives in a given Muslim context, civic dis-
course will likely reflect ethical values that
draw far more explicitly on ‘Islam’ than any
comparable experience one can invoke in a
Western society v i s - à - v i s J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n
ethics. There is nothing inherently nativist
about this notion: on the contrary, an array
of Muslim activists and intellectuals have
drawn attention to its pluralist and human-
ist impulses.5 Moreover, ethical norms are
all the more critical in transitional societies
and civic contexts where the rule of law is
f r a g i l e .
N o t e s
1 . As claimed notably by Ernest Gellner (1994),
Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals,
London. Cf. Ellis Goldberg’s imaginative probing
into rich veins of civic culture in pre-modern Islam:
‘Private Goods, Public Wrongs, and Civil Society in
Some Medieval Arab Theory and Practice’, in
Goldberg, Ellis (1993) Kasaba, Resat and Migdal,
Joel S. (eds.), Rules and Rights in the Middle East,
London, p. 248.
2 . Habermas, Jurgen (1996), Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law
and Democracy, trans. William Rehg, Cambridge,
UK, p. 367.
3 . Bunt, Gary (2000), Virtually Islamic, Cardiff, p. 17.
4 . See, inter alia, Filali-Ansari, Abdou (1996), ‘The
Challenge of Secularisation’, Journal of Democracy,
76; and Arkoun, Mohammed (1994), R e t h i n k i n g
I s l a m, Oxford, esp. at pp. 18-26.
5 . See generally Cooper, John, Ronald Nettler and
Mahmoud, Mohamed (eds.) (1998), Islam a n d
Modernity: Muslim Intellectuals Respond, L o n d o n ;
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (1995), ‘Civil Society and
Prospects for Democratisation in the Arab World’,
Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 1, Leiden, pp.
27-54; and Sajoo, Amyn B. (1995), ‘The Islamic
ethos and the spirit of humanism’, I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, New York, p.
5 7 9 .
Readers are invited to view highlights of this series –
including a forthcoming session on Turkey by Prof.
Ersin Kalaycioglu – on the Institute’s website:
w w w . i i s . a c . u k
’Civil Society in Comparative Muslim Contexts’ is an
ambitious series of seminars hosted by the Institute
of Ismaili Studies (IIS) in London, with leading schol-
ars exploring issues ranging from human rights and
engaged citizenship to the interplay of ethics, law,
culture and information technology. The series will
culminate in a volume of essays in 2002, aimed at
contributing to a vital discourse in and about transi-
tional societies as diverse as Tajikistan, Pakistan,
Iran, Turkey, Morocco, Indonesia and Malaysia.
A p p o i n t m e n t
Chair  of Paleography




The Board of Directors of Leiden University decided on 1 June
2001 to create a new chair for Paleography and Codicology of
the Islamic World (Handschriftenkunde van de islamitische
wereld). Dr Jan Just Witkam was appointed as its first holder.
Jan Just Witkam (born in Leiden, 1945) studied Arabic, Persian
and Middle Eastern History at Leiden University from 1964 to
1972, and attended the University of Teheran in 1970. Since
1974 he has been a curator at the Leiden University Library, and
since 1980 he is the curator of Oriental Collections. In 1989 he
obtained his Ph.D. in Leiden with a thesis on the life and work of
the Egyptian physician and encyclopaedist, Ibn al-Akfani
( d . 1348). From 1991 to 1998 he served as president of Melcom
International, the European Association of Middle East Librari-
ans. The prestigious title of ‘Interpres Legati Warneriani’ was
conferred to him in 1992. Prof. Witkam has taught Middle East-
ern paleography and codicology for over 20 years, using the Is-
lamic manuscript treasures of the Leiden Library as illustrative
objects for his students.
Among Prof. Witkam’s best known publications in book form
are the final volume of A.J. Wensinck’s Concordance et Indices de
la Tradition Musulmane (Leiden 1988, with W. Raven); S e v e n
Specimens of Arabic Manuscripts (Leiden 1978); and the C a t a-
logue of Arabic Manuscripts (ongoing project, since 1982). In
1998 he was co-author of the Catalogue of Malay Manuscripts
(with E. Wieringa). He published several volumes in the series,
Manuscripta Indonesica, of which he is a co-founder. In 1986 he
founded the international journal, Manuscripts of the Middle
E a s t. He also serves on the editorial boards of Codices Manuscrip-
t i, a series of manuscript catalogues, and of Kleine Publicaties, a
series of exhibition catalogues, both published by Leiden Uni-
versity Library. Presently he conducts research on the tech-
niques and approaches of Muslim scholars, and more specifical-
ly he is working on the analysis of readers’ protocols (i j a z a t,
s a m aca t) in Arabic manuscripts.
Dr Amyn B. Sajoo is a visiting fellow at the IIS,
coordinator of the civil society series, and editor of
the forthcoming volume of essays stemming from
the series.
E-mail: asajoo@iis.ac.uk
M o h a m m e d
Arkoun and Azim
Nanji at the IIS
s e m i n a r .
T H E  N E T H E R L A N D S




Tel: +31 10 270 7172
Fax: +31 10 270 7182
E - m a i l : m e d i a t h e e k @
w e r e l d m u s e u m . r o t t e r d a m . n l
▲ Ali Omar Ermes, ‘The Seventh
Ode’, 1993, 250 x 225 cm, acrylic
and ink on paper, fixed on canvas.
6 July 2001 – 24 March 2002
• Contemporary work by 12 artists se-
lected by Egee Art Consultancy, Lon-
don. Contemporary Arab artists are
flourishing in Europe as well as the
Arab world. This exhibitions presents
a brief overview of twelve of the best
from Morocco to Iraq. They have all
exhibited prolifically and interna-
tionally, many with careers spanning
20 years or more.
C o n t i n u i n g




2517 HV The Hague
Tel: +31 70 338 1111 / 365 8985
U R L : w w w . g e m e e n t e m u s e u m . n l
C o n t i n u i n g
• Islamic crafts. The renewed exhibi-
tion from its own collection, in p a r-
ticular ceramics; other objects illus-
trating Islamic art.
Rijksmuseum voor
V o l k e n k u n d e
Steenstraat 1
2312 BS Leiden
Tel: +31 71 516 8800
Fax: +31 71 512 8437
U R L : w w w . r m v . n l
27 April – 30 September 2001
• ’Through Afghanistan on the Royal En-
field – Photos by Jeroen Nooter’. On his
way from India to the Netherlands on
a 40-year-old Royal Enfield motorcycle,
Jeroen Nooter finds himself in Pakistan
and is faced with the decision of
whether to follow a dangerous route
through Pakistan or to continue
straight ahead through unpredictable
Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan he
finds the local population extremely
curious and friendly. That very
evening, in the restaurant where he
will also sleep amongst 50 Afghans,
the many people who want talk to him
are dispersed by the Taliban.
M u s i c
RasaNetwerk Non-Western
M u s i c
Pauwstraat 13a
3512 TG Utrecht
Tel: + 31 30 2330123
Fax: + 31 30 2330122
E - m a i l : r a s a @ r a s a . n l
U R L : w w w . r a s a . n l
Throughout 2001
• Music from Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey,
and Morocco. Concerts are organized
in a number of cities in the Nether-
lands and Belgium. Programme to
b e obtained from Rasa.
F R A N C E
E x h i b i t i o n s
Institut du Monde Arabe
1, Rue des Fosses St. Bernard
75236 Paris
Tel: +33 1 40 51 39 60/ 33 1 0
U R L : w w w . i m a r a b . o r g
22 October 2001 – 10 March 2002
• ’The Orient of Saladin during the time
of crusade’. The exhibition shows the
history of the artistic and cultural de-
velopment of the Ayyubids and the
different contributions of the Fa-
timids, Seljuqs and Zangids; military
architecture from the citadels of
Cairo, Aleppo and Damascus as well
as the architecture of science. More
than 250 objects mainly from Egypt-
ian and Syrian collections.
G E R M A N Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
Museum of Islamic Art
Museuminsel, Berlin-Mitte
Tel: +49 30 2090 5401
C o n t i n u i n g
• This continuing exhibition is dedicat-
ed to the art of Islamic peoples from
the 8t h to the 19t h century. The works
of art originate from an area stretch-
ing from Spain to India.
Ethnologisches Museum
Lansstrasse 8, Berlin-Dahlem
28 September 2001 – 3 March 2002
• With pack and sack: The Nomads of
Iran and their textile art.
Linden-Museum Stuttgart
Hegelplatz 1, 70174 Stuttgart
Tel: +49 711 202 23
U R L : w w w . l i n d e n m u s e u m . d e
14 July 2001 – 27 January 2002
• Afghanistan – Tree of Life and
Kalashinikov: more than 20 years of
war, civil war, displacement of peo-
ple, and the Taliban’s iconociasm
have led to immense losses of cultur-
al treasures. At the same time, the
brutalities of war have inspired a
new form of popular art. Baluch and
Turkmen tribal women and those
from other western Afghan groups
weave carpets that depict automatic
guns, tanks, helicopters and other
motifs. The exhibition exemplifies im-
portant periods of the region’s cul-
ture since the bronze age and dis-
plays a selection of war carpets from
a private German collection.
Rautenstrauch-Joest Mu-
s e u m
Ubierring 45, 50678 Köln
Tel: +49 221 – 33 694 13
Fax: +49 221 – 33 694 10
U R L : w w w . m u s e e n k o e l n . d e / R j m
13 December 2001 – 
29 September 2002
• Fascination Orient, Max von Oppen-
heim, scientist, collector and diplomat.
Jubilee exhibition celebrating the
1 0 0t h anniversary of the museum.
Museum fur Islamische
Fliesen und Keramik
W e s t e r h o f - K l i n i k
Olaf-Gulbranson strasse 19
83684 Tegernsee
Tel: + 49 8022 1810
C o n t i n u i n g
• Dr Theodor Sehmer collected, since
the 1950s, Islamic Ceramic, in partic-
ular tiles from Turkey, Iran and Iraq.
Some 300 pieces of this very interest-
ing collection dating from the 10t h –
1 9t h century are to be admired at the




Tel: + 49 30 226 796 16
Fax: +49 30 226 796 18
U R L : w w w . i f a . d e
17 August – 14 October 2001




Tel: +49 711 2225 173
Fax: +49 711 2225 194
U R L : w w w . i f a . d e
30 November 2001 – 
13 January 2002
• So Near and yet so Far Away: 
New Palestinian Art.
I R A N
E x h i b i t i o n s
Tehran Museum of Con-
temporary Art
T e h r a n
21 July – 4 October 2001
• The First Iranian Conceptual Art Exhi-
bition. This event showcases works
created with novel elements, media
and tools of conceptual expression.
The exhibition and the side line semi-
nar aim to encourage artists toward
new artistic novelties by utilisation of
the latest modes of innovation and
expression in art.
8 October – 7 November 2001
• The Fifth Tehran Cartoon Biennial.
‘Immigration’ is the theme for the
cartoonists’ top works, which will be
judged by a jury comprised of Iranian
and international members. Portrait
caricature comprises part of this ex-
hibition. A related seminar is to be
conducted by prominent Iranian and
non-Iranian artists.
11 November 2001 – 
10 January 2002
• Three Modernist Iranian Pioneers –
Nasser Ovaisi, Hossein Zandehroudi,
Massoud Arabshahi. The tendency
toward national ideals and identity
along with the use of traditional
Iranian motifs are prominent fea-
tures in works of Iranian artists dur-
ing the 1940s and 1950s. The cre-
ations of these three artists are an in-
dication of a praiseworthy effort to
establish ‘national painting’ emanat-
ing from Iranian identity by way of
modern modes of artistic expression.
Islamic Period Museum
T e h r a n
C o n t i n u i n g
• Continuing exhibition of Qur’anic
manuscripts, ceramics, metalwork
and textiles.
J O R D A N
E x h i b i t i o n s
Darat al Funun
P.O. Box 910406
A m m a n
Tel: +962 6 4643251/2
Fax: +962 6 4643253
E - m a i l : D a r a t f @ a r a b b a n k . c o m . j o
U R L : w w w . d a r a t a l f u n u n . o r g . /
September and October 2001
• Traditional costumes from Jordan
and Palestine: the private collection
of Widad Kawar.
November and December 2001
• Centenary of the late Turkish-Jordan-
ian artist Fahrelnissa Zeit (1901-2001).
M A L A Y S I A





Tel: +60 3 2274 2020
C o n t i n u i n g
• Collections of local and international
Islamic art objects. The museum
holds local and international-orient-
ed exhibitions at regular intervals.
R U S S I A
E x h i b i t i o n s
The State Hermitage Mu-
s e u m
St Petersburg
Tel: +812 110 9079 / 96 25
Fax: +812 312 1550
U R L : w w w . h e r m i t a g e . r u
C o n t i n u i n g
• Art of the Near East is represented in
the museum by an excellent collec-
tion covering the 7t h to 19t h c e n t u r i e s
which includes several exquisite mas-
t e r p i e c e s .
T U R K E Y
E x h i b i t i o n s
The Museum of Turkish
and Islamic Art
I s t a n b u l
C o n t i n u i n g
• Exhibition of Ottoman and Islamic
Art, Folk Art and Folk Life
U N I T E D  K I N G D O M
E x h i b i t i o n s




Tel: +44 171 412 71 11
Fax: 44 171 3238614/8480
U R L : w w w . t h e b r i t i s h m u s e u m . a c . u k
18 May – 2 September 2001
• ’Jewelled Arts of India in the Age of
the Mughals’ – a spectacular exhibi-
tion which celebrates the jewelled
arts. The exhibition will leas with 300
pieces of Indian jewellery dating
from the reigns of the Great Mughals
who ruled India from the mid-16th to
the early 18t h c e n t u r y .
Hermitage Rooms at Som-
erset House
S t r a n d
L o n d o n
Tel: +44 20 784 54 630
25 November 2000 – 
23 September 2001
• ’Treasures of Catherine the Great’,
among which are beautiful examples
of art from the Islamic World.
Egee Art Gallery
9 Chelsea Manor Studios
Flood Street
London SW3 5SR
Tel: 44 171 351 68 18
Fax: 44 171 376 85 10
U R L : w w w . e g e e a r t . c o m
C o n t i n u i n g
• Arabic Calligraphy 2000 – The Saudi
Show. Presentation of a breathtaking-
ly beautiful and diverse collection of
contemporary calligraphy. Contempo-
rary and antique Middle Eastern art.
A u c t i o n s
C h r i s t i e ’ s
L o n d o n
U R L : w w w . c h r i s t i e s . c o m
King Street
• 16 October 2001 – Islamic Art
South Kensington
• 19 October 2001 – Islamic and Indian
Costume and Textiles
S o t h e b y ’ s
L o n d o n
U R L : w w w . s o t h e b y s . c o m
• 18 October 2001 – Islamic and Orien-
tal Art
U N I T E D  S T A T E S
E x h i b i t i o n s
Harvard University Art
M u s e u m s
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Tel: + 1 617 495 9400
U R L : w w w . a r t m u s e u m s . h a r v a r d . e d u
7 July – 30 December 2001
• The Sensuous and the Sublime: Rep-
resentations of Love in the Arts of the
Middle East and Southern Asia. This
exhibition presents many facets of
love, sacred and profane, as ex-
pressed in the artwork of Iran, India,
Tibet and Nepal, produced from the




20 – 29 September 2001
• Annual Heritage Festival: exhibition of
20 miniatures of Dr Hashim Al-Tawil.
Indianapolis Museum of Art
1200 West 38t h S t r e e t
Indianapolis, Indiana 46208-4196
Tel: +1 317 923 4788
Fax: +1 317 931 1978
23 September 2001 – 
13 January 2002
• Gifts to the Tsars, 1500-1700; Trea-
sures from the Kremlin. Gold, silver
and silver-gilt objects, jewels, pre-
cious textiles, icons, parade arms and
armour, and ceremonial horse trap-
pings are featured in this exhibition.
All of the crafted and beautiful ob-
jects are drawn from the collection of
the armoury; many objects never be-
fore shown outside of Russia.
Nance Museum
Lone Jack, Missouri
P e r m a n e n t
• Saudi Bedouin Jewelry displays more
than 100 pieces donated recently by
Lewis Hatch and Marie Kukuk, which
has doubled the collection of the mu-
s e u m .
Brooklyn Museum of Art
200 Eastern Parkway
Brooklyn, NY 11238
Tel: +1 718 638 5000
Fax: + 1 718 638 3731
U R L : w w w . b r o o k l y n a r t . o r g
C o n t i n u i n g
• The Arts of Asia. The Asian collection
contains some of the most compre-
hensive and diverse holdings in the
New York metropolitan area. The col-
lection of art from Iran’s Qajar dy-
nasty (1790s to 1924) is the only seri-
ous collection of its kind on display in
A m e r i c a .
Metropolitan Museum
o f A r t
1000 Fifth Avenue at 82n d S t r e e t
New York, New York 10028
Tel: +212 535-7710
11 September – 30 December 2001
• Along the Nile: Photographs of Egypt
1850-1870. This installation of approx-
imately forty-five 19th-century pho-
tographs of Egypt will include some of
the earliest camera images of Egypt’s
dramatic landscapes, exotic inhabi-
tants, and imposing monuments.
2 October – 13 January 2002
• Glass of the Sultans. On display will
be a selection of approximately 150
of the most spectacular glass objects
from the Islamic period, ranging
from products inspired by the late
antique tradition in the 7t h century to
1 9t h-century Persian and Indian
glass. Also included will be European
glass made for the Oriental market or
directly inspired by Islamic glass, dat-
ing from the 13t h to the 20t h c e n t u r y ,
as well as a selection of high-quality
glass found at archaeological sites.
The Arthur M. Sackler




Tel: +1 202 357 4880
U R L : w w w . a s i a . s i . e d u / e x h i b i t i o n s
16 December 2001 – 5 May 2002
• Paradise Unspoiled: Paintings and
Drawings from Iran and India. From
the late 15t h century, artists in Iran
and later in India created indepen-
dent drawings and paintings that no
longer corresponded to a specific
text. The images were often com-
bined with the finest examples of cal-
ligraphy in lavishly prepared albums
(muraqqa) whose beauty was de-
scribed as rivalling that of an un-
spoiled paradise. This exhibition of
some 30 works includes several
works by the most celebrated painter
of this genre, Riza Abbasi, and of
other notable artists active in 16t h-
and 17t h-century Iran and India.
Through 10 March 2002
• ’Storage Jars of Asia’: based on the
Freer’s rich but rarely-exhibited col-
lection of large storage vessels, this
exhibition presents a selection of the
biggest and boldest jars made in
China, Japan, Korea, Thailand,
Burma, Iran and Syria between the
second millennium B.C. and the 16t h
century and have never before been
exhibited together.
L o n g t e r m
• ’Fountains of Light’. Islamic Metal-
work from the Nuhad Es-Said Collec-
tion. This collection – arguably the
finest private collection of Islamic
metalwork – consists of 27 inlaid
brass, bronze and steel objects dat-
ing from the 10t h to the 19t h c e n t u r y
C o n t i n u i n g
• ’Arts of the Islamic World’. Some 60
works – Qur’an pages, metalwork,
ceramics, glass, paintings, and callig-
raphy – from the 9t h to 17t h c e n t u r y
explore Islamic artistic traditions.
Themes include the forms and func-
tions of the works of art, the role of
calligraphy, the use of figurative dec-
oration, and the meaning of abstract
d e s i g n s .
C o n t i n u i n g
• ’Luxury Arts of the Silk Route Empires’:
In these two galleries connecting the
Freer Gallery of Art and the Arthur M.
Sackler Gallery, examples of metal-
work and ceramics from the collec-
tions of each museum illustrate the
effect of multicultural interaction on
the arts of the first millennium A.D.
Ornaments, bowls, cups, bottles, jars,
mirrors, ewers, and ritual objects in
gold, silver or silver and gilt, earthen-
ware, or porcelain from Iran, China,
Turkey, Syria, and Afghanistan are in-
cluded in this exhibition.
Info Pages3 8 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  8 / 0 1
Art & Culture Agenda
The Agenda is produced by
t h e Centre of Islamic Culture in
Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Please send all information
with regard to activities
related to culture and art in
the Islamic World to:
The Centre of Islamic Culture
and Art, 
P.O. Box 361,
3 0 0 0 AJ Rotterdam,
T h eN e t h e r l a n d s
Fax: +31 10 270 7182
E-mail: sikc@wereldmuseum.
r o t t e r d a m . n l
▲ Laila Shawa,
‘Two Words: Liberation’,
1994, 38 x 58 cm,
photo lithograph.









Date: 29-30 September 2001
V e n u e: Oxford
C o n t a c t: Gina Burrows
Institute of Social and Cultural
Anthropology (ISCA)
University of Oxford, UK
T e l : +44 1865 274 687
F a x: +44 1865 274 630




p a t r i m o n i a l i s a t i o n
D a t e: 2-6 October 2001
C o n t a c t: Abderrahim Kassou or 
Pascal Garret
Centre Jacques Berque pour les
études en sciences humaines et
s o c i a l e s
1, rue Annaba
10 000 Rabat, Morocco
T e l : +212 37 769640 / 769641
F a x: +212 37 768939
E - m a i l: cjbavm@maghrebnet.com
U R L: www.ambafrance-
m a . o r g / c j b / a v m / s e d . h t m l
24th Annual Third World
Studies Conference:
‘Globalization vs
R e g i o n a l i s m ’
D a t e: 4-6 October 2001
V e n u e: Omaha, Nebraska
Sponsored by: University of Nebraska
at Omaha and the University of
Nebraska Medical Centre
C o n t a c t: Stephanie Cannon, Third
World Studies Conference
C o o r d i n a t o r
University of Nebraska at Omaha
International Studies and
Programs, ASH 241
Omaha, Nebraska 68102-0536, USA
T e l : 402 554-2293
F a x: 402 554-2949
E - m a i l: Thirdworld@unomaha.edu
U R L: www.unomaha.edu/~twsc
Le prospetive Europe di
apertura all’Europa
orientale e ai paesi del
M e d i t e r r a n e o
D a t e: 11-13 October 2001
V e n u e: Ravenna, Italy




Strada Maggiori 45, Bologna, Italy
T e l : +39 51 2092500
E - m a i l: gusgozzi@spbo.unibo.it
Cinema, Media and the Middle East –
the Maghreb
D a t e: 24-25 October 2001
V e n u e: University of Mainz
Hosted by: Anton Escher and Thomas
K o e b n e r
C o n t a c t: Stefan Zimmerman
Centre for Research on the Arab
World (CERAW)
Institute of Geography, University
of Mainz
55099 Mainz, Germany
T e l : +49 6131 3924494
F a x : +49 6131 3924736
E - m a i l :
S . Z i m m e r m a n n @ g e o . u n i - m a i n z . d e
Al-Ghazali’s Legacy: Its
Contemporary Relevance
D a t e: 24-27 October 2001
V e n u e: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Sponsored by: International Institute
of Islamic Thought and C i v i l i z a t i o n
( I S T A C )
C o n t a c t: The Secretariat of Al-Ghazali
Conference, ISTAC
205A Jalan Damansara
50480 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
T e l : +603 254 4444, ext. 243
F a x: +603 254 8343
E - m a i l: fsistac@po.jaring.my
U R L: www.ghazaliconf.com




D a t e: 25-28 October 2001
V e n u e: Lund
C o n t a c t: Nordic Society for Middle
Eastern Studies
Centre for Middle Eastern Studies
University of Bergen
5020 Bergen, Norway
F a x: +47 555 898 91
E - m a i l: knut.vikor@smi.uib.no
U R L: www.hf.uib.no/smi/nsm/
n o r d c o n f . h t m l
w w w . h i s t . l u . s e / h i s t / m i d d l e e a s t /
m i d d l e _ e a s t . h t m
3 0t h Annual Conference
o f the Association of
Muslim Social Scientists
Annual Conference:
Religion and Public Life
i n the Global Epoch
D a t e: 26-28 October 2001
V e n u e: Dearborn, Michigan
Sponsored by: Muslims in the
American Public Square Project
(MAPS) and the University of
M i c h i g a n - D e a r b o r n
C o n t a c t: Layla Sein, AMSS
P.O. Box 669
Herndon, VA 20172, USA
T e l : +1 703 471 1133, ext. 120
F a x: +1 703 471 3922
E - m a i l: coordinator@amss.net
U R L: www.amss.net
Arab Voices in the
D i a s p o r a
D a t e: 17-18 November 2001
V e n u e: Center for Mediterranean
Studies, Department of Arabic and
Middle Eastern Studies, University
of Leeds
C o n t a c t: Rhiannon Daniels
Centre for Mediterranean Studies
Michael Sadler Building, University
of Leeds
Leeds LS2 9JT, UK
T e l : +44 113 233 3569
F a x: +44 113 233 3568
E - m a i l: cmdtr@leeds.ac.uk
3 5t h Middle East Studies
Association (MESA)
D a t e: 17-20 November 2001
V e n u e: San Francisco
C o n t a c t: MESA
University of Arizona
1643 East Helen Street
Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA
T e l : +1 520 621 5850
F a x: +1 520 626 9095
E - m a i l: mesana@u.arizona.edu
U R L: www.mesa.arizona.edu
Annual Meeting American
Academy of Religion (AAR)
D a t e: 17-20 November 2001
V e n u e: Denver, Colorado
C o n t a ct: AAR
825 Houston Mill Rd. NE
Atlanta, GA 30329-4246, USA
T e l : +1 404 727 3049
F a x: +1 404 727 7959
E - m a i l: aar@aarweb.org




in the Middle East
‘Learning from Regional
Experiences & Building
P a r t n e r s h i p s ’
D a t e: 24-30 November 2001
V e n u e: Amman
Sponsored by: Jordan University of
Science and Technology (JUST),
The Council for British Research in
the Levant (CBRL), Darat al Funun
of The Abdul Hamid Shoman
F o u n d a t i o n
C o n t a c t: Rami Farouk Daher
P.O. Box 402
Amman 11118, Jordan
E - m a i l: radaher5@just.edu.jo
t u r a t h @ j o i n n e t . c o m . j o
6t h I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Metropolis Conference
D a t e: 26-30 November 2001
V e n u e: Rotterdam, The Netherlands





T e l : +31 10 414 9779
F a x: +31 10 413 5022
E - m a i l: s.minten@mpi-rotterdam.nl
U R L:




t e r r i t o r i e s
Date: 29 November – 1 December 2001
V e n u e: Napoli, Italy
C o n t a c t: Segretaria de SeSaMo
c/o Dip. Di studio sullo Stato
Via Laura, 48
50121 Firenze, Italy
T e l : +39 55 2757 073
F a x: +39 55 2345 486
E - m a i l: sesamo@unifi.it
Anthropology in
t h e Middle East:
G e n d e r e d P e r s p e c t i v e s
Date: 30 November – 2 December 2001
V e n u e: Berlin, Germany
C o n t a c t: Anja Peleikis
Centre for Modern Oriental Studies
Kirchweg 33
14129 Berlin, Germany
T e l : +49 30 803 070 / 803 072 31
F a x: +49 30 803 072 10
E - m a i l: anja.peleikis@rz.hu-berlin.de
3r d Mediterranean Social
and Political Research
M e e t i n g
D a t e: 24-25 March 2002
V e n u e: Florence, Italy
F a x: +39 055 468 5770
E - m a i l: medmeet@iue.it
U R L: www.iue.it/RSC/MED/meeting




D a t e: 5-6 April 2002
V e n u e: UCLA, Los Angeles, USA
C o n t a c t: Edward A. Alpers
Department of History UCLA
Los Angeles, CA 90095 1473, USA
T e l : +1 310 825 2347
F a x: +1 310 206 9630
E - m a i l: alpers@history.ucla.edu
1s t World Congress for
Middle Eastern Studies
D a t e: 11-14 September 2002
V e n u e: Centre for Research on the
Arab World (CERAW)
C o n t a c t: Prof. Günter Meyer





T e l : +49 61 31 392 2701
F a x: +49 61 31 392 4736
E - m a i l: davo@geo.uni-mainz.de
U R L: http://www.geo.uni-mainz.de/
d a v o
Academic Meetings
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
Amir Hassanpour
Homeland and Hostland: 
Iranian Press in Canada
1
I S I M






‘The Production of Islamic







‘Islam, Women’s Rights and
I s l a m i c F e m i n i s m ’
4
Workshop Report: ‘Family, State, and




and Identities in Africa’
5
Books: ‘Islamic Literature in Tanzania
and Kenya’
6
F E A T U R E S
Sophie Bava
The Mouride Dahira between Marseille
a n dT o u b a
7
Gerdien Jonker
Connecting Muslim Knowledge to




On the Way to Public Recognition?
9
A R T  &  L I TE R A T UR E
Mohamed Abusabib




’Mughal Mania’ under Zia ul-Haq
1 1
Reina Lewis
Cross-cultural Dressing in the Late Ottoman
E m p i r e
1 2
Pervaiz Nazir
Modernity, Re-Islamization and Waris Shah’s
H e e r
1 3
G E N E R A L  I S S U E S
Anh Nga Longva
Apostasy and the Liberal Predicament
1 4
M E D I A
Najib Ghadbian
Al-Jazeera’s Coverage of Syrian Politics
1 5
T. Deniz Erkmen
Construction of Satanism in Turkish
Secularist and Islamist Newspapers
1 6
Matthias Brückner
IslamiCity: Creating an Islamic Cybersociety
1 7
H I S T O R I C A L  A P P R O A C H E S
Charles Hirschkind
Tradition, Myth, and Historical Fact





I N T E L L E C T U A L  D E B A T E S
Armando Salvatore




New ‘Revival of Religious Sciences’
2 1
Amr Hamzawy
al-Manar al-Jadid: Changes in
t h e Contemporary Islamist Discourse
2 2
R E G I O N A L  I S S UE S
Peter Gottschalk
The Problem of Defining Islam in Arampur
2 3
Francis Robinson
The cUlama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic
C u l t u r e
2 4
Rehana Ghadially
Women Pilgrims: Boons and Bonds
i n a n Ismaili Sect
2 5
Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh
Brotherhoods and Gender Relations
i n M a u r i t a n i a
2 6
Mohammed Hamdouni Alami
The Fiction of Architectural Identity
i n Contemporary Morocco
2 7
Tair Faradov
Religiosity in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: 
A Sociological Survey
2 8
Ali Ç a r koğ l u
Religion and Public Policy in Turkey
2 9
Beth Kangas
Informing Terminally ill Patients in Yemen
3 0
Penelope Larzilliere
The Intifadas and the Palestinian Youth
3 1
Ana Oprisan and George Grigore
The Muslim Gypsies in Romania
3 2
Johan Meuleman
Headscarves, Homosexuals, and Imams
i n the Netherlands
3 3
Scott Darrel Morrison
Muslim Life in Sao Paulo
3 4
R E S E A R C H
Agnes Devictor
Contemporary Artistic Creation
in Societies of Islam
3 5
M I S C E L L A N E O U S  
Mareike Jule Winkelmann
The Construction of Female Identity
i n Muslim Modernity
4
Ekkehard Rudolph
Muslim Minorities and European Identities
3 6
Armando Salvatore
Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam
3 6
Amyn B. Sajoo
Revisiting the Muslim Public Sphere
3 7
I N F O  P A G E S
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ISIM Events
Summer Academy: 
The Production of Islamic Knowledge
In cooperation with the Working Group Modernity
and Islam
Date: 3-14 September 2001
Venue: YILDIZ Technical University Istanbul, Turkey
Lecture Series: The Production
o f Islamic Knowledge in Western
Europe: The State of the Art
• Fatwas for Europe: A Survey of Studies and
S o u r c e-M a t e r i a l s
Sjoerd van Koningsveld (Leiden University,
F a c u l t y of Theology)
D a t e: 3 October 2001
V e n u e: Utrecht
• What Do We Really Know about Muslims in Europe?
Islamic Voices and Academic Ears
Stefano Allievi (University of Padova, Faculty of
Sciences of Communication)
D a t e: 24 October 2001
V e n u e: Utrecht
• Connecting Islamic Knowledge: How German
Muslims Produce for German Schools
Gerdien Jonker (Philipps University, Marburg,
Faculty of Social Science and Philosophy)
D a t e: 14 November 2001
V e n u e: Utrecht
Workshop: The Application of
I s l a m i c Law in Muslim Courts
In conjunction with Cornell University
D a t e: 26-28 October 2001
V e n u e: Leiden
Seminar Series: Key Texts in
t h e Anthropology of Islamic Law
D a t e: 2 November – 7 December 2001 (Fridays)
V e n u e: Leiden
Workshop: Islam, Women’s Rights
and Islamic Feminism:
M a k i n g Connections between
Different Perspectives
D a t e : 9-11 November 2001
ISIM Annual Lecture
Piety and Persuasion in the Modern Islamic World
by Barbara Metcalf (University of California, Berkeley)
D a t e : 23 November 2001, 16.00
V e n u e : Agnietenkapel, Amsterdam
Conference: Religion, Media
& t h e Public Sphere
Organized with the Research Centre Religion
& Society, University of Amsterdam
D a t e: 6-8 December 2001
V e n u e: University of Amsterdam
For more information on these and other ISIM Events:
ISIM Secretariat
Tel: +31 71 5277905
Fax: +31 71 5277906
E-mail: i s i m @ l e t . l e i d e n u n i v . n l
Url: h t t p : / / w w w .i s i m . n l / i s i m / a c t i v i t i e s
The International Institute for
t h e Study of Islam in the Modern
World (ISIM) promotes and conducts
interdisciplinary research on
contemporary social and intellectual
trends and movements in Muslim
societies and communities. 
